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ABSTRACT 
Background 
Iniluenza is a disease of global significance, including in tropical regions where it 
spreads throughout the year. Understanding the spread and impact of influenza in the 
tropics is therefore important for preparedness planning. While there are numerous 
pharmaceutical and public health measures that attempt to reduce the spread and 
impact of influenza, few conclusive epidemiological studies are available to document 
their effectiveness. Scientific evidence is especially lacking for pandemic 
preparedness and response measures due to the rarity of pandemics. Singapore, a 
globally-connected, tropical Asian city-state, provides an excellent platform to 
determine the spread and impact of influenza in the tropics, and the effectiveness of 
public health measures in reducing the impact. 
Aims 
This thesis aims to detail the impact of epidemic and pandemic influenza in 
Singapore, and to assess the effectiveness of various assessment and response 
measures in Singapore during the 2009 I l l N l influenza pandemic. 
Results 
Influenza epidemics and pandemics were the likely cause of most excess mortality 
periods in Singapore from 1950 to 2000. Good surveillance is therefore important to 
detect epidemics for appropriate response. During the 2009 H l N l influenza epidemic 
in Singapore, different methods for estimating influenza infection rates provided 
comparable findings if accurate input parameters were used. There are advantages and 
disadvantages to each method, and multiple methods should be used where possible 
for cross validation. One such method, a seroepidemiology cohort study, showed a 
13% seroconversion rate in adults in the community and lower rates among hospital 
workers, suggesting that most of the population remained susceptible and required 
further protection. A surveillance program in the Singapore military during the peri-
pandemic period showed the different clinical presentation of influenza compared to 
non-intluenza cases, and introduced a clinical diagnostic model to help predict 
influenza among febrile respiratory illness cases for management. 
The possible effectiveness of combination strategies in reducing the impact of 
influenza was shown via a systematic review of mathematical modeling studies. It 
provides new evidence for the effectiveness of different strategies to reduce the spread 
of influenza in the military setting. One study showed that influenza vaccination may 
confer cross protection to other H l N l strains, and previous exposure to pre-1957 
H l N l strains may confer some protection against the 2009 H l N l strain. Another 
study showed the effectiveness of post-exposure ring prophylaxis with oseltamivir, 
together with prompt outbreak detection and isolation, as a containment strategy to 
reduce influenza spread. In the same setting, cessation of post-exposure prophylaxis 
did not result in subsequent disproportionate increase in infection rates, and 
asymptomatic infections occurred which may confer additional protection against 
future infection. While prophylaxis failures occurred, none were due to mutations that 
conferred resistance. Another study documented that public health measures such as 
enhanced surveillance with isolation, segregation and social distancing, and wearing 
personal protective equipment limited transmission of influenza. 
Conclusions 
This thesis provides substantial contribution to the existing knowledge on influenza, it 
is important for public health professionals and decision makers to learn from the 
findings, and to use them as a platform for policy making. 
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Geometric mean titers (the aritiimetic mean of the logarithmic 
titers obtained from the laboratory test) 
Haemagglutinin (a surface protein on the inlluenza virus) 
Haemagglutination inhibition (ability of antibodies to prevent 
the agglutination of red blood cells by virus antigens by 
forming antibody-antigen complexes) 
International Committee of Medical journal Editors 
Intluenza-like illness (group of illnesses that have fever, and 
respiratory symptoms such as cough and sore throat) 
Likelihood ratio (likelihood of a result occurring in one group 
compared to the likelihood of the result in another group) 
Madin-Darby Canine Kidney (cell lines grown from the kidney 
tissue of an adult canine) 
Neuraminidase (a surface protein on the influenza virus) 
Negative predictive value (proportion of test subjects with a 
negative test result who are correctly identified as negative) 
Reverse transcription polymerase-chain reaction 
Positive predictive value (proportion of test subjects with a 
positive test result who are correctly identified as positive) 
Basic reproductive number (the average number of secondary 
cases produced by a primary case) 
Ribonucleic acid 
Severe acute respiratory syndrome 
World Health Organization 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Influenza is a respiratory disease that causes annual seasonal epidemics with 
substantial disease burden globally. In addition, once in every few decades pandemics 
occur which result in devastating health and socio-economic consequences globally. 
A substantial proportion of the world's population is affected each year by seasonal 
epidemic influenza, and this proportion may increase with pandemic influenza. Due to 
the propensity for the influenza virus to mutate, populations are constantly at risk of 
seasonal influenza epidemics, and are almost completely susceptible to novel 
pandemic strains as they emerge. The current global socio-cultural landscape 
promotes the close interaction between humans, birds which are the natural hosts of 
all known influenza subtypes, and animals which can harbor both avian and human 
strains of influenza. This results in the unique opportunity for the re-assortment and 
emergence of new influenza strains which threaten to spread across the world. 
Influenza is well recognized as a disease of significance in temperate regions due to 
the clear seasonal peaks in winter. In temperate countries, seasonal influenza 
epidemics occur during the winter season with influenza activity increasing high 
above baseline levels for six to eight weeks as a single peak, while baseline influenza 
activity remains relatively low throughout the rest of the year (1). Influenza in tropical 
regions, on the other hand, lacks well-defined seasons and spreads throughout the year 
with a high baseline incidence and frequently more than one epidemic peak annually 
(2). Studies in sub-tropical Hong Kong and tropical Singapore have shown that the 
mortality and morbidity due to influenza is of similar magnitude compared to 
temperate countries (3-6). It is therefore important for public health practitioners and 
policy makers to understand how influenza epidemics and pandemics spread in 
tropical regions. 
In addition, there are numerous pharmaceutical and public health measures that have 
been used in an attempt to reduce the spread and impact of influenza. While there has 
been evidence of the effectiveness of some of these measures, sufficient direct 
scientific evidence is lacking for most, especially for proposed pandemic preparedness 
and response measures, due to the relative rarity of influenza pandemics. There is 
therefore an urgent and important need to determine the effectiveness of these 
measures where the opportunity arises, and to contribute to an improved evidence 
base. 
Singapore, a globally-connected, tropical Asian city-state located at the equator, is 
well poised to perform the necessary surveillance and research to detail the spread and 
impact of inlluenza in the tropical setting. In addition, Singapore was affected 
substantially by the 2009 influenza H l N l pandemic, which provides an excellent 
platform to determine the extent to which public health measures influence the impact 
of influenza in the local setting. 
Aims and Overview of the Thesis 
The aims of this thesis are: 
1) to detail the impact of epidemic and pandemic influenza in Singapore, 
providing additional evidence on the impact of influenza in tropical regions; 
and 
2) to assess the effectiveness of various assessment and response measures using 
data obtained in Singapore during the spread of 2009 pandemic influenza. 
This will be important for preparedness and response planning for future pandemics 
of influenza and other similar respiratory diseases. 
The thesis is based on a series often published journal manuscripts, organized around 
individual chapters, that collectively address the aims by presenting new evidence on 
different components of the impact, assessment, and response during epidemic and 
pandemic inlluenza. In addition, there is a background chapter which provides the 
context for the published work, and a concluding chapter which ties the evidence 
together and suggests important research questions for the future. At the start of each 
chapter, there is a short background section to provide a link to the previous chapter, 
as well as to introduce the next manuscript. 
The second chapter of the thesis introduces aspects of influenza viruses which are 
important for the understanding of the disease. It also describes the development of 
epidemics and pandemics, and lays the foundation for the rest of the thesis. 
The third chapter focuses on influenza epidemics and pandemics in the tropics, and 
includes publications on the excess mortality due to influenza in Singapore from 1950 
to 2000; and also the spread and impact of the three 20"' Century pandemics in 
Singapore. This provides the backdrop for the importance of influenza prevention in 
tropical countries such as Singapore. 
The fourth chapter introduces the reader to the 2009 H l N l influenza pandemic in 
Singapore. It then uses the 2009 pandemic as a backdrop to present a methodological 
paper on the comparability between different methods for estimating influenza 
infection rates, and the importance of all of these methods in different settings. 
The fifth chapter continues from the fourth chapter by providing a detailed analysis of 
the specific seroepidemiology cohort study to determine infection rates among 
different cohorts during the first epidemic wave of 2009 H l N l pandemic influenza in 
Singapore. 
fhe sixth chapter introduces the unique differences in the spread of influenza in 
closed and semi-closed environment such as military institutions and schools, and the 
importance of surveillance in such environments. It then showcases one such 
surveillance program in the Singapore military to determine the epidemiology and 
clinical features of influenza in a semi-closed military setting during the time of the 
2009 influenza pandemic. This surveillance program is also important to show the 
differences in clinical presentation of influenza compared to non-influenza cases, and 
among different influenza strains. Pursuant to the previous chapter, it also illustrates 
the difficulty of using influenza-like illness (ILI) or other clinical criteria for diagnosis 
without accompanying laboratory testing. 
The seventh chapter provides a detailed overview of the importance of preparedness 
and response strategies to reduce the spread and impact of influenza, and the current 
evidence for these strategies. It starts off with a systematic review of mathematical 
modeling studies which show the effectiveness of combination strategies in reducing 
the impact of influenza. 
The eighth to twelfth chapters then move into new evidence for the effectiveness of 
different strategies for influenza prevention and response in a semi-closed military 
environment. This includes the cross-reactivity of influenza vaccines to other non-
vaccine strains, the effectiveness of post-exposure ring prophylaxis with oseltamivir 
as a containment strategy, and the effectiveness of various public health measures in 
reducing the spread of influenza. 
The thirteenth and final chapter discusses the impact of these studies in providing 
additional evidence and understanding of influenza in the tropics, and the 
effectiveness of different measures to prevent its spread, especially in closed and 
semi-closed environments where intluenza can have substantial impact. It suggests 
gaps for additional research, and proposes a framework for future studies to address 
these gaps and improve the evidence-base to deal with the threat of influenza in the 
future. 
This research provides a substantial contribution to the body of knowledge on 
influenza and its prevention. It will be important for public health professionals and 
decision makers worldwide to learn from the lessons described herewith, and to use 
this as a platform for policy making. 
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Influenza viruses are single-stranded ribonucleic acid (RNA) viruses belonging to the 
Orthomyxoviridae family. There are three types of influenza viruses - influenza A, B, 
and C, differentiated by their nucleus, matrix, and surface proteins which have 
different antigenic properties. This thesis focuses on influenza A viruses which 
commonly circulate among humans, birds, and other mammals such as pigs, and has 
the propensity for causing human epidemics and pandemics, f he thesis also 
occasionally refers to influenza B viruses that are in current circulation globally and 
are detected through epidemiological surveillance as they are also a common cause of 
human epidemics. 
Influenza A viruses are categorized into subtypes by two different surface proteins, 
the haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) proteins. These subtypes are 
further categorized into strains which differ by specific genetic sequences. The HA 
protein facilitates the binding of the influenza virus to the host cell through sialic acid 
receptors, enabling entry into and infection of the host cell for replication. Once the 
replication of viral progeny is completed inside the host cell, the NA protein cleaves 
the sialic acid receptors to allow the progeny to be released from the infected cell, 
enabling further infection of other cells. There are currently sixteen known 
haemagglutinin proteins types and nine neuraminidase protein types and all influenza 
subtypes can be found in aquatic birds (1,2). In humans, only H I N I , H2N2, and 
H3N2 subtypes have been documented to be in widespread circulation in humans in 
the past century with efficient transmission from person to person. Other mammals 
have been known to be infected with the influenza virus, and pigs are common 
alternate hosts for influenza viruses and can harbor both avian and human viruses. 
Pigs are therefore an important platform in the reassortment and emergence of new 
viral strains - tiiis was the hypothesized mechanism leading up to the influenza 
pandemic in 2009 among humans (1.3). 
Spread and Clinical Features of Influcn/.a 
influenza spreads by droplet, contact and airborne modes, but the relative likelihood 
of spread through each of these modes varies. The main mode is believed to be 
through droplets (aqueous particles >10|.un containing virus particles) which are 
formed by actions such as coughing and sneezing (4,5). Influenza can also spread 
through airborne aerosols of influenza particles (<5|.im) that are expelled also through 
coughing and sneezing, or from medical procedures such as nebulisation or intubation 
(4-6)- although aerosol transmission is believed to be a less common mode of 
transmission (7). Finally, contact with infected material such as contaminated fomites 
which are then transferred to the respiratory tract (directly or indirectly through 
hands) are also thought to result in substantial transmission (8,9). 
The incubation period of influenza is about one to four days (10). Detection of 
influenza viruses in respiratory samples have been shown to occur one to two days 
before the onset of symptoms until about five days after; and detection can occur for 
two weeks or more after the onset of illness in children and immunocompromised 
individuals (11-16). For the novel 2009 H l N l pandemic influenza virus, viral 
shedding may last longer with one study having cultured viruses in about a quarter of 
samples taken seven days after the onset of illness (17). The likely infectious period 
for influenza is thought of to coincide with viral detection in respiratory samples, but 
it is not known how virus detection in respiratory samples correlates with 
infectiousness and intensity of spread. Infection may also be sub-clinical without 
significant clinical symptoms, and these cases are difficult to detect while still likely 
to be able to transmit the virus (18). 
Clinical attack rates during seasonal influenza epidemics range from 10% to 20%, and 
may be higher in pandemics depending on population susceptibility to the circulating 
influenza strain (19). The estimated basic reproductive number (Ro, the average 
number of secondaiy cases produced by a primary case) ranges from less than two for 
seasonal epidemics in the general population, to less than four for the 1918 pandemic 
(20,21). This is overall much lower than other infectious diseases with high 
transmissibility such as measles or varicella. However, as described in later chapters, 
the Ro and overall spread of influenza varies substantially from sub-population to sub-
population, with some groups being at high risk of increased spread due to various 
reasons discussed later. 
Influenza causes a wide range of clinical symptoms including: fever; cough; sore 
throat; myalgia; rhinorrhea; nasal congestion; weakness; loss of appetite; headache; 
and gastro-intestinal symptoms. Fever usually resolves after five days but myalgia and 
other symptoms often last for up to and beyond two weeks. Respiratory symptoms are 
the result of local cellular damage and apoptosis due to viral infection, together with 
inflammation; while host immune responses produce cytokines and other immune 
modulators that result in fever and other systemic presentations such as headache, 
myalgia, anorexia, and malaise (16,22). Occasionally, severe inflammation may result 
in primary viral pneumonia, and the loss of epithelial and ciliated cells in the 
respiratory tract increases the susceptibility of the host to secondary bacterial 
infections. There are unfortunately no unique signs or symptoms that describe 
intluenza illness, and influenza cases are difficult to differentiate from other similar 
illnesses caused by a variety of other viruses and bacteria; these are therefore 
collectively called intluenza-like illnesses (ILls). f h e WHO definition of IIJ is 
sudden onset fever of more than 38.0°C and cough or sore throat in the absence of 
other diagnoses (23). 
•fhere have been several studies exploring the clinical presentation that predicts 
infiuenza infection but the results have been mixed. The accuracy of the set of 
symptoms and signs in predicting infiuenza infection is highly dependent on the local 
context, especially the other circulating ILls and the demographics of the local 
population. One systematic review using summary statistics from several selected 
studies found that there were no overall symptoms or signs that had a summary 
likelihood ratio for influenza of greater than two (24). Only the absence of fever 
(Likelihood Ratio (LR) 0.40), cough (LR 0.42), and nasal congestion (LR 0.49) had 
likelihood ratios of less than 0.5, showing a decreased likelihood of infiuenza if these 
symptoms were absent (24). The I LI definition was found in a recent study to only 
have sensitivity of 73.8%, specificity 43.0%, positive predictive value (PPV) 39.5% 
and negative predictive value (NPV) 76.5% in identifying influenza cases (25). It is 
therefore useful to consider the difficulty in defining the set of symptoms and signs 
that exactly describe influenza infection, and that other modalities for surveillance are 
necessary. These will be discussed further in Chapter Six. 
Laboratory Testing for Influenza Viruses 
Laboratory testing provides a more definitive method of determining infection from 
influenza viruses, especially to identify the unique influenza strain. This is important 
in the context of understanding the epidemiology of iniliienza and the effect iveness of 
various interventions in preventing the spread of the disease. At the same time, 
laboratory testing requires additional resources and depending on the test method, 
may pose a substantial challenge in lower resource settings, especially at point-of-care 
clinical consultations. This section describes some of the common laboratory tests for 
inlluenza - these form the foundation to identify influenza infection for the studies 
presented in this thesis. 
Virus culture is usually considered the gold standard for influenza diagnosis . Cultures 
are performed on clinical samples which include throat or nasopharyngeal swabs, to 
nasopharyngeal or bronchial washes or aspirates. It can only yield positive cultures if 
there is live virus in the clinical samples, and therefore false negative tests often 
occur. Standard viral cultures in Madin-Darby Canine Kidney ( M D C K ) cells or 
inoculation of eggs take about three to 10 days to yield sufficient virus for 
identification, limiting its immediate use in clinical and public health settings (26). 
Rapid cell cultures (for example shell cultures or cell mixtures) can reduce test t imes 
to about one to three days, al though this is still far longer than the other tests 
described below. The virus obtained from the viral cultures will still have to be tested 
to determine the subtype or strain, using another laboratory method such as reverse 
transcription polymerase-chain reaction (PCR) haemagglutinat ion inhibition (HAl) 
tests, or immunot luoresence tests mentioned below. Due to the substantial quantit ies 
of virus produced that can be used for further tests, virus cultures are of ten the 
foundation for further genetic sequencing studies that can determine the specific 
influenza strain and the presence of any genetic di f ferences such as mutations. 
PCR is a popular testing method and is widely used to identify influenza strains if 
appropriate reagents are available to detect strain-specific regions of the viral genome. 
PCR tests need to be performed in specialized laboratories by trained technicians, and 
are able to yield results within four to six hours which makes them useful for clinical 
and public health interventions. In addition, PCR is able to detect viral genetic 
material as long as it is part of the detection region of the reagent, regardless of 
whether the genetic material is only a virus fragment or a whole live virus. It is 
therefore very sensitive for influenza infection, but a positive test may not necessarily 
correlate with infect iousness as sufficient live virus may not be present. 
Antibody tests are also used for epidemiological studies due to their ability to 
determine prior infection in the absence of respiratory samples. They use blood 
samples and detect the antibodies against the influenza strain being tested. The two 
most commonly used tests in research studies are neutralization tests or HAl. 
Influenza neutralization tests are based on the inhibition of the influenza virus 's 
pathogenic effect on M D C K cells by the subject ' s serum at different dilutions or 
titers. This is of ten a very resource and time intensive process, and current testing 
frequently uses microneutralization tests in which staining dyes are used to detect 
cells that have been infected by the influenza virus. Although microneutralization 
tests are less resource intensive compared to traditional neutralization assays, they are 
still more resource intensive when compared to other laboratory methods. An HAl 
test, on the other hand, uses the property of the influenza virus to agglutinate red 
blood cells, and can be performed relatively quickly with results in less than one hour 
(excluding sample preparation time). Red blood cells often used for testing for human 
influenza viruses include turkey, guinea pig, and human type O cells. HAl titres of 
1:40 (typically, depending on the laboratory method used) are associated with a 50% 
or more protection against influenza infection (27). There is no such direct correlation 
for neutralization titres. Further details of the HAI titres are found in the publications 
in this thesis. 
The usual measure of seroconversion - using antibody studies as an indication of 
probable infection - is a four-fold or greater increase in antibody levels post-infection 
compared to pre-infection or acute phase samples in the same individual. This 
necessitates serial sampling and this may pose a challenge as it requires early blood 
samples being taken and follow up weeks later; this also reduces its use for individual 
clinical management. Two recent studies have found that for the 2009 H l N l influenza 
pandemic, antibody levels increase rapidly after two weeks post infection (28,29). 
Both neutralization and HAI have good sensitivities of more than 80% compared to 
PGR although neutralization tests using microneutralization techniques are usually 
slightly more sensitive than HAI (28). HAI is the test used for traditional vaccine 
efficacy studies, and is easier and less time consuming to perform than neutralization 
tests. In some population-based epidemiological studies only a single post-infection 
sample is available in the study population. In these cases, a cut-off antibody detection 
level is used to indicate probable immunity and the immune proportion in the study 
population are then compared with banked blood samples obtained from other 
individuals that are used to estimate pre-existing immunity levels to obtain an overall 
estimated infection rate. Further details are shown and discussed in Chapter Four. 
Immunofluorescence testing with direct or indirect antibody staining can also be 
performed in a specialized laboratory setting and yield results within four hours. It 
detccts viruses in the clinical samples obtained from the patient. The viral antigens are 
bound to monoclonal antibodies that can be influenza type, subtype, or strain specific, 
and illuminated using lluorescence staining o f the antibodies. However, these 
immunotluorescence tests are in general less sensitive compared to PCR tests (30). 
Rapid diagnostic tests, which are immunoassays, are also available that can yield 
results in less than one hour and oiten within minutes, and can be used as a point-of-
case test. There are many different types o f rapid diagnostic test kits available on the 
market, but their sensitivity and specificity for detecting influenza generally or 
specific subtypes or strains vary widely and are often poor compared to the more 
established methods mentioned above (30). Their use in clinical management must 
therefore take into account the low sensitivity, especially i f clinicians would like to 
use them to determine the need for early treatment or isolation in individual cases. 
Rapid tests may instead be more useful in identifying influenza outbreaks as more 
suspect cases are available for testing such that the misidentification o f a few cases 
due to the low sensitivity would not hinder the overall identification o f the outbreak 
for public health measures to be taken. 
Influenza Epidemics and Pandemics 
Influenza epidemics and pandemics occur with such regularity that the resultant 
impact is substantial and o f interest to public health workers and policy makers. The 
main reason for these regular epidemics and pandemics is that influenza A and B 
viruses lack adequate proofreading by the virus's R N A polymerase during replication 
o f progeny R N A . This results in frequent point mutations in the surface glycoproteins 
and the virus accumulates new antigenic properties that are sufficiently different from 
previously circulating inlluenza strains - tiiis is known as antigenic drift . Individuals 
who have not been exposed to similar influenza strains will be susceptible to infection 
by the novel virus as they have no pre-existing immunity to the new strain. This 
results in seasonal epidemics where a proportion of the wor ld ' s population does not 
have pre-existing immunity and is affected. During each influenza epidemic, the 
proportion of the population infected by the virus depends on the amount of 
differentiation in the genetic makeup of the new strain f rom previously circulating 
viruses, and the pre-existing immunity of the population to closely related strains. 
This will be discussed further in Chapter Eight. The overall impact of the epidemic 
will depend not only on the disease spread and infection rate, but also on the clinical 
severity of illness. 
Pandemics are caused by the creation of a totally novel subtype or strain of 
influenza A virus that is substantially different f rom existing circulating strains such 
that the vast majority of the wor ld ' s population does not have immunity to the virus 
and are susceptible to infection. This is known as antigenic shift and this can occur 
through direct transmission of an influenza subtype f rom another species (e.g. birds) 
with adaptation to humans which was the postulated origins of the 1918 "Spanish 
Flu" pandemic (31); or from genetic reassortment where genetic material f rom various 
influenza strains came together to form a new virus, which was postulated for the 
1957 and 1968 pandemics (32,33). Reassortment commonly occurs when humans or 
pigs are co-infected with different influenza strains giving rise to a novel virus with 
genetic material f rom both strains. Reassortment can occur multiple t imes result ing in 
a virus with components f rom multiple strains, which was the situation leading to the 
creation of the 2009 H l N l pandemic strain. This is described in further detail in later 
chapters. Some of this reassorted genetic material in the novel virus al lows for 
effect ive transmission among humans , while having surface proteins f rom different 
strains ensures that the new virus is different f rom existing circulating human strains. 
As most people will not have pre-existing immunity to the new strain, the virus will 
spread globally with high infection rates. However, the overall impact of an intluenza 
pandemic can vary depending on clinical severity of the virus - for example, the 
mortality rate was very high during the 1918 pandemic compared to the much lower 
mortality rates of the 2009 pandemic. 
This thesis explores intluenza epidemics and pandemics in the tropics, especially 
during the 2009 H l N l pandemic, including the spread, infection rates, and 
effect iveness of various interventions to reduce the spread of the virus. 
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Chapter Three 
Epidemic and Pandemic Influenza in 
Tropical Singapore 
Singapore is a tropical city-state in South-East Asia, 1°15' north of the equator. 
Singapore covers an area of slightly more than 700 square kilometres and has a 
population of about f ive million people. It has a tropical climate with no distinct 
climatic seasons and is characterized by high temperatures, rainfall , and humidity. 
Singapore is a global transportation hub with high volumes of travel and trade, 
making it a melting pot of cultures and potentially vulnerable to the spread of 
infectious diseases. For example, the S A R S (severe acute respiratory syndrome) 
outbreak in 2003 spread quickly f rom China to Hong Kong and then to Singapore. 
Singapore is therefore an ideal setting to study the spread and transmission of 
influenza. 
The patterns of influenza transmission in the tropics are substantially different f rom 
those in temperate regions. In countries with temperate climates, seasonal inf luenza 
epidemics usually occur during the winter months and influenza cases surge rapidly 
and remain above baseline levels for about six to eight weeks (1). This is dif ferent in 
the tropics which lack well-defined climatic seasons. Surveil lance data shows that 
Singapore has a high baseline incidence of infiuenza and other respiratory diseases 
throughout the year, and seasonal influenza epidemics in Singapore usually occur 
during the second and fourth quarter of the year, often with more than one distinct 
peak of infiuenza activity each year (2,3). Although the pattern of inf iuenza outbreaks 
in tropical regions differs f rom temperate countries, the impact of inf luenza remains 
similar. In Singapore, about 20% of the population is affected by influenza annual ly, 
resulting in an estimated 500,000 physician visits and 300,000 work days lost (4). A 
study in Singapore showed that the excess mortality attributable to inf luenza was of 
similar magnitude in tropical Singapore (14.8 per 100,000 person-years) , sub-tropical 
1 long Kong (16.4 per 100.000 person-years), and temperate United States (19.6 per 
100,000 person-years) (5). Although there is general awareness of the impact of these 
diseases globally, there is a lack of data on respiratory diseases in tropical regions. 
To address these gaps, 1 previously published two papers examining the impact of the 
three pandemics of the 20"' Century in Singapore (6,7). The studies showed that the 
local epidemics of novel pandemic inlluenza viruses in Singapore occurred early 
during the global pandemic's course, and resulted in significant mortality. The studies 
showed that tropical Singapore was not spared from the impact of previous 
pandemics, regardless of their geographical origin. To build upon this evidence, the 
following study aims to provide additional evidence on the impact of seasonal 
epidemic influenza in tropical Singapore, and on the relationship and timing between 
epidemics in Singapore and in other countries across the world, fhis will show that 
influenza affects tropical regions substantially and consistently, and that attention 
should be paid to reduce the burden of disease in the tropics. 
Study 1 
This article was published in PLoS One 
Lee VJ, Yap J, Ong JB, Chan KP, Lin RT, Chan SP, Goh KT, Leo YS, Chen Ml. 
Influenza excess mortality from 1950-2000 in tropical Singapore. PLoS One. 2009 
Dec l;4(12):e8096. 
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Abstract 
Introduction: Tropical regions inave been slnown to exiiibit different influenza seasonal patterns compared to tlieir 
temperate counterparts. However, tliere is little information about the burden of annual tropical influenza epidemics across 
time, and the relationship between tropical influenza epidemics compared with other regions. 
Methods: Oaxa on monthly national mortality and population was obtained from 1947 to 2003 in Singapore. To determine 
excess mortality for each month, we used a moving average analysis for each month from 1950 to 2000. From 1972, 
influenza viral surveillance data was available. Before 1972, information was obtained from serial annual government 
reports, peer-reviewed journal articles and press articles. 
Results:Jhe influenza pandemics of 1957 and 1968 resulted in substantial mortality. In addition, there were 20 other time 
points with significant excess mortality. Of the 12 periods with significant excess mortality post-1972, only one point (1988) 
did not correspond to a recorded influenza activity. For the 8 periods with significant excess mortality periods before 1972 
excluding the pandemic years, 2 years (1951 and 1953) had newspaper reports of increased pneumonia deaths. Excess 
mortality could be observed in almost all periods with recorded influenza outbreaks but did not always exceed the 95% 
confidence limits of the baseline mortality rate. 
Conclusion: Influenza epidemics were the likely cause of most excess mortality periods in post-war tropical Singapore, 
although not every epidemic resulted in high mortality. It is therefore important to have good influenza surveillance 
systems in place to detect influenza activity. 
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Introduction 
Trop ica l regions have been shown to exhibit d i f ferent inf luenza 
seasonal pa t t e rns c o m p a r e d to t e m p e r a t e regions. Whi le t e m p e r a t e 
countr ies have a single a n n u a l ep idemic du r ing winter , inf luenza 
in the t ropics spreads t h r o u g h o u t the year , with two a n n u a l peaks 
having been descr ibed for S ingapore , a g lobal ly-connected tropical 
city [1,2]. H o w e v e r , while the seasonali ty differs f r o m t e m p e r a t e 
countr ies , mor ta l i ty f r o m inf luenza activity in tropical S ingapore is 
c o m p a r a b l e to t e m p e r a t e a n d sub- t ropical countr ies such as the 
Un i t ed States a n d H o n g K o n g [3]. T h e three 20"" ccntur>' 
inf luenza p a n d e m i c s in S ingapore were also associated with 
substant ial excess dea th s w h e n c o m p a r e d against baseline 
morta l i ty ra tes in s u r r o u n d i n g years [4]. 
Ix)ng t ime-series da t a on successive inf luenza seasons have been 
used to highl ight a n d quan t i fy the b u r d e n of disease a t t r ibutable to 
inf luenza in t e m p e r a t e count r ies [5-8] . In addi t ion, such da t a has 
been used to g r a d e the severity of difl'erent ep idemic inf luenza 
seasons as well as .specific inf luenza sub-types a n d strains [9 -11] . 
However , there are few equivalent studies on the b u r d e n of a n n u a l 
inf luenza epidemics in the tropics, a n d the relat ionship be tween 
tropical inf luenza epidemics c o m p a r e d with o ther regions [12]. 
T h e r e is a scarcity of da t a on tropical influenza, d u e to the lack of 
clear seasonality a n d virological da ta to identify per iods oi' 
inf luenza activity a n d its associated impac t on mortal i ty. 
S ingapore is a t ropical island city-state in South-Eas t Asia. 
Being a global ly-connected city, it provides a representa t ion of the 
spread of inf luenza in the tropics. In addi t ion, S ingapore has good 
consistent records of mortal i ty statistics, a n d h a d been routinely 
isolating inf luenza viruses for surveillance since 1972 (as a 
na t ionwide study in 1972 a n d 1973, a n d as a na t ional surveillance 
p r o g r a m m e f rom 1974 onwards) [1]. In this study, we explore the 
possible links be tween excess morta l i ty f r o m 1950 to 2000 in the 
pos t -Wor ld W a r T w o era in S ingapore a n d inf luenza epidemics. 
T h i s t ime-per iod also included almost 30 years of inf luenza 
virological sur \e i l lance da ta . W e use this da t a to demons t r a t e the 
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clear cor re la t ion b e t w e e n in f luenza ep idemic per iods a n d excess 
mor ta l i ty , a n d highl ight the b u r d e n a n d t iming of p r o m i n e n t 
in f luenza ep idemics in t ropical S ingapore . 
Materials and Methods 
D a t a on m o n t h l y na t iona l all cause mor ta l i ty a n d p o p u l a d o n 
size was o b t a i n e d f r o m 1947 to 2 0 0 3 f r o m the Regis t ry of Births 
a n d Dea ths , S ingapore t h r o u g h the D e p a r t m e n t of Statistics, 
S i n g a p o r e the g o v e r n m e n t a l agency responsible for collection, 
ver i f icat ion, a n d m a i n t e n a n c e of na t iona l statistics. M o n t h l y 
mor ta l i ty ra tes were ca lcula ted f r o m this da ta . 
T o d e t e r m i n e the excess mor ta l i ty for e a c h m o n t h f r o m 1950 to 
2000 , we used a m o v i n g ave rage analysis wh ich has p roven 
app rop r i a t enes s d u e to the lack of distinct seasonal mor ta l i ty 
pa t t e rn s in S i n g a p o r e [4], Unl ike t e m p e r a t e regions, w h e r e 
m e t h o d s relying o n seasonal var ia t ion such as tha t used by 
Serf l ing a re c o m m o n l y used, we a s s u m e d tha t m o n t h l y mor ta l i ty 
in S ingapore exhib i ted a secular t r e n d wi thou t seasonal c o m p o -
nents . W e the re fore used a m o v i n g ave rage analysis for e a c h 
m o n t h cons t ruc ted using d a t a f r o m 3 years be fore a n d 3 years a f te r 
the m o n t h (excluding the m o n t h itself) to calculate the p red ic t ed 
m e a n a n d 9 5 % con f idence intervals for the expec ted mor ta l i ty for 
tha t m o n t h . M o n t h s previously k n o w n to be af fec ted by the 1957 
a n d 1968 p a n d e m i c s (May 1957, a n d Augus t a n d S e p t e m b e r 
1968) were exc luded to e l iminate inf lat ion of con f idence intervals 
in the per iods s u r r o u n d i n g those m o n t h s . T h e m o v i n g averages 
f o r m e d the ent i re basel ine mor ta l i ty ra te wi th 9 5 % conf idence 
intervals across 50 years f r o m 1950 to 2000. Excess dea th s were 
ca lcula ted as the ac tua l mor ta l i ty ra te on record m i n u s the m o v i n g 
ave rage basel ine ra te . M o n t h s for wh ich the mor ta l i ty ra te 
exceeded the 9 5 % conf idence intervals were cons ide red as those 
with significant excess dea ths , a n d used to highlight possible 
inf luenza ep idemic per iods . T h e analyses were p e r f o r m e d in S ta ta 
10.0 for W i n d o w s (Stata C o r p . , Col lege S t a d o n , T X , USA). 
D a t a on inf luenza virological surveil lance was ob t a ined f r o m the 
D e p a r t m e n t of Pa thology at the S ingapore G e n e r a l Hospi ta l , 
which is the W o r l d Hea l th O r g a n i z a t i o n ( W H O ) Na t iona l 
In f luenza C e n t r e (NIC) in S ingapore since 1972 [13]. T h e 
surveil lance p r o g r a m m e tracks inf luenza activity y e a r - r o u n d 
t h rough virus isolation a n d ident if icat ion f r o m respi ra tory samples 
col lected f r o m pat ien ts a t t e n d i n g g o v e r n m e n t ou tpa t i en t clinics for 
influenza-l ike symptoms , as well as f r o m pat ien ts in hospitals a n d 
pr iva te clinics. St ra in charac te r i za t ion was p e r f o r m e d at the W H O 
Co l l abo ra t i ng C e n t r e s for R e f e r e n c e a n d R e s e a r c h on In f luenza in 
the U S A , U K a n d Austral ia , a n d at the N I C . T h e da t a inc luded 
records of p r e d o m i n a n t strains a n d their per iods of c i rcula t ion in 
S ingapore , wh ich were available f r o m 1972 onwards . T h e 
p r o p o r t i o n of respi ra tory illness samples positive for in f luenza 
was available f r o m 1972 to 1993, a n d the b r e a k d o w n on the 
p e r c e n t a g e of samples positive for inf luenza A ( H l N l ) , (H3N2) , 
a n d inf luenza B was available f r o m 1994 onwards . T h e s e 
p ropo r t i ons were c o m p a r e d to mor ta l i ty ra tes to d e t e r m i n e if 
per iods with excess mor ta l i ty c o r r e s p o n d e d to increases in 
inf luenza isolates. 
In add i t ion , we p e r f o r m e d a search of serial a n n u a l g o v e r n m e n t 
repor t s f r o m the D e p a r t m e n t of Hea l th , S ingapore f r o m 1950 to 
1965 (before S ingapore ga ined independence) , the Minis t ry of 
H e a h h a n d the Minis t ry of the E n v i r o n m e n t f r o m 1965 o n w a r d s 
(pos t - independence) , peer - rev iewed j o u r n a l articles, a n d press 
articles f r o m T h e Strai ts T i m e s (the m a i n a n d only English 
n e w s p a p e r across all the years). This was d o n e for all the m o n t h s 
w h e r e signif icant excess mor ta l i ty occur red , to d e t e r m i n e if the re 
were repor t s suggestive of in f luenza epidemics . T h i s p rov ided 
add i t iona l ev idence of the k n o w n in f luenza o u t b r e a k s , a n d the 
r e c o r d e d b u r d e n of these ep idemics . 
Results 
T h e a n n u a l n u m b e r of dea th s f r o m 1950 to 2000 , a n d excess 
dea th s w h e r e mor ta l i ty e x c e e d e d the u p p e r limit of the 95% 
conf idence interval is s h o w n in F igure I A. A p a r t f r o m the known 
p a n d e m i c s of 1957 a n d 1968, w h i c h resul ted in substantial 
morta l i ty , the re were 20 o t h e r t ime po in t s in wh ich there was 
significant excess morta l i ty . 
Exc lud ing the two p a n d e m i c s , t he re w e r e 8 pe r iods with excess 
mor ta l i ty be fore 1972. O f these, 2 pe r iods co inc ided with 
n e w s p a p e r repor t s of inc reased p n e u m o n i a dea ths . T h e r e were 3 
weeks in Augus t 1953 w h e r e p n e u m o n i a was the m e n t i o n e d as the 
m a i n cause of dea th s in n e w s p a p e r r epor t s (weeks e n d i n g August 8 
with 2 3 dea ths , Augus t 15 wi th 30 dea ths , a n d Augus t 22 with 31 
deaths) [14,15]. In Augus t a n d S e p t e m b e r 1951, p n e u m o n i a was 
also the m a i n cause of dea th s for the weeks e n d i n g Augus t 18 (29 
death.s), Augus t 25 (30 deaths) , S e p t e m b e r 2 (35 deaths) [16-18]. 
In e n d - S e p t e m b e r 1951, t he re was also a n increase in pneumonia 
cases in Malays ia (a c o u n t r y N o r t h of S i n g a p o r e also under the 
admin i s t r a t ion of the British E m p i r e at the time) [19]. 
F igure 1B shows the s ignif icant excess mor ta l i ty per iods and the 
% of resp i ra tory illness s amp le isolates posit ive for inf luenza from ' 
1972 o n w a r d s w h e n virological d a t a b e c a m e avai lable . T h e r e were 
12 per iods wi th s ignif icant excess mor ta l i ty post 1972 for which 
virological d a t a was avai lable . F igure 2 shows the excess mortalit)' 
a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g in f luenza virological survei l lance for these 
per iods . O f the 12 per iods wi th excess mor ta l i ty post 1972, only ' 
o n e (1988) did no t co inc ide wi th a t e m p o r a l increase in the 
p e r c e n t a g e of resp i ra tory illness samples tha t were positive for 
inf luenza , a l t hough only 8 of the 12 pe r iods were explicitly labeled 
as inf luenza ep idemics or o u t b r e a k s on g o v e r n m e n t records. 
T a b l e 1 lists all t ime pe r iods wi th s ignif icant excess mortalit)', 
a l o n g with per iods desc r ibed as in f luenza ep idemics o r ou tb reab 
on g o v e r n m e n t records . O v e r the 29 years (1972 to 2000) for 
which in f luenza survei l lance records a re descr ibed , the re were 21 
in f luenza ep idemic per iods , a n d an add i t iona l 4 per iods where 
significant excess mor ta l i ty was obse rved (three of which 
c o r r e s p o n d e d to a n increase in virological activity). O f the 12 
per iods of significant excess mor ta l i ty pos t -1972 , 5 of the peak 
excess mor ta l i ty m o n t h s o c c u r r e d in the m o n t h of M a y , followed 
by 4 in J a n u a r y , a n d I each in M a r c h , J u n e , a n d J u l y . O f the 13 
ep idemic pe r iods wh ich did not result in significant excess | 
mor ta l i ty , 5 ep idemic peaks o c c u r r e d in the m o n t h of May , with 
2 peaks e a c h in J a n u a r y a n d J u l y , a n d o n e e a c h in M a r , April, 
J u n e , a n d O c t o b e r . T h e m o n t h of M a y also d o m i n a t e d in the 8 
n o n - p a n d e m i c signif icant excess mor ta l i ty pe r iods pre-1972, with 
4 o c c u r r i n g in tha t m o n t h , a n d 1 e a c h in J a n u a r y , August, 
S e p t e m b e r , a n d O c t o b e r . Overa l l , t he re were m o r e reported 
increases in M a y c o m p a r e d to all o t h e r m o n t h s . 
In f luenza ep idemics of ten a c c o m p a n i e d the in t roduc t ion of new 
inf luenza an t igenic var iants , a n d n e w in f luenza var ian t s also often 
gave rise to second e p i d e m i c waves . T h e s p r e a d of H I N l 
fol lowing its r e - e m e r g e n c e in late 1977 fol lowed such a pattern, 
with the first wave caus ing ep idemics f r o m D e c 77 to Feb 78 (as 
A / U S S R / 1 / 7 7 ) , fol lowed by a second w a v e w h i c h passed through 
S i n g a p o r e f r o m Sep 78 to O c t 78 (as A / B r a z i l / 1 1 / 7 8 ) . In most < 
cases, second waves h a d less mor ta l i ty t h a n the first, the exception , 
b e i n g A / E n g l a n d / 4 2 / 7 2 , w h e r e b o t h e p i d e m i c waves caused 
substant ia l excess mor ta l i ty , wi th the first wave w h i c h peaked in Jul i 
72 be ing mi lder t h a n the s econd wave w h i c h p e a k e d six months 
later in J a n 73. 
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Figure 1. Periods of significant excess deaths in tropical Singapore*. Panel A-Excess deaths compared to overall deaths, 1950 to 2000. Panel B-
Excess deaths compared to positive influenza positive, 1972 to 2000. *Significant excess mortality w^hich occurred over 2 contiguous months (August to 
September 1951, June to July 1989, and December 1992 to January 1993) w^ as summed to allow for comparisons of overall epidemic magnitude. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008096.g001 
Epidemic periods which did not give rise to significant excess 
mortality caused lower overall excess mortality, although positive 
deviations from baseline mortality were detectable for most 
periods for which epidemic activity had been reported (Figure 3). 
Tempora l peaks in mortality either corresponded to or lagged by 
one month the peaks in percentage of respiratory illness isolates 
positive for influenza. 
Table 2 compares the epidemic timing and excess mortality 
attributable to prominent epidemics (the two pandemics (1957 and 
1968), H l N l emergence in 1977, and 1951 where pneumonia 
deaths contributing substantially to overall mortality) to the 10 
time periods with most excess mortality after 1972 when 
virological data became available. With the exception of the A/ 
Port Chalmers/1/73 (H3N2) epidemic in M a y 1974, 9 of the 10 
periods also qualif ied as periods of significant excess mortality. 
Excess deaths in Aug-Sep 1951 (46 excess deaths per 100,000) 
were comparable to the 1957 pandemic (54 excess deaths per 
100,000) while the H3N2 pandemic of 1968 caused half as much 
excess mortality. Estimates for the most severe influenza epidemic 
seasons ranged from 7.0 to 15.8 excess deaths per 100,000 
population. With the exception of B/Singapore/222/79, H3N2 
influenza activity featured in all the other 9 time periods. The re-
emergence of H l N l influenza as A/USSR/1/77 caused relatively 
mild mortality with only 3.5 excess deaths per 100,000 population; 
this was compared to a mean of 11.3 for the 10 episodes featured 
in Table 2, and 6.9 for all the periods listed in Table 1. Of the 10 
periods with the most severe excess mortality, half occurred in the 
month of May ; three others occurred in J anua r y , with one each in 
J u n and Ju l . 
Most of the key antigenic drift variants which caused severe 
epidemics in Singapore also caused epidemics elsewhere (Table 2). 
In 1951, 1972/3, 1976, and 1998/99, the periods of high 
mortality corresponded to some of the highest non-pandemic 
mortality periods [20]. However, the relative mortality of 
individual epidemics vary in different countries. The 1975-76 
epidemic in England and Wales due to A/Victoria/3/75 (H3N2) 
had an excess mortality of 60.84/100000 (37), which was much 
higher than similar epidemics in Singapore and the U S (10). In 
Singapore and the US, most of the outbreaks caused by the similar 
viruses in similar time period had generally comparable excess 
mortality rates (see Table 2). However, the A/Sydney/5/97 
(H3N2) epidemics in the U S had a much higher mortality of 26.82 
and 26.10 per 100,000 population in the winters of 1997-98 and 
1998-99 respectively (11). This was higher compared to that of 
Singapore and as well as many previous epidemics in the US (11). 
The timing of occurrence in diflerent countries also varies. The 
first wave of infections with A/England/42/72 (H3N2)-related 
viruses peaked in Singapore in Ju ly 1972; while infections peaked 
about the same time in Australia in August 1972, excess mortality 
was not markedly high [21]. In the Northern hemisphere winter of 
1972 to 1973, relatively severe epidemics of A/England/42/72 
(H3N2) were noted on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean [6,22]. 
Singapore also experienced a severe second wave which peaked in 
J a n 73. For influenza A/Port Chalmers/1/73 (H3N2), outbreak 
reports in New Zealand dated to Sept 1973 [23] but the first wave 
in Singapore only peaked in M a y 1974, and related viruses did not 
cause substantial mortality in Northern Hemisphere countries like 
the USA until the winter of 1974 to 1975 [6]. The epidemic of B/ 
Singapore/222/79 in M a y 1979 also heralded the epidemic in the 
USA in the winter of 1979 to 1980 [24]. Conversely, A/Victoria/ 
3/75 (H3N2) related viruses caused a severe influenza season in 
the USA and England and Wales in the winter of 1975 to 1976 
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Figure 2. Periods with significant excess deaths in S ingapore and positive influenza isolates, 1972 to 2000*. 'Areas shaded in grey 
correspond to official reports of influenza epidemics during the time period. 
doi;10.1371/journal.pone.0008096.g002 
with excess mortality of 11.39 and 60 .84 per 100,000 population 
respectively [6,25] before the first wave spread through Singapore 
in April to J u n e 1976. While A/Sydney/5/97 (H3N2) infections 
were reported in Australia in the mid-1997 influenza season, this 
was followed by the spread in the Northern hemisphere [11,26] 
before major epidemics in Singapore and some other countries 
[27] in the earlier half o f 1998. 
Discussion 
Influenza possibly accounted for the majority of time periods 
with significant excess mortality in tropical Singapore in the post-
war years, including the 3 highest mortality records in 1951, 1957, 
and 1968. Although most pre-1972 significant excess mortality 
months lacked documented evidence of influenza epidemics, two 
periods (August and Sept 1951, and August 1953) coincided with 
media reports o f pneumonia deaths, and an additional four 
periods occurred in May the month with the most number of 
known influenza epidemic peaks. This suggests that influenza 
probably resulted in more excess mortality than any other variable 
cause. T h e second highest excess mortality in 1951 was only 
slightly less than the 1957 pandemic and 7 0 % higher than the 
1968 pandemic. This coincided with 3 consecutive newspaper 
reports of pneumonia dominating mortality [ 1 6 - 1 8 ] , and excess 
pneumonia deaths correlating with increased all-cause mortality-
are known to occur during influenza epidemics [10]. The year 
1951 also saw major influenza outbreaks caused by the influenza A 
( H l N l ) virus, with higher mortality and transmissibility in 
England and Wales and Canada than the 1957 and 1968 
pandemics [28]. In Liverpool, the supposed epicenter of the 
1951 epidemic, severity was higher than the 1918 pandemic [29]. 
O u r data strongly suggests that the burden of the 1951 epidemic 
was not restricted to temperate regions but also affected tropical 
countries like Singapore and Malaysia. 
In contrast, the large dengue outbreaks in the 1990s and 2000s, 
which where constantly in the media reports, resulted in much fewer 
deaths [ 3 0 - 3 2 ] ; while the worst industrial accident in Singapore's 
history, the Spyros oil tanker explosion, killed only 76 people. The 
number of deaths attributable to each significant influenza epidemic 
was much higher than that caused by any other known man-made 
or natural cause during the same period. Based on this observation, 
it is therefore of public health and socio-economic importance to 
have good surveillance and prevention programs against seasonal 
influenza. Fumre measures should include promotion of annual 
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rate per lOO.OOOi Dominant influenza strains during epidemic period 
May 72-Jul 72 Jul 72 294.7 13.8 A/England/42/72 (H3N2), T ' w a v e j 
Oct 72-Mar 73 Jan 73 341.2 15.8 A/England/42/72 (H3N2), 2"'' wave{ 
May 74-Jul 74 May 74 218.1 9.9 A/Port Chalmers/1/73 (H3N2), l " wave 
Nov 74-Feb 75 Jan 75 3.5 0.2 A/Port Chalmers/1/73 (H3N2), 2"" wave 
Apr 75-Jun 75 May 75 54.9 2.4 A/Scotland/840/74 (H3N2) 
Jul 75-Jul 75 Jul 75 12.4 0.6 B/Hong Kong/5/72 
Apr 76-Jun 76 May 76 291.7 12.8 A/Victoria/3/75 (H3N2)} 
Apr 77-Jul 77 May 77 160.0 6.9 A/Victoria/3/75 (H3N2), A/Texas/1/77 (H3N2) and B/Hong Kong/5/72 
Dec 77-Feb 78 Jan 78 82.4 3.5 A/U55R/1/77 (H1N1) 
Sep 78-Oct 78 Oct 78 59.4 2.5 A/Brazil/11/78 (HlNl) 
Apr 79-Jun 79 May 79 264.2 11.2 B/Singapore/222/79J 
Apr BO-Jun 80 May 80 121.4 5.1 A/Texas/1/77 (H3N2) 
May81 -Jun 81 Jun 81 121.4 4.9 A/England/333/80 (HlNl ) 
Jan 83 162.4 6.1 A/Philippines/2/82 (H3N2)J 
May 83-Jul 83 May 83 93.0 3.5 A/Chile/1/83 (HlNl) 
Jul 84-Sep 84 Jul 84 136.4 5.0 A/Philippines/2/82 (H3N2) 
Apr 85-Jun 85 Apr 85 115.5 4.2 A/Philippines/2/82 (H3N2) 
Mar 86-May 86 Mar 86 84.7 3.1 A/Switzerland/79/85 (HlNl), A/Dunedin/27/84 (HlNl), A/Victoria/7/83 
(HlNl) and A/Singapore/6/86 (HlNl) 
May 88 179.3 6.4 A/Victoria/7/87 (H3N2), A/Sichuan/2/87 (H3N2), A/Sydneyl/87 (H3N2) and 
B/Victoria/2/87t 
Jun 89 339.2 11.7 A/Shanghai/ll/87-like (H3N2) and A/OMS/5389/88-like (H3N2)t 
Dec 92-Jan 93 Jan 93 361.0 11.2 A/Beijing/32/92 (H3N2)J 
Feb 95-Mar 95 Mar 95 212.9 6.2 A/Taiwan/86 (HlNl), A/rexas/36/91 (H1N1){ 
- May 97 398.0 10.7 A/Wuhan/359/95 (H3N2)J 
Apr 98-Jun 98 May 98 324.1 8.4 A/Sydney/5/97 (H3N2), T ' wavet 
Jan 99-Feb 99 Jan 99 275.2 7.0 A/Sydney/5/97 (H3N2), 2"" wavef 
•Month with highest excess mortality during a reported influenza epidemic period, or month with highest excess mortality in a period with significant excess mortality. 
tSum of positive deviations from the expected mortality for three-month period centered around the month with peak excess mortality; excess mortality rate is derived 
using estimates for total Singapore population during that period. 
{Periods with significant excess mortality. 
doi:l 0.1371 /journal.pone.0008096.t001 
inf luenza vacc ina t ion , a n d early ep idemic identif ication a n d 
\ irological surveil lance to al low judic ious use of measures such as 
anti-viral t r e a t m e n t of inf luenza d u r i n g epideinic periods. Vacc ine 
util ization in S i n g a p o r e has h i ther to been p o o r ( < 0 . 5 % of the 
popu ladon) , m a k i n g vaccine mi sma tch less relevant [3]. In concer t 
wi th p r o m o t i n g seasonal vacc ina t ion p rograms , studies a re needed 
to explore vaccine m a t c h to tropical ep idemic strains. O t h e r studies 
should also be p e r f o r m e d to val idate the utility of di lferent 
surveil lance systems, a n d d e t e r m i n e the cost-eifectiveness of 
surveil lance a n d in tervent ion p rograms . 
W h i l e o u r s imple a lgor i thm for flagging m o n t h s with significant 
excess mor ta l i ty a p p e a r s to have a high specificity for de tec t ing 
per iods of in f luenza activity, not all significant ep idemics were 
ident i f ied by the a lgor i thm. For ins tance, the first wave of the A / 
Por t C h a l m e r s / 1 / 7 3 ( H 3 N 2 ) virus which peaked in M a y 1974 
caused substant ia l excess mor ta l i ty (Table 2), but did not exceed 
the 9 3 % c o n f i d e n c e limits for tha t per iod , possibly because it was 
flanked by several ep idemics of equa l o r g rea te r severity ( A / 
E n g l a n d / 4 2 / 7 2 in J u l 1972 a n d J a n 1973, a n d A / \ ' i c t o r i a / 3 / 7 5 
( H i \ 2 ) in M a y 1976). S o m e ep idemics m a y also have h a d high 
m o r b i d i t y wi th low mor ta l i ty such as the A / U S S R / 9 0 / 7 7 ( H l N M ) 
strains, which re -emerged in N o v e m b e r 1977. In S ingapore , 
infect ions were repor ted a m o n g mili tary personne l in mid -
D e c e m b e r 1977 a n d spread quickly, with the ep idemic peak ing 
in J a n u a r y 1978 a n d lasting until Feb rua ry 1978. G o v e r n m e n t 
repor ts indicated that a l though ou tpa t i en t a t t endances for u p p e r 
respira tory tract infections (UR'FIs) doub led in J a n u a r y 1978, 
there was no co r r e spond ing increase in p n e u m o n i a a n d inf luenza 
(I'&I) dea ths [1]. As the virus af lected main ly chi ldren a n d y o u n g 
adults , the relative spar ing of o lder popu la t ions might explain the 
lower overall morta l i ty of the 1977 H l N l ep idemic . Age-re la ted 
i m m u n e protec t ion in older individuals (2009) might also cause the 
inf luenza A H I N 1-2009 p a n d e m i c to have a lower overall 
mortalitv- rate (US CDC), 2009). 
O u r da t a also suggests the i m p o r t a n c e of cor re la t ing viral 
character is t ics with mortal i ty . As the 1951 ep idcmic suggests, 
ep idemic seasons a r o u n d that t ime were relatively mild in the 
U n i t e d States in te rms ol' morb id i ty a n d morta l i ty , but were far 
m o r e severe in C a n a d a , Eng land a n d Wales [28] a n d S ingapore 
a n d Malaysia . In a d d i d o n , in the pos t -1972 per iod , new inf luenza 
var ian ts were no ted to cause ep idemics in S ingapore , at t imes 
p r e c e d i n g (e.g. B / S i n g a p o r e / 2 2 2 / 7 9 ) a n d at o t h e r t imes fol lowing 
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Figure 3. Additional epidemic periods in Singapore, with corresponding excess deaths and positive influenza isolates, 1972 to 
2000*. "Areas shaded in grey correspond to official reports of influenza epidemics during the time period. 
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outbreaks and epidemics in other countries (e.g. A/Sydney/5 /97) . 
A systematic review comparing the burden and relative timing of 
different influenza seasons with a focus on identifiable strains could 
yield deep insights into how influenza circulates globally, with 
important ramifications for vaccine strain selection. 
For now, the reasons for the asynchronous nature of the timing of 
global influenza epidemics and their differential burden of disease in 
different regions, as well as the driving force behind the timing of 
influenza epidemics in Singapore remains a mystery. Although 
there is little climatic seasonal variation in Singapore, this study 
shows that influenza seasons tend to occur from April to July and 
November to February, with May having most epidemics and peak 
excess mortality. The observed seasonality could be due to subtle 
differences in climate, new strains developing in tropical areas 
during the corresponding periods, or the spread of viruses from 
temperate regions. Herald waves which occur during the spring in 
Northern Hemisphere temperate countries [24] and taper off 
during the summer months, while failing to propagate in temperate 
countries, could go on to cause epidemics in tropical countries 
which are receptive to influenza viruses throughout the year. 
Limitations of our study include the use of monthly all cause data 
which may under-estimate the burden of epidemics that straddle 2 to 
3 months, as mortality split across more than 1 time period may not 
appear significant compared to epidemics where mortality is 
concentrated within the time period of analysis. The moving average 
calculation of the confidence intervals also means that less severe 
epidemics may be missed if flanked by more severe epidemics, as was 
the case for the 1974 epidemic caused by influenza A/Port 
Chalmers/1/73. Data resolution is another issue as there was no 
age-specific or influenza-specific data available across all 50 years. 
The accuracy of disease burden estimates is also difiicult to assess, and 
different methods should be used for comparison. For example, a 
study in Hong Kong Island by Chiu and colleagues [33] determined 
influenza hospitalization rates through virological testing of hospital-
ized respiratory cases. Virologic data is also imperfect, as it represents 
only % of samples tested and not the actual size of the epidemic. As 
such, future studies will compare the range of estimates obtained 
through influenza-specific mortality, and different data sources such 
as primary care data and virologic testing of hospitalized or fatal cases 
where available. Finally, comparisons of disease burden across 
countries are difficult due to different methods used and future studies 
should analyze global data simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, this study shows that crude mortality estimates can 
be sufficient to signal the most significant influenza epidemics, and 
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Selected countries affected by the same virus during the same 
period, with timing of epidemics in parentheses. Excess all cause 
mortality per 100,000 are shown for selected outbreal<s in the US 
and England & Wales where data is available 
Ten most severe recorded influenza epidemic seasons 
A/England/42/72 (H3N2), wave 13.8 Jul 1972 India (1971-72), Nepal (1972-1973) [34] Australia (August 72) [20] England 
& Wales (1972-73) [21] United States (1972-73) [6,10]-Excess mortality 9.0 
A/England/42/72 (H3N2), 2""' wave 15.8 Jan 1973 As above. 
A/Port Chalmers/1/73 (H3N2), l " wave 9.9 May 1974 Port Chalmers, New Zealand (1973) [22] Nigeria (1974) United States (1974-
75) [6,10] - Excess mortality 7.0 Houston, United States (1974-75) [35] 
A/Victoria/3/75 (H3N2) 12.8 May 1976 United States (1975-76) [6,10] - Excess mortality 11.4 Houston, United 
States (1976) [36,37] England & Wales (1975-76) [25] - Excess mortality 60.8 
B/Singapore/222/79 11.2 May 1979 United States (1979-80) [6,10] - Excess mortality 7.6 Houston, United States 
(1979-80) [35] England & Wales (1978-79) [25] - Excess mortality 16.3 
A/Shanghai/ll/87-like, A/OMS/5389/88-like (H3N2) 11.7 Jun 1989 USA (1989-90) (A/Shanghai/11/87) [38] - Excess mortality 4.2 [6,10] Poland 
(1990) (A/OMS/5389/88) [39] England & Wales (1988-89) [25] - Excess 
mortality 20.0 
A/Beijing/32/92 (H3N2) 11.2 Jan 1993 USA (1991-92) [10] - Excess mortality 16.7 Netherlands (1993-94) [40] 
Ontario, Canada (1993-94) [41] Lasi, Romania (1993-94) [42] 
A/Wuhan/359/95 (H3N2) 10.7 May 1997 USA (1996-97) [11] - Excess mortality 25.9 Pune, India (Jan-Feb 1996) [44] 
Poland (Feb 1997) [45] Thailand (Jul-Aug 1997) [46] 
A/5ydney/5/97 (H3N2), l " wave 8.4 May 1998 USA (1997-98) [11,47] - Excess mortality 26.8 Australia (1997) [24] South 
Africa (1998) [25] 
A/Sydney/5/97 (H3N2), 2"" wave 7.0 Jan 1999 USA (1998-99) [11] - Excess mortality 23.1 
Other epidemics and pandemics of note in Singapore 
1951 influenza epidemic strain (MINI) 46.4 Sep 1951 
Asian influenza pandemic (H2N2) 54.4 May 1957 
Hong Kong influenza pandemic (H3N2) 28.0 Aug 1968 
A/USSR/1/77 (HIND 3.5 Jan 1977 
doi:10.1371 /iournal.pone.0008096.t002 
can be easily appl ied to count r ies w h e r e d a t a of f iner r eso ludon 
m a y be lacking. In t e rna t iona l c o m p a r i s o n s of East Asian a n d 
t ropical Sou theas t Asian count r ies should be cons idered , par t ic-
ularly at n e w var ian t s in view of recent phylogenet ic work which 
suggests tha t the region m a y be critical in the genesis of n e w H 3 N 2 
inf luenza s trains [34], 
In f luenza ep idemics were the likely cause of mos t of the excess 
mor ta l i ty pe r iods in pos t -war t ropical S ingapore , a l though not 
every in f luenza ep idemic resul ted in high morta l i ty . It is impor t an t 
to have good publ ic hea l th p r o g r a m s in place to detect inf luenza 
activity. Such p r o g i a m m e s , a long with a p p r o p r i a t e publ ic hea l th 
in tervent ions like vaccinat ion a n d jud ic ious antiviral use, could 
potent ial ly r educe the b u r d e n of seasonal or p a n d e m i c inf luenza. 
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Chapter Four 
2009 H l N l Influenza in Singapore and 
Estimating Overall Infection Rates 
As we move into the 21" Century, one of the questions that many public health 
decision makers were focused on was not if but when the first influenza pandemic of 
the new Century would arrive. Many countries had developed influenza pandemic 
preparedness and response plans for this eventuality, and had spent considerable 
resources on various preparedness programs. The world did not have to wait very long 
for the next pandemic as a novel H1N1 influenza virus was reported by the WHO on 
24 April 2009. The pandemic spread quickly from it's origins in Mexico in early 2009 
to the United States, and soon after to Canada, New Zealand, Israel, several European 
countries by 1 May 2009, and then to the rest of the world, resulting in the first 
influenza pandemic of the Century (1). 
As with previous pandemics, Singapore was yet again affected by the 2009 pandemic, 
although the arrival of the pandemic in Singapore occurred about a month after it was 
first reported globally. The first imported case of 2009 pandemic H l N l influenza was 
detected in Singapore on 26 May 2009 and reported the next day (2). From May to 
9 July 2009, there were 467 imported influenza cases of which the most frequent 
country of travel was Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and the United 
States (3). Transmission in the local community (detection of an unlinked local case) 
was first reported on 18 June 2009 (4). 
Although Singapore is a travel hub, it did not identify the first imported case for 
several weeks after other similar hubs in the region such as Hong Kong or Melbourne 
were affected. This occurred in spite of the high rates of travel from these affected 
regions and the substantially increased levels of vigilance for the novel virus in 
Singapore. For example, in Hong Kong, a city similar to Singapore, the first imported 
case was reported on 1 May 2009 (5). The reasons for the later detection in Singapore 
are unclear and it is likely that milder cases could have been imported or that some 
cases had evaded detection (3). At the same time it may also be possible that the delay 
was due to the measures implemented by the Singapore Government at that time, 
although there is no available scientific evidence that these measures were effective. 
The initial containment measures included temperature screening via thermal scanners 
at all entry points to Singapore, testing and isolation of all 2009 H l N l cases, 
distribution of health alert notices to all arriving individuals, and temporary visa 
requirements for visitors from Mexico from 2 to 12 May. These served to increase the 
awareness of the measures by arriving passengers (6), and perhaps reduced the 
likelihood of ill travelers coming to Singapore. 
At the same time, there was also a substantial delay between the first reported 
imported case and the first reported local transmission case in Hong Kong (5), which 
was similar to the experience in Singapore. This could have been due to the initial 
measures taken by the two governments such as isolation of confirmed cases in 
hospital, contact tracing and quarantine of contacts, anti-viral prophylaxis for 
contacts, and public education (5,6). In addition, the school holidays in Singapore 
started on 30 May 2009 and lasted until 28 June 2009, and may have contributed to 
the reduction in spread. However, it is also likely that some community spread could 
have occurred before the first reported case of local transmission (3). 
Nevertheless, after the first report of local transmission, the virus quickly spread 
across the country in a major epidemic wave that peaked in early August 2009 and 
subsided by September 2009. Due to the rapid spread of the virus globally and within 
Singapore, there was an interest from policy makers to determine the infection rate 
from the epidemic, and the associated severity rates in terms of severe cases requiring 
hospitalization or ventilator support, or death. The infection rate was especially 
important as it represented the extent of spread and possible immunity against 
subsequent waves of the same influenza strain, and is necessary as a denominator to 
determine the severity rates. The latter point cannot be overstated, as basing the 
denominator solely on laboratory positive cases or similar methods will substantially 
overestimate the severity of the disease, as shown in the early weeks of the 2009 
H l N l pandemic from the initial data coming out of Mexico (7). 
However, it is difficult to estimate infection rates from influenza due to the non-
specific clinical presentation which as previously mentioned is very similar to other 
ILIs, and the fact that influenza often presents as sub-clinical or asymptomatic 
infection which is difficult to detect. One of the methods that is often used to 
determine the overall infection rate is serological studies which determine the increase 
in antibody titers to the particular influenza strain. During the 2009 pandemic, many 
countries worldwide used such studies with different study designs to estimate the 
local infection rates (8). Although this is a fairly accurate and consistent measure used 
to determine infection in influenza and other diseases, it is resource intensive and 
difficult to perform to ensure good representation of the population even in the best of 
situations. In addition, there is a time delay that is inherent for serological studies due 
to the time needed for serological conversion to occur in the infected individual, and 
the testing thereafter. 
At the same time, many countries have good existing syndromic surveillance systems, 
or are able to set up these systems quickly during the lead-in to the local epidemic. 
These systems may provide good estimates of infection rates, but an expansion factor 
must be considered to include cases that are not picked up by these syndromic 
surveillance systems. 
The following study explores this concept through the use of four different methods to 
estimate the infection rate of the 2009 H l N l influenza epidemic in Singapore. This is 
made possible due to the various studies that have been done in the local setting, some 
of which have been showcased in this thesis, and the single first epidemic wave which 
provided an easier characterization of the start and end of the wave. The results from 
this study will allow policy makers and public health professionals worldwide to 
design surveillance systems that can provide important data during future epidemics 
and pandemics. 
Study 2 
This article was published in the American Journal of Epidemiology 
Lee VJ, Chen MI, Yap J, Ong J, Lim WY, Lin RTP, Barr I, Ong J, Mak TM, Goh 
LG, Leo YS, Kelly PM, Cook AR. Comparability of different methods for estimating 
influenza infection rates over a single epidemic wave. AJE. 2011;174(4)468-78. 
References 
1. World Health Organization. WHO Influenza-like illness in the United States 
and Mexico, 29 April 2009, Cited 10 August 2011. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009 04 24/en/indcx.html. 
2. Ministry of Health Singapore. First confirmed case of influenza A ( H l N l -
2009) in Singapore, 27 May 2009. Cited 10 August 2011. Available at: 
http://www.moh. gov.sg/mohcorp/pressreleases.aspx?id=21914. 
3. Cutter J, Ang LW, Lai F, Subramony H, Ma S, James L. Outbreak of 
pandemic influenza A (HIN 1-2009) in Singapore, May-September 2009. Ann 
Acad Med Singapore. 2010;39(4):273-10. 
4. Ministry of Health Singapore. Confirmed new cases of influenza A H1N1, 18 
June 2009. Cited 10 August 2011. Available at: 
http://www.moh.gov.sg/mohcorp/pressreleases.aspx?id=22194. 
5. Wu JT, Cowling BT, Lau EH et al. School closure and mitigation of pandemic 
( H l N l ) 2009, Hong Kong. Emerg Infect Dis. 2010;16(3):538-41. 
6. Tay J, Ng YF, Cutter JL, James L. Influenza A (HlNl -2009) pandemic in 
Singapore-public health control measures implemented and lessons learnt. 
Ann Acad Med Singapore. 2010;39(4):313-12. 
7. Lipsitch M, Lajous M, O'Hagan JJ, Cohen T, Miller JC, et al. Use of 
Cumulative Incidence of Novel Influenza A/HINI in Foreign Travelers to 
Estimate Lower Bounds on Cumulative Incidence in Mexico. PLoS ONE. 
2009; 4(9): e6895. 
8. World Health Organization. Seroepidemiological studies of pandemic 
influenza A ( H I N l ) 2009 virus. Weekly Epidemiological Record. 2010;24 
(85), 229-236. 
American Journal of Epidemiology Advance Access published June 30, 2011 
m Amer ican Journal of Epidemiology © The Author 2011, Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Tills is an Open Access article distributeij under tfie terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http;//crealivecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5), which permits unrestricted non-commercial use. 
distnbution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited-
DOI: 10.1093/aje/kwr113 
Practice of Epidemiology 
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Estimation of influenza Infection rates is important for determination of the extent of epidemic spread and for 
calculation of severity indicators. The authors compared estimated infection rates from paired and cross-sectional 
serologic surveys, rates of influenza like illness (ILI) obtained from sentinel general practitioners (GPs), and ILI 
samples that tested positive for influenza using data from similar periods collected during the 2009 H I N1 epidemic 
in Singapore. The authors performed sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of estimates to input parameter 
uncertainties, and they determined sample sizes required for differing levels of precision. Estimates from paired 
seroconversion were 17% (95% Bayesian credible interval (BCI); 14, 20), higher than those from cross-sectional 
serology (12%, 95% BCI: 9,17). Adjusted ILI estimates were 15% (95% BCI: 10, 25), and estimates computed from 
ILI and laboratory data were 12% (95% BCI: 8, 18). Serologic estimates were least sensitive to the risk of input 
parameter misspecification. ILI-based estimates were more sensitive to parameter misspecification, though this 
was lessened by incorporation of laboratory data. Obtaining a 5-percentage-point spread for the 95% confidence 
interval in infection rates would require more than 1,000 participants per serologic study, a sentinel network of 90 
GPs, or 50 GPs when combined with laboratory samples. The various types of estimates will provide comparable 
findings if accurate input parameters can be obtained. 
epidemics; estimation; infection; influenza, human; population surveillance; serologic tests; statistics as topic 
Abbreviations: BCI, Bayesian credible interval; GP, general practitioner; HAI, hemagglutination inhibition; ILI, influenzalike illness; 
RT-PCR, reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction. 
Assess ing the spread and severi ty of inf luenza ep idemics 
is necessary to ca l ibra te response and mi t iga t ion strategies 
(1). T h e Wor ld Hea l th Organ iza t ion and m a n y individual 
count r ies have m a d e substant ia l inves tments to measure ep-
idemic indicators . O n e impor tan t indicator is the e p i d e m i c ' s 
infec t ion rate, w h i c h is crucial to quan t i fy overal l morbid i ty 
and to obta in an accura te denomina to r fo r ca lcu la t ing c o m -
phca t ion and morta l i ty rates used to c lass i fy severi ty; the 
latter, in turn, gu ides pr ior i t izat ion of in tervent ions for miti-
gat ing e p i d e m i c severity. 
The 2 0 0 9 inf luenza p a n d e m i c showed the urgency of such 
a s se s smen t s for act ivat ion of appropr ia te responses , espe-
cially ear ly in a p a n d e m i c . Because comple t e case coun ts 
are not feas ib le (2), dur ing the 2009 ep idemic publ ic heal th 
off icials in many count r ies a t t empted to es t imate infect ion 
ra tes us ing w h a t e v e r da ta w e r e ava i l ab l e . T h i s i nc luded 
es t ima t ing cl inical a t tack rates f r o m in f luenza l ike i l lness 
( ILI) surve i l lance , d e t e r m i n i n g in fec t ion ra tes t h rough se-
ro logic surveys , and even us ing non t rad i t iona l m e t h o d s 
such as Internet sea rches (3, 4). However , ex is t ing da ta 
co l lec t ion p lans are vi tal , s ince ex t r apo la t ing f r o m ILl sur-
ve i l lance necess i t a tes e s t ima t ing ra tes of p r ima ry -c a r e 
consu l ta t ion a m o n g in f luenza cases , w h i c h are in f luenced 
by popu la t ion hea l th -ca re - seek ing b e h a v i o r s (5), whi le se-
ro logic su rveys r equ i re subs tant ia l p l ann ing and l abora to ry 
suppor t (6). 
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With myriad estimation methods in use, it is important 
to determine their comparability and stabihty to misspeci-
fication of input parameters, to allow better interpretation 
of estimates over different countries and successive influenza 
epidemics. In this study, we answered these questions by 
comparing results of different methods in a single setting. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
To illustrate the different methods used worldwide to 
estimate infection rates during the 2009 H IN l influenza 
pandemic, we performed a literature search with the 
PubMed search engine (US National Library of Medicine), 
spanning May I, 2009, to August I, 2010, using the search 
terms "influenza attack rate" and "influenza infection 
rate." The inclusion criterion was all English-language ar-
ticles that provided infection rate estimates and explicitly 
described the methods used to derive the estimates. 
Different methods for estimating infection rates 
From the common methods used globally (5, 7-20) 
(Table I), we selected 4 representative generic methods 
(Table 2), together with generic equations and minimum 
data requirements, to determine their comparability. The 4 
methods were serologic cohort and cross-sectional studies, 
sentinel general practitioner (GP) ILl surveillance, and lab-
oratory surveillance to supplement GP data. 
Using data from the first wave of the 2009 H I N l epi-
demic in Singapore, a tropical city-state, we compared 
infection rates estimated using these methods. Singapore 
was ideal for this study, because the first epidemic wave's 
temporal progression was well-defined—beginning in late 
June, peaking in early August, and ending by September 
(Figure 1)—and several surveillance programs and studies 
were performed simultaneously in the adult population, 
facilitating comparison of different methods. 
Data sources 
We used data sources available from June 2009, at the 
first suggestion of community transmission in Singapore, to 
October 2009, I month after numbers of respiratory illness 
cases returned to baseline levels (Figure I). ILI cases were 
defined as cases involving new-onset respiratory symptoms 
with body temperature greater than 38.0°C (1()0.4°F), 
following World Health Organization definitions (21, 22). 
We performed aggregated and age-stratified analyses among 
5 age groups: 20-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and >55 years. 
Data sources included: 
I) A paired seroincidence adult cohort study (17). Multiple 
blood samples were obtained from each participant, 
including a baseline sample taken up to June 27, 2009 
(before the local epidemic); a second sample taken 
between August 20, 2009, and August 29, 2009 (4 weeks 
after the epidemic's peak); and a postepidemic sample 
taken between October 6, 2009, and October 11, 2009 
(4 weeks after the epidemic subsided). Fortnightly 
telephone surveys were used to collect data on clinical 
symptoms and health-care consultations. Data from 727 
participants with paired serum samples were used. 
2) A sentinel GP network of 23 GPs nationwide reporting 
ILI cases, initiated in June 2009 (23). Individual patient 
consultations involving ILI were recorded using a stan-
dardized template and submitted daily, together with ba-
sic demographic details. 
3) Laboratory-based national surveillance by the Ministry 
of Health using samples from ILI patients visiting 
sentinel primary health-care clinics. Samples were tested 
for 2009 influenza A virus (H IN l ) by means of reverse-
transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) (24), 
producing weekly age-stratified data on the proportion 
of ILI samples positive for HIN1 -2009. When combined 
with ILI surveillance data, this negates the need to esti-
mate the proportion of ILI consultations due to influenza 
(ILI consultations include conditions not due to influ-
enza), leaving only the proportion of influenza cases 
who seek medical consultation for ILI to be determined. 
Data from the serologic and GP studies were collected under 
the approval of the National University of Singapore Insti-
tutional Review Board. Laboratory data were part of the 
Ministry of Health's ongoing influenza epidemiology sur-
veillance program, and no ethics review was required. 
Statistical methods and computation of infection rates 
In addition to the main data, each method required supple-
mentary data ranging from simple test sensitivity for paired 
serologic data to consultation rates given infection and in-
fection rates given ILI consultation. While serologic surveys 
intrinsically account for asymptomatic infections, ILI-based 
estimates need to be complemented with prior information to 
allow for nonreporting of symptomatic cases and asymptom-
atic infections. Because the latter information was available 
from the serologic surveys, we used parameters derived from 
the serologic surveys for the ILI-based estimates. 
To allow full propagation of parametric uncertainty, we 
used an objective Bayesian approach, taking flat prior dis-
tributions in the absence of data and informative priors only 
when suitable external data were available. We used as 
many data as were available from these studies, including 
some which would not be available in other settings using 
only I source of data. Full details on the statistical methods 
used and the distributions of key parameters can be found 
in the Web Appendix (http://aje.oxfordjournals.org/). 
Method 1: paired serologic surveys. To estimate infec-
tion rates from paired serologic surveys, we defined overall 
seroconversion as a 4-fold or greater rise in titer on hemag-
glutination inhibition (HAI) testing between baseline titers 
and subsequent samples for the same individual. Since not 
all influenza infections may be detected by HAI (because of 
sample timing, insufficient titer increases, or measurement 
error), we adjusted the seroconversion rates by HAI sensi-
tivity using data from our study and another study (17, 25). 
Because there was no clear evidence on HAI false-positive 
rates, we did not adjust for this possibility. 
Method 2: cross-sectional serologic surveys. To estimate 
infection rates from cross-sectional sampling similarly to 
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other studies, we defined the cross-sectional seroprevalence 
at each sampling point as the proportion with HAl titers 
of >40 (12, 14). We then subtracted baseHne seroprevalence 
from final seroprevalence and adjusted the results by the 
sensitivity of a single postinfection sample to detect HAl 
titers of >40 in patients confirmed to have infection. 
Method 3: ILI data from sentinel GPs. When using ILl 
data from sentinel GP sites, we computed the number of 
ILl consultations per sentinel GP day and scaled this to 
the population using the relative proportion of ILI seen by 
the average GP, using data on primary-care consultations 
from a national survey (26). In addition, we estimated the 
ratio of all ILI consultations to influenza infections through 
data on symptoms and health-care-seeking behavior available 
from our serologic cohort study (adjusting for HAl sensitiv-
ity), assuming that the serologic study was representative of 
the general population in terms of symptom presentation 
and health-care-seeking behavior. We then estimated the 
number of community influenza infections given the ILI 
observed. In the absence of such data, other approaches 
must be taken to scale the estimates from the sampled data 
to the general population appropriately (see Discussion). 
Method 4: laboratory surveillance and ILI data from 
sentinel GPs. We also used laboratory data to supplement 
sentinel GP ILI data, replacing the proportion of ILI con-
sultations due to influenza with the proportion of ILI sam-
ples that tested positive for HlNl-2()()9 by RT-PCR, while 
adjusting for the imperfect sensitivity of the RT-PCR assay 
in detecting influenza cases (25). Ideally, validation should 
be performed in the same laboratory using the same virus 
strain and correlated with epidemiologic data; because this 
was not possible, we performed sensitivity analysis to ac-
count for it. We then incorporated the fraction of infections 
without a primary care consultation for ILI from our cohort 
study as above. 
Because of the poor specificity of acute respiratory illness 
in estimating influenza (27), we did not include analysis 
relying on acute respiratory illness only. 
Sensitivity analyses 
Because not all countries have access to relevant support-
ing data, especially on ILI consultation rates, some methods 
require extrapolation from other settings. Therefore, we 
performed Bayesian sensitivity analyses to determine the 
robustness of these methods to misspecification of key input 
parameters and the resulting impact on inferred infection 
rates. We set Dirac delta priors on one parameter at a time, 
keeping all other priors as above and varying the single 
parameter in question over a plausible range, as might 
be done operationally when no accurate data are available. 
The parameters examined were the sensitivity of the tests, 
the ratio of all ILI consultations to influenza cases, and 
the market share of sentinel GPs—factors that may vary 
by strain, location, and time. 
Analysis of sample-size effects 
Finally, to appreciate the effect of sample size on the 
spread of estimates for future surveys, we performed boot-
strap analysis on our existing data. For methods 1 and 2, we 
simulated, using a binomial distribution, the proportion 
of infections which might be observed to seroconvert with 
different numbers of paired sera or to have antibodies at 
titers >40 in different numbers of baseline and follow-up 
samples, respectively, assuming that the true infection rate 
corresponded to our estimate. For methods 3 and 4, we 
simulated the observations for a situation in which the sen-
tinel GP ILl data had been derived from different numbers 
of GPs, by resampling with replacement from the available 
GPs (we restricted resampling to GPs who submitted data 
for at least 50% of all days). To estimate the effect of 
laboratory samples on method 4, we used the binomial dis-
tribution to simulate positive proportions which might be 
observed in each week, assuming that laboratory samples 
were distributed uniformly each week across the epidemic. 
The corresponding formulae were applied to the estimates 
derived from the bootstrap with 100,000 resamples for each 
method and sample size. Since the availability of external 
data in future outbreaks is unpredictable, we did not attempt 
to incorporate parametric uncertainty from external data 
in these analyses. We used a 5- to 10-percentage-point spread 
in the 95% confidence interval of the infection rate estimate 
as reasonable for classifying epidemic severity or for evalu-
ating the success of interventions. 
RESULTS 
Figure 2 shows the estimated infection rates calculated 
from the various estimation methods based on the Singapore 
studies. The overall infection rate estimated using paired 
seroconversion samples was 17% (95% Bayesian credible 
interval (BCI): 14, 20). Using estimates derived from paired 
seroconversion data as the comparison group, the overall 
estimate derived from cross-sectional serologic sampling 
(obtained with baseline and final titers from the serologic 
cohort study as independent samples) was lower at 12% 
(95% BCI: 9, 17), also observed across all age groups. Es-
timates from ILI rates (15%, 95% BCI: 10, 25) and estimates 
from the combination of ILI and laboratory data (12%, 95% 
BCI: 8, 18) provided overall estimates close to the serologic 
estimates, although there were variations among various age 
groups. 
The substantial overlap in 95% Bayesian credible inter-
vals for all 4 methods, along with fairly close point esti-
mates, suggests that accurate determination of input 
variables can produce similar results regardless of the es-
timation method. The actual and effective sample sizes 
available to us led to estimates from ILl alone being the 
most uncertain, while seroconversion data gave the most 
precise estimates, although this may have been different 
if resources had allowed for different relative sample sizes. 
Estimates using the combination of ILl and laboratory data 
were less sensitive than ILl alone but more sensitive than 
the seroconversion estimates. 
From the sensitivity analyses (Web Figure 1), serologic 
cohort estimates were very robust to misspecification of 
the external input parameter (test sensitivity), as were 
cross-sectional serologic estimates. The latter, however. 
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International public health records 
surveyed to estimate infection rates 
among travelers to Mexico 
Cases among Mexican residents = 
cases in travelers x (Mexican 
population X 30 days)/(traveler 
population X duration of travel) 
Incidence of ARI consultations 
gathered from social insurance data, 
adjusted by the proportion of sentinel 
physician consultations 
Health-care-seeking behavior in 
persons with ARI from a cross-
sectional survey 
Calculated by extrapolating the 
proportion of randomly selected ARI 
patients testing HIN1-positive in the 
total estimated no. of ARI cases 
Incidence of ILI from an online self-
reporting ILI surveillance system 
Proportion of ILI samples that tested 
HINI-posit ive from national 
laboratories 
Using these data, the proportion of ILI 
cases due to H1N1 was estimated 
and extrapolated to the general 
population. 
Cohort of children selected from an 
existing dengue study 
Testing criteria were fever with cough, 
sore throat, or rhinorrhea 
Samples were tested by RT-PCR to 
determine the H1N1 clinical attack 
rate. 
No extrapolation to the general 
population was done. 
Cross-sectional seroprevalence study 
from serum obtained from pregnant 
women in weeks 48-49 of 2009 
Cumulative seroprevalence was then 
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April 21, 2009, 
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Colizza, 
2009 (19) 
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Estimation using mathematical model 
and probabilities of ILI with 
consultations, consultations that 
were tested, and proportion positive. 
For New York, a telephone survey was 
conducted to determine self-reported 
ILI status. 
Abbreviations: ARI, acute respiratory illness; CI, confidence interval; ILI, influenzalike illness; RT-PCR, reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain 
reaction. 
were strongly influenced by misspecification of the level of 
baseline prepandemic titers. Because substantial propor-
tions o f persons had baseline antibodies to H IN 1-2009 
(12, 17, 28), accurately determining baseline rates is impor-
tant, and cross-sectional estimates that assumed no baseline 
titers (similar to the 0 % baseline value in Web Figure I C ) 
wou ld bias infection rate estimates upwards. 
ILI estimates were very sensitive and changed substan-
tially with key parameters of market share per GP, propor-
tion of influenza cases who seek medical consultation for 
IL I , and proportion of IL l consultations due to influenza. 
Estimates derived from combin ing ILI data with laboratory 
data only required determining the proportion o f influenza 
cases that sought medical consultation for ILI , which we 
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Table 2. Methods Used for Est imat ing Rates of Inf luenza Infection During the 2009 H1N1 Outbreak in Singapore 
Method and Data Requirements Advantages {+) and Disadvantages ( - ) 
Method 1: paired serologic sun/eys® 
Seroconvers ion data from cohort study 
Sensit ivi ty of the serologic test to detect true infection 
Total populat ion size (to determine conf idence interval 
for the est imate) 
Method 2: cross-sect ional serologic sun/eys' ' 
Proport ion of persons with high pre- and postpandemic 
titers 
Sensit ivity to detect change in titers {proport ion of true 
infections that have high postpandemic and low 
prepandemic titers using the cutoff titer) 
Total populat ion size (to determine conf idence interval 
for the est imate) 
Method 3: syndromic survei l lance for ILI"^ 
Data on all ILI consul tat ions f rom sentinel GPs 
Proport ion of inf luenza cases involving consultat ion for ILI 
Proport ion of ILI consul tat ions due to inf luenza 
Market share of GPs surveyed among the total populat ion 
Total populat ion size 
Method 4: syndromic survei l lance for ILI with virologic data' ' 
Data on all ILI consultat ions from sentinel GPs 
Market share of GPs surveyed among the total populat ion 
Proport ion of inf luenza cases involving consultat ion for ILI 
Laboratory proport ion of ILI samples that test posit ive for 
inf luenza 
Sensit ivity of the laboratory test 
Total populat ion size 
+ Detects subcl inical cases 
- Diff icult ies in t imely data col lect ion dur ing an evolv ing 
pandemic 
- No est imate of cl inical infection rate 
- Availabil i ty of results is dependent on sampl ing intervals 
-H Relative ease of data col lect ion in compar ison with paired 
serologic surveys 
- Risk of underest imat ion because of persons with high 
basel ine titers 
- Difficult to general ize to populat ion when using banked 
samples 
-H Al lows for " real- t ime" est imat ion of infection rate 
-I- Data col lect ion is possible with minimal resources 
- Unable to capture subcl inical infections 
- Dependent on cl inician report ing 
- Difficulties in est imat ing input parameters 
- Large margin of error if g iven inaccurate data 
+ Margin of error is reduced in compar ison with method 3 
+ Al lows for "real- t ime" est imat ion of infection rate 
- Addit ional resources required for laboratory test ing 
- Dependent on sensit ivity of laboratory test 
Abbreviat ions: GP, general practit ioner; ILI, inf luenzalike illness. 
® Method 1 infection rate = (no. of persons who seroconverted)/[( total no. fol lowed up) x (sensitivity of the serologic test)]. 
'' Method 2 infection rate = [(proportion with high postpandemic titers) - (proport ion with high prepandemic titers)]/(sensit ivity to detect true 
change in titers). 
Method 3 infection rate = (no. of ILI cases)/ [(market share of GPs surveyed) x populat ion x (proport ion of inf luenza cases that involved 
consul tat ion for ILI) x (proport ion of ILI consultat ions due to influenza)]. 
Method 4 infection rate = (no. of ILI cases)/ [(market share of GPs surveyed) x populat ion x (proport ion of inf luenza cases that involved 
consultat ion for ILI) x (proport ion of ILI samples that tested posit ive/sensit ivity of the laboratory test)]. 
ob t a i ned f r o m ou r sero log ic s tudy ques t ionna i re . I n fec t i on 
rate es t imates were very sensit ive to m isspec i f i ca t ion o f th is 
pa rameter ; however , were it d e t e rm i ned w i t h greater ac-
curacy, this m e t h o d w o u l d p rov i de ex t reme ly accurate esti-
mates , as s h o w n by the very narrow Bayes i an cred ib le 
in terva ls in W e b F igure I H . 
F igure 3 shows the samp le sizes required to obta in 5- and 
lO-percentage-point spreads in m e a n infect ion rates for the 
9 5 % conf idence intervals. For paired serologic estimates, 
300 part ic ipants were required in order to achieve a 10-
percentage-point spread, and 1,150 were required for a 
5-percentage-point spread. For cross-sectional serologic esti-
mates , more persons are needed per survey to achieve a s imi lar 
spread. For IL I est imates a lone, the required n umbe r o f G P s 
that report da i ly had to be 20 and 90 to achieve spreads o f 10-
and 5-percentage points, respectively (S ingapore had an esti-
mated 2,138 G P s in 2009) (26). A d d i n g laboratory data re-
duces the n umbe r o f G P s needed by a lmos t hal f , wh i l e the total 
n umbe r o f laboratory samples required over the entire study 
per iod was less than 200 for a 5-percentage-point spread. 
Tab le I s u m m a r i z e s da ta on the 15 papers selected f r o m 
ou r l i terature search, ou t o f 295 ident i f ied . These stud ies d i d 
not al l use the s ame me thods , a nd it is d i f f i cu l t to c o m p a r e 
their results because mos t invest igators d i d not c omp l e t e l y 
ad just for key parameters such as test sensi t iv i ty , a s ymp t om-
atic cases, or base l i ne titers. Three s tud ies used surve i l l ance 
d a t a — f r o m travelers to M e x i c o ear ly in the e p i d e m i c (7) , 
f r o m a sent ine l phys i c i an ne two rk (8) , a n d f r o m on l i n e sur-
ve i l l ance too ls together w i t h l abora tory da ta (9) ; a nd al l 
used d i f ferent me t hods o f sca l i ng da ta to the p o p u l a t i o n 
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Figure 1. Sources of available data on influenza infection in Singa-
pore from June to October 2009. A) Numbers of cases of acute re-
spiratory illness (ARI) diagnosed in government clinics, in thousands 
per week; B) numbers of adult cases of influenza like illness (ILI) 
reported by primary-care general practitioner (GP) sentinel clinics 
per GP per week; 0 ) percentage of ILI cases that tested positive for 
H1N1 -2009 influenza per week. Lighter lines, 95% confidence interval. 
level. Of the serologic surveys, only I study used paired 
samples (17); 7 studies were cross-sectional, with different 
sample origins (5, 11-16); and only 2 adjusted for prepan-
demic seroprevalence (12, 16). Two studies performed lab-
oratory testing of all ILI cases but in unique small-scale 
military (18) and pediatric cohort (10) settings, while 2 used 
mathematical modeling of primary data (19, 20). 
DISCUSSION 
Estimation of epidemic infection rates is important in 
order to evaluate disease morbidity and to obtain accurate 
denominators for severity indicators, such as hospitaliza-
tions or case fatality. Attempts have been made to determine 
infection rates through different methods during different 
time periods (Table 1). However, none describe the relative 
comparability and robustness of these estimation methods 
in a single setting. Public health professionals and policy-
makers should understand the advantages and disadvantages 
of these methods to incorporate data collection into prepared-
ness plans and to account for possible errors. 
Serologic surveys provide reliable estimates of infection 
rates, since they determine antibodies even for asymptomatic 
cases (17, 29). Serial sampling from individuals in the con-
text of H1N1 -2009 is important because baseline antibodies 
were present f rom cross-reactivity to different strains (28). 
Serial sampling requires preplanning and good timing to 
establish cohorts with baseline blood samples before the 
epidemic 's onset. Therefore, few countries have been able 
to perform serologic cohort studies (6). Serologic surveys 
are only available after each sampling interval, depending 
on laboratory capacity; will usually not provide real-time 
estimates; and are unable to detect temporary rises in titers 
that may arise from mild infections, which may 
be important for subsequent immunity. A further weakness 
of serologic surveys is that they do not estimate clinical 
infect ion rates unless clinical surveys are conduc ted 
simultaneously. 
Cross-sectional serologic surveys have disadvantages 
similar to those of cohort studies but are easier to conduct 
without individual follow-up, and samples can be obtained 
from other collection sources (e.g., blood banks). However, 
upon subtraction of baseline prepandemic levels, they may 
produce lower estimates than cohort studies because of 
overcompensation for baseline titers (12, 17, 28). This 
may result in estimates with negative infection rates, which 
are difficult to interpret (12). This may also be a problem 
when producing age-stratified estimates if baseline antibody 
levels differ by age (12, 14, 28). Other surveys used only 
a single postpandemic sample without baseline adjustment 
(5, I I , 13-15), which may have resulted in overestimation; 
estimates were as high as 58.9% in one study ( I I ) and were 
21% in another study, which also had a 6% baseline preva-
lence of antibodies (14). Unless accurate baseline estimates 
are available, cross-sectional surveys will be less accurate 
than paired surveys. The sample source may also make it 
difficult to generalize results—some studies obtained blood 
collected for other purposes, including blood donations and 
health monitoring programs, which may not represent the 
general population (12, 14-16). 
It is clear from our sensitivity analyses that serologic 
survey estimates result in narrower ranges and are less sen-
sitive to misspecification of input parameters. However, how 
serologic titers decrease over time is unknown, especially if 
samples are taken at long intervals. This can be averted by 
conducting serologic cohort studies with multiple samplings 
at shorter intervals. 
ILI-derived estimates are easily obtained from sentinel 
CPs, and in Singapore they were similar to serologic and 
laboratory estimates. However, ILI estimates are very sen-
sitive to changes in input parameters, and these must be 
determined accurately. Adjustment for nonreporting and 
asymptomatic infection can be achieved via a "scal ing-up 
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Figure 2. Rates of H1N1-2009 inf luenza infection est imated from var ious methods, aggregated and by age group, Singapore, 2009. For details 
on methods 1 - 4 (I\/I1-M4), see Table 2. ILI, inf luenza like illness. Whiskers, 9 5 % Bayesian credible interval. 
factor" or by using prior information on ILI consultations 
for all influenza infections. The latter is intrinsically difficult 
to obtain, since it is ideally based on data from confirmed 
cases, which were available for our study (17). In other 
settings, strategies might involve extrapolating from past 
epidemics or other regions. For example, because different 
adjustment factors were used in the studies by D'Ortenzio 
et al. (8) and Dawood et al. (9), these estimates are unlikely 
to be comparable. Adding accurate laboratory testing data 
to ILI addresses the otherwise substantial difficulty in esti-
mating ILI consultations due to influenza, and results in 
estimates that are less sensitive to parameter misspecifica-
tion. This does not obviate the need to estimate the propor-
tion of influenza cases who seek medical consultation for 
ILI, which we did via our serologic cohort (17), although 
this proportion can also be estimated through local surveys 
carried out among ILI cases (since consultation is influenced 
by local health-care-seeking behaviors) (2), adjusted by the 
proportion of ILI among influenza cases, which is a biologic 
variable that presumably can be extrapolated from other 
regions. The need for reliable extraneous data is the main 
weakness of consultation data, especially in heterogeneous 
environments. 
Infection rates differ across age groups, with the highest 
infection rates being seen in younger adults, confirming 
that young adults (and perhaps children) had higher infec-
tion rates during the 2009 H I N I pandemic. Estimates from 
different estimation methods also differ across age groups: 
Greater differences exist between estimates in the younger 
age groups, with ILI-derived estimates being biased upwards 
relative to serology (although the 95% Bayesian credible 
intervals overlap). This shows the difficulties in estimating 
attack rates for different age categories through surveillance, 
without having accurate scaling factors and concomitantly 
larger sample sizes to accurately determine age-specific 
infection rates. 
Data from primary health-care surveillance and laborato-
ries are more suited than serologic studies to providing real-
time data with which to map an epidemic's development 
and develop predictive models (23). ILI-derived estimates 
with laboratory data can also be continually used to monitor 
seasonal influenza infection rates and are already part of 
many routine surveillance systems. The Mexican studies 
carried out at the epidemic's start to determine early extent 
of spread (7, 19) and the localized San Diego, California, 
outbreak (18) provided real-time estimates for early plan-
ning. However, additional laboratory data may not be read-
ily available in low-resource settings and may be difficuh 
to obtain in a heterogeneous setting with different socio-
demographic profiles within a country. 
Another potential obstacle to accurate estimation of 
infecfion rates is the sample size required for sufficient accu-
racy. Serologic studies required to achieve a 5-percentage-
point spread (>1,000 participants per survey) may be 
difficult to perform in settings with fewer resources. ILI 
estimates may be easier to collect if GPs are able to rou-
tinely report ILI cases, since 4% of all GPs can achieve a 
5-percentage-point spread. Including laboratory samples 
further reduces the number of GPs required, while only 
requiring a small number of samples over the epidemic 
period because of good correlation between influenza-
positive laboratory samples and the epidemic curve. With 
a consistent sentinel GP network and laboratory testing 
program, method 4 can be routinely used to estimate in-
fection rates for regular influenza seasons and the relative 
burden of disease from different strains. 
Two limitations of our study were the lack of pediatric 
data for comparison (these data were collected differently 
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F igure 3. Change in the 9 5 % conf idence interval (dashed lines) for the mean est imated H1N1 inf luenza infection rate (solid line) with different 
sample sizes using 4 different est imation methods, Singapore, 2009. A) Method 1; B) method 2; C) method 3; D) method 4; E) method 4 (see Table 
2). Sample s izes which resulted in a 5- and 10-percentage-point spreads in the conf idence interval for the mean est imates are shown with dotted 
vertical lines; the actual sample size used in the Singapore studies is shown with a circle on the x-axis. The total number of general practi t ioners 
(GPs) in Singapore in 2009 was approximately 2,138. 
f rom data on adults) and small sample sizes when stratifying 
by age for some analyses. Researchers who aim to est imate 
age-group-specif ic infection rates will need to increase the 
sample size proport ionally, which could result in very large 
studies. In this paper, we have clearly displayed the differ-
ences be tween the methods in a single populat ion, and these 
concepts are appl icable to other populat ions and settings. 
Al though this study was based on Singapore ' s HlNl-2() ( )9 
epidemic, the methods proposed are applicable globally to 
other infect ious diseases. 
Es t imates of infection rates f rom serologic data and ILI 
data with or without laboratory data can provide comparable 
results if input parameters are accurately determined. Each 
method has advantages and disadvantages which should 
be considered when compar ing est imates. The epidemic 
t iming, object ives of data col lect ion, and availabil i ty of 
resources will also determine the method used. Countr ies 
with sufficient resources may consider using mult iple esti-
mation methods to cover the disadvantages of some while 
benefit ing f rom the advantages of others. 
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Web Figure 1. One-way sensitivity analyses showing changes in the estimated infection rates 
using various methods, with changes to single input parameters. Graphs A to H show changes to 
the infection rate estimates using the various methods (labeled Ml to M4, respectively) shown 
on the j-axis with changes to the input parameters shown on the x-axis. The mean and 95% 
Bayesian credible intervals of the sensitivity analyses are shown in the main graphs. The box 
plots or point estimates of the actual parameters obtained from the Singapore studies are shown 
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Statistical methodology 
All four approaches to estimate infection rates reqnire information from multiple sources. The 
Bayesian statistical paradigm (1) is particularly well suited to combining information from dif-
ferent sources while allowing for proper propagation of micertainty. For all four methods, we use 
non-informative, flat prior distributions on all parameters unless external data were available to 
provide an informative prior distribution. For these informative prior distributions, we started 
with a non-informative prior, ht a model to the external data, and used the resulting posterior 
distribution including all within model uncertainty as the informative prior for the main analysis. 
Where an analytical form could not be found for it. the posterior distribution from fitting to 
external data was approximated by a (nuiltivariate) Gaussian distribution. 
When conjugate priors were not available, models were fit using Markov chain Monte Carlo 
integration, with univariate Gaussian proposal distributions centred on the current value and the 
Metropolis-Hastings acceptance algorithm (1). Proposal bandwidths were selected by trial and 
error until satisfactory mixing of MCMC chains was achieved; convergence of MCMC output was 
assessed by visual inspection of trace plots. When mixing was slow, chains were run for longer and 
thinned to reduce autocorrelations, but for models in which the MCMC routine mixed ostensibly 
quickly through the posterior distribution, no thimiing was used. 
Method 1: paired serological surveys 
Method 1 used paired serology, with a baseline blood sample and the highest follow up sample, 
either mid- or post-epidemic. A "fourfold rise" (from baseline in {l:t,l:2t) to (l:4t.l:8f) for 
t e {5.10.20,...}; note that although this does not guarantee a fourfold rise in the uncensored 
titres standard terminology is to call it a fourfold rise, a convention we abide by here) is deemed 
to be a seroconversion. The proportion seroconverting must however be scaled up to accoimt tor 
imperfect sensitivity of serology. To do this, we used data on seroconversions associated with 
RT-PCR confirmed infection from (2) and (3). 
Data used: 
• number of seroconversions; 
• number of possible seroconversions; 
• estimated sensitivity of seroconversion. 
The number of seroconversions and niunber at risk were taken from a seroepidemiological study 
performed in Singapore during the first wave (3). The sensitivity of seroconversion relative to 
RT-PCR confirmed infection was estimated from historic (2) and contemporary (3) studies. The 
estimates from these two studies individually were close enough to warrant merging the two and 
using the historic data alongside the 2009-HlNl data. 
Notation: 
• n = the number of individuals in follow-up- known; 
• X = the niunber of individuals that seroconverted- known; 
• fTj = sensitivity of the seroconversion test versus RT-PCR, i.e. the probability of a sero-
conversion given a virologically confirmed infection; 
• p = the proportion infected in the population. 
Full model for data and parameters: 
X ~ Bin(n,a ip) 
cTi ~ Be(675.174) 
P ~ U(0,1). 
The prior distribution for a i comes from taking the conjugate prior U(0, 1) = Be(l, 1) to a 
binomial model for seroconversion given RT-PCR confirmed infection using the data in (2) and 
(3). 
Simplified representation of model: 
P = — 
nai 
(Ti = 0.79 
Assumptions: 
• The findings from (2) and (3) generalise to our study population. The two papers show 
similar results, supporting this assumption. 
• Our cohort is a random sample from the population—the fact that it is not means there 
may be a systematic and unquantifiable bias in the results. 
• Seroconversions are independent—some study participants had co-habitants also in the 
study, leading to a systematic underestimate of the uncertainty. The magnitude of the bias 
is likely to be small due to the small fraction of households with nmltiple members in the 
study. 
Table 1: Posterior mean and 95% credible intervals for parameters of method 1 
Parameter Estimate Lower bound Upper bound 
0-1 0.79 0.77 0.82 
P 0.17 0.14 0.20 
Estimation: 
The joint distribution of (iTi,p) is sampled via Markov chain Monte Carlo. 
Method 2: cross-sectional serological surveys 
Method 2 uses cross-sectional serological samples of the population. We emulate this by delinking 
the paired serology data, hi both samples, a titre of 1:40 is taken as evidence of exposure to the 
virus. To account for pre-existing antibodies (resulting from cross reaction to other strains or 
measurement error), the estimated proportion above this threshold pre-epidemic is "subtracted" 
from the estimated proportion post-epidemic. 
Data used: 
• number of people at pre- and post-epidemic with titres above 1:40; 
• number of people in these two samples; 
• cross sectional antibody data from participants with RT-PCR confirmed infection. 
The emulated cross-sectional data are derived from ref (3), as is the sensitivity estimate. 
Notation: 
• m = the mmiber of individuals giving samples at baseline- known; 
• 712 = the number of individuals at final follow up known; 
• Xi = the number of individuals with high (above 1:40) initial titres—known; 
• X2 = the number of individuals with high final titres—known; 
• q = the proportion of the population with natm'ally high titres, pre-infection (presumed); 
• (72 = the proportion of the population with high titres at final follow that were infected 
and had low initial titres; 
• p = the proportion infected in the population. 
Table 2: Posterior mean and 95% credible intervals for parameters of method 2 
Parameter Estimate Lower bound Upper bound 
0-2 0.79 0.67 0.88 
0.03 0.02 0.04 
P 0.12 0.09 0.17 
Full model for data and parameters: 
xi ~ Bin(ni,(7) 
X2 ~ Bm{n2,q + {1 - q)(J2P) 
(72 - Be(46,12) 
q ~ Be(3,55) 
P ~ U(0,1). 
The prior distributions for q and a2 come from taking the conjugate priors U(0,1) = Be(l . 1) to a 
binomial model for high titres at baseline and follow up for individuals with RT-PCR confirmed 
infection during the study using the data from (3). 
Simplified representation of model: 
, _ X2ln2 - xi/ni 
^ ( l - x i / n i ) ( 7 2 
(72 = 0.79. 
Assumptions: 
• The sensitivity and initial high titres findings generalise to our study population. 
• Our cohort is a random sample from the population—which, again, it is not. 
• Titre levels are independent (i.e. no household effects). 
• We treat these as two independent cross-sectional surveys, but in actuality they are paired 
(see method 1 for the method accounting for pairing). 
Estimation: 
The joint distribution of {(72, q, p) is sampled via Markov chain Monte Carlo. 
Method 3: ILI data from sentinel GPs 
Data used: 
• daily number of ILI consults at GP sentinel network; 
• daily number of GPs reporting; 
• interview of participants in serological study ami their seroconversion status to estimate 
consultation rates; 
• sensitivity of seroconversion (as method 1). 
ILI consult data come from a G P sentinel network previously described (4). The questionnaire 
data are previously unpublished and were collected from the same group of patients as provided 
sera in ref (3). Sensitivity data sources are as in method 1. 
Notation: 
Unobserved: 
• p = the proportion of the population infected; 
• Pi = the proportion of infections leading to ILI consults; 
• P2 = the proportion of ILI consults that correspond to actual infection; 
• (73 = the probability of seroconverting given ( R T - P C R confirmed) infection; 
• N j y g = the number of people infected, visiting primary care with an ILI and seroconverting 
in the serology-questionnaire study; 
• N f g = the number of people infected and seroconverting in the serology- questionnaire 
study; 
• Nf = the nimiber of people infected in the serology-questionnaire study: 
• N y = the number of people visiting primary care with an ILI in the population as a whole; 
• K = a parameter controlling the variability of G P consultations around the mean. 
Observed: 
• A^l = the number of people seroconverting in the serology- questionnaire study; 
• N y g = the number of people seroconverting and visiting primary care with an ILI in the 
serology-quest ionnaire st udy; 
• N y = the number of people visiting primary care with an ILI in the serology-questionnaire 
study: 
• TT = 1/2486 the proportion of primary care constiltations attributable to a single G P in our 
study—assumed known: 
» N " = the number of people in the serology -questionnaire study; 
, NP = the number of people in the population (we restrict attention to resident adults 
throughout) : 
• Dt = the daily number of ILIs reported on day t\ 
• Ft = the number of GPs faxing or emailing a report on day t. 
» T = the length of time of the two stutlies. 
Full model for data and parameters: 
- Bin(iV;,(T3) 
fTs ~ Be(675,174) 
- N^s) 
Nfvs 
N?vs ~ Bin(Nfs,p,) 
Nfvs ~ Bin(iV^,P2) 
Nf 
Dt ~ NegBin(/i( = FtirN^/T, k = k) 
K ~ U(0,10) 
Pi ~ U(0,1) 
P2 ~ U(0,1) 
P ~ U(0,1) 
K = ppiN^IP2 







K = n 
Note that alternative simplified point estimates of the number of ILI consults in the population 
exist and it is not clear which gives the least bad representation of the estimate accounting for 
all within model uncertainty. 
Assumptions: 
• The sensitivity findings generalise to our study population. 
• Our cohort is a random sample from the population. 
• Seroconversions are independent (i.e. no household effects). 
• The GPs in the surveillance network are representative. 
• Observed ILIs in the GP study are negative binomial distributed, i.e. inflated by a factor 
K relative to a Poisson to account for the inhomogeneous pattern of consults caused by the 
epidemic wave and day of week effects. 
Table 3: Posterior mean and 95% credible intervals for parameters of method 3 
Parameter Estimate Lower bound Upper bound 
<73 0.79 0.77 0.82 
Pi 0.20 0.13 0.28 
P2 0.67 0.47 0.86 
Nfs 124 112 137 
Nfvs 24 20 30 
K 2.95 1.88 4.53 
K 116 000 100 000 133 000 
p 0.15 0.10 0.25 
Estimation: 
A two-stage approach is taken. In the first round, Markov chain Monte Carlo is used to sample 
the joint distribution of {pi.p2-cr3. Nfyg, Nfg). A bivariate Normal distribution is then used to 
approximate the joint distribution of {pi.p-i) which is then used as an informative prior for round 
two. In the second round, Markov chain Monte Carlo is used to sample the joint distribution of 
the population level estimands {pi,P2, k, Ny). 
Method 4: Laboritory surveillance and ILI data from sen-
tinel GPs 
Here, we replace the estimated probability of HlNl given ILI consult from the questionnaire 
associated with the serology study by an estimate from lab surveillance. 
Data used: 
• daily number of ILI consults at GP sentinel network; 
• daily number of GPs reporting; 
• weekly numbers of swabs of patients presenting with ILI testing positive and negative to 
H l N l : 
• sensitivity of RT-PCR from (2); 
• sensitivity of seroconversion (as method 1): 
• interview of participants in serological study and their seroconversion status to estimate 
consultation rates. 
Data sources as per method 3. with in addition laboratory data from Singapore's National 
Laboratory (published in part in ref (5)). 
Notation: 
Unobserved: 
• L'^ = the number of people sampled for lab testing that were infected in week w, 
• pi = the proportion of infections leading to ILI consults; 
• P2 = the proportion of ILI consults that correspond to actual infection aggregated over 
the study period of the sero-cohort questionnaire, subsequently replaced by lab-derived 
estimates; 
• P2w = the proportion of ILI consults that correspond to actual infection in week w; 
• (jP'^ f^ = the probability of RT-PCR confirmed infection given any form of confirmed infec-
tion; 
• (J®®™ = the probability of seroconverting given (RT-PCR confirmed) infection; 
• N^yg = the number of people infected, visiting primary care with an ILI and seroconverting 
in the serology-questionnaire study; 
• Njg = the number of people infected and seroconverting in the serology-questionnaire 
study; 
• Ny^ = the number of people visiting primary care with an ILI in the population on day t; 
• ^ fv t ~ number of infected people visiting primary care with an ILI in the population 
on day t; 
• Nfy = the number of infected people visiting primary care with an ILI in the population 
over the course of the study; 
• Nf = the rmmber of people infected in the population. 
Observed: 
• L+ = the number of people sampled for lab testing that test positive in week w; 
• L~ = the number of people sampled for lab testing that test negative in week w; 
• Ng = the number of people seroconverting in the serology questionnaire study; 
• ^ v s — number of people seroconverting and visiting primary care with an ILI in the 
serology-questionnaire study; 
• TT = 1/2486 the proportion of primary care consultations attributable to a single GP in our 
study—assumed known; 
• iVP = the number of people in the population (we restrict attention to resident adults 
throughout); 
• Dt = the daily number of ILIs reported on day t, 
• Ft = the number of GPs faxing or emailing a report on day <; 
• w{t) = the week that contains day t. 
Full model for data and parameters: 
r + 
LL rv^  
P^CR rsj Be(73K62) 
Nts BmiNf.a"'"') 
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• The sensitivity findings generalise to the lab samples. 
• Our cohort is a random sample from the population. 
• The GPs in the surveillance network are representative. 
• Observed ILIs in the GP study an any particular day given the number of [Lis in the 
community on that day are Poisson. 
• Lab samples were randomly drawn from the population of ILI cases. 
• Independence of lab samples, seroconversions, infection status of patients consulting for 
ILI between and within days. 
• The proportion of ILIs with HINl infection is piece-wise constant and changes only on 
Sundays with the beginning of a new e-week. 
Estimation: 
A three stage procedure is used. In the first round, the joint distribution of 
is sampled using MCMC and the lab data. In the second round, the joint distribution of 
{Pi,P2,cr'""'°,Nf,Nfy) is sampled (as in method 3) using Markov chain Monte Carlo. In the 
final round, the posterior distribution for all other estimands is sampled by Monte Carlo simula-
tion, exploiting conjugacy to obtain beta posteriors for pi and gamma posteriors for Nyf.. The 
posterior distributions for all other terms can be sampled directly. 
Table 4: Posterior mean and 95% credible intervals for parameters of method 4. Estimarids that 
vary with time are not shown. 
Parameter Estimate Lower bovuid Upper bound 
^PCR 0.92 0.90 0.94 
^sero 0.79 0.77 0.82 
Pi 0.20 0.13 0.28 
P2 0.67 0.47 0.86 
Nfv 24 20 31 
Nf 124 113 138 
Nfv 61000 57000 64 000 
Nf 317000 216000 499000 
P 0.12 0.08 0.18 
Age stratified analyses 
We inulertook analyses of the infection rate in two ways: 
• age s t ra t i f ied , in which infection rates in five age groups (20 24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 
55 or over) were analysed independently. For methods using GP ILI consults, we assumed 
all ages had the same probability of consulting with an ILI when infected and that the 
proportion of ILIs due to H l N l infection were the same for all ages. This assumption was 
needed since there was insufficient information on these proi)ortions when the serological 
questionnaire was divided by age groups, as the number of ILI cases among seroconvertors 
within any particular age group was too small to obtain usable estimates. All other pa-
rameters were estimated using data from the subset of the data corresponding to that age 
group only. 
• non-age s t ra t i f ied , in which we derived estimates of the adult infection rate under the 
assumption that infection rates are constant for all age groups. The motivation for this as-
sumption is that for some of the age groups, there is considerable uncertainty on the motlel 
parameters, which can only be reduced by pooling information. An obvious, though com-
plicated and computer-intensive, alternative to this homogeneity assumption that would 
also provide narrower estimates would be to develop an hierarchical model (see e.g. (1)) or 
to introduce a functional form for the effect of age on infection rates as part of a regression 
analysis. 
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Chapter Five 
Seroconversion to 2009 HlNl Influenza in 
Singapore 
In the previous chapter, we have shown that given the availability of good data, 
different methods of estimating influenza infection rates can yield overall estimates of 
similar magnitude. Of these, serological surveys are a good method to determine 
infection rates due to their ability to estimate probable infections that are sub-clinical 
or asymptomatic without the need to determine the expansion factors to account for 
these cases using traditional surveillance methods. Seroepidemiological studies have 
been proposed by the WHO as part of initial pandemic surveillance to understand the 
virulence, severity and clinical manifestation, as well as the effectiveness of various 
interventions (1-3). As such, the next study aims to determine the probable infection 
rates in different cohorts in Singapore, and the risk factors associated with 
seroconversion. I am the second author of the study (which is a large collection of 
subjects from four cohorts), and was the original study designer together with Dr 
Chen, the lead author. 1 led the military cohort section of this study as principal 
investigator. 
To determine the seroconversion to 2009 H l N l influenza in Singapore, we selected 
four different cohorts for the study for the following reasons: 
1) The first cohort was taken from an existing serological cohort for chronic 
disease that was chosen to provide representation of the Singapore adult 
general population. This would provide the overall estimate of the infection 
rate in the adult population, and allows for comparison of the other groups. 
2) The second cohort was from the military, a young population living in a 
semi-closed environment which will be the subject of most of the subsequent 
chapters. This is a unique cohort of individuals in Singapore due to the 
conscript military service for all male citizens and permanent residents for a 
3) The third cohort was from hospital workers in a major pubhc hospital in 
Singapore. Hospitals may be an area of increased transmission due to the 
interaction with infected individuals seeking treatment. At the same time, the 
use of personal protective equipment may provide protection to reduce 
transmission in the work environment, while the possibly better infection 
control training of hospital workers may reduce their risk of infection both in 
and out of the workplace. 
4) The fourth cohort was residents in long-term care facilities that may be at 
risk of increased transmission due to the closed living environments, but this 
group comprised of a substantial proportion of older adults. In the context of 
the 2009 H l N l pandemic, older adults were thought to have possible 
protective antibodies to the virus strain where up to a third of the elderly 
(>65 years of age) had cross-reactive antibodies to the 2009 H l N l virus prior 
to the onset of the pandemic (4). 
Within each cohort, there are different sub-groups with possible reasons for different 
infection rates that are the subject of other manuscripts. One is the subject of 
Chapter Twelve and discussed in further detail there. Another study on the hospital 
cohort showed that significant risk factors included being a nurse, and working in 
2009 H l N l influenza isolation wards. The study was published in Emerging 
Infectious Diseases in 2010 with myself as the second author, but not included in the 
thesis (5). 
For this study, the laboratory test that was used was the HAI test. The other option 
was the virus micro-neutralization assay. A separate study in Singapore showed that 
HAI was comparable to the micro-neutralization assay (6). Although the latter test had 
slightly better sensitivity, HAI is much easier to perform in a timely manner. This is 
one of the key determinants of test selection, as the data would be needed to guide 
prompt public health policy decision making. That study also showed that increases in 
antibody levels that are detectable by HAI occur after two weeks post infection (6). In 
our study, we sampled the participants three to four weeks after the peak and end of 
the epidemic wave respectively to allow for adequate detection by the HAI test. 
While the pediatric sub-population is an important group that needs to be considered 
in a population-wide analysis, it was unfortunately not possible to obtain a similar 
pediatric sample before the start of the local epidemic due to challenges obtaining the 
requisite approvals. This study therefore focuses on the adult population and sub-
groups in Singapore. To address the pediatric issue, we have collaborated with a local 
pediatric hospital to perform a cross-sectional serological study using blood collected 
for other reasons. This would be the subject of subsequent research outside of the 
scope of this thesis. 
The results of the following study are important to assist public health decision 
makers determine the extent of infection, the possible immunity in the population and 
therefore protection against subsequent 2009 H l N l epidemic waves, and the 
consequent need for vaccination and for continued preparedness of public health and 
clinical services. 
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ON A P R I L 2 4 , 2 0 0 9 , T H E W o r l d Health Organiza-tion ( W H O ) reported the emergence of a novel in-
f l u e n z a A v i r u s ( 2 0 0 9 i n f l u e n z a 
A [ H 1 N 1 ] ) . ' Early data from Mexico 
based on laboratory-confirmed cases 
suggested h igher in fec t ion rates in 
younger age groups but higher case-
fatality ratios in elderly individuals/ al-
though it was initially unclear whether 
these observations were affected by bi-
ases in case ascertainment. Various ex-
perts have called for serological inves-
tigations to more accurately determine 
© 2 0 1 0 American Medical Associat ion. All rights reserved. 
Context Singapore experienced a single epidemic wave of 2009 influenza A(H1 N1) 
with epidemic activity starting in late June 2009 and peaking In early August before 
subsiding within a month. 
Objective To compare the risk and factors associated with HI N1 seroconversion In 
different adult cohorts. 
Design, Setting, and Participants A study with serial serological samples from 4 
distinct cohorts: general population (n = 838), military personnel (n = 1213), staff from 
an acute care hospital (n = 558), and staff as well as residents from long-term care fa-
cilities (n=300) from June 22, 2009, to October 15, 2009. Hemagglutination Inhibi-
tion results of serum samples taken before, during, and after the epidemic and data 
from symptom questionnaires are presented. 
Main Outcome Measures A 4-fold or greater Increase in titer between any of the 
3 serological samples was defined as evidence of H1N1 seroconversion. 
Results Baseline titers of 40 or more were observed In 22 members (2.6%; 95% 
confidence interval [CI], 1.7%-3.9%) of the community, 114 military personnel (9.4%; 
95% CI, 7.9%-11.2%), 37 hospital staff (6.6%; 95% CI, 4.8%-9.0%), and 20 par-
ticipants from long-term care facilities (6.7%; 95% CI, 4.4%-10.1 %). In participants 
with 1 or more follow-up serum samples, 312 military personnel (29.4%; 95% CI, 
26.8%-32.2%) seroconverted compared with 98 community members (13.5%; 95% 
CI, 11.2%-16.2%), 35 hospital staff (6.5%; 95% CI, 4.7%-8.9%), and only 3 long-
term care participants (1.2%; 95% CI, 0.4%-3.5%). Increased frequency of serocon-
version was observed for community participants from households In which 1 other 
member seroconverted (adjusted odds ratio [OR], 3.32; 95% CI, 1.50-7.33), whereas 
older age was associated with reduced odds of seroconversion (adjusted OR, 0.77 per 
10 years; 95% CI, 0.64-0.93). Higher baseline titers were associated with decreased 
frequency of seroconversion In community (adjusted OR for every doubling of base-
line titer, 0.48; 95% CI, 0.27-0.85), military (adjusted OR, 0.71; 95% CI, 0.61 -0.81), 
and hospital staff cohorts (adjusted OR, 0.50; 95% CI, 0.26-0.93). 
Conclusion Following the June-September 2009 wave of 2009 Influenza A(H1 N1), 
13% of the community participants seroconverted, and most of the adult population 
likely remained susceptible. 
JAMA. 2010:303(14):1383-1391 www.jama.com 
infection rates, especially since a sub-
stantial proportion of influenza infec-
tions are asymptomatic.^ 
Singapore, a Southeast Asian tropical 
city-state of 4 .8 million people and a 
global travel hub, detected its first im-
ported cases of 2009 influenza A(H 1N1) 
in late May 2009 . Virological surveil-
lance documented sustained commu-
nity transmission from the latter half of 
June 2 0 0 9 , " followed by a single epi-
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demic wave peaking in the first week of 
August and subsiding by September 
20097 ® We initiated a cohort study using 
serial blood specimens to determine an-
tibody levels against 2 0 0 9 influenza 
A ( H I N I ) as a marker of infection in 3 
different population groups of public 
health concern—mili tary personnel, 
acute care hospital workers, and staff 
members and residents of long-term care 
facilities and compared them with com-
munity-dwelling adults. The study aimed 
to compare the risk of infection in these 
different cohorts and to investigate risk 
factors for infection. 
M E T H O D S 
Study Design 
This was a cohort study including 4 dif-
ferent populations in Singapore and in-
volving the planned collection of up to 
3 serial serological samples from each in-
dividual: a baseline sample was col-
lected either before the local 2009 influ-
enza A ( H I N I ) epidemic using banked 
samples or in the early epidemic phase 
before widespread community transmis-
sion; the second sample was collected 
during the epidemic about 4 weeks af-
ter the epidemic had peaked; and third 
sample was collected at least 4 weeks af-
ter epidemic activity had subsided. 
When possible, the start and stop dates 
of specimen collection across the co-
horts were intentionally synchronized to 
allow intercohort comparison of sero-
conversion rates at each follow-up time 
point. Clinical symptom reviews were 
performed using a standardized ques-
tionnaire once every 2 weeks for the 
community cohort and at each sample 
collection in the other 3 cohorts. Par-
ticipants were asked to report all new-
onset respiratory symptoms and consti-
tutional symptoms such as headaches, 
myalgia, and fever ( including mea-
sured temperature where available); and 
baseline demographic data and whether 
they had ever received seasonal influ-
enza vaccination in the past. 
Study Populations 
1. Community-dwelling adults were 
recruited from the Multiethnic Cohort 
(MEC) of the Singapore Consortium of 
1 3 8 4 J A M A , April 14 , 2 0 1 0 — V o l 3 0 3 , No. 1 4 (Repr in ted) 
Cohort Studies (SCCS), a long-term re-
search project initiated to study gene-
environment interactions in chronic 
disease causat ion. T h e MEC (http: 
//www.nus-cme.org.sg/home.html) is a 
subcohort of the SCCS, compris ing 
a b o u t 9 0 0 0 c o m m u n i t y - d w e l l i n g 
healthy Singaporeans aged 21 to 75 
years, recruited through public out-
reach activities and referrals for which 
recruitment is ongoing. We enrolled 
new MEC recruits into the study (from 
late June 2009) , and recontacted 2 4 0 0 
existing MEC participants, with the aim 
of enrolling 9 0 0 participants. Eor the 
first serum sample collection, new re-
cruits donated fresh baseline blood, 
while existing participants granted per-
mission to use specimens banked on 
original recruitment. Symptom ques-
tionnaires were administered via tele-
phone interviews at 2-week intervals. 
2. The military personnel cohort was 
recruited from the Singapore Armed 
Forces, Singapore's national military 
and composed largely of conscripted 
males who serve after completion of 
high school from ages 18 through 19 
years. Most individuals reside in mili-
tary camps during weekdays but re-
turn to the community on weekends. 
Individuals were recruited by invita-
tion from 15 units selected to give a 
good representation of the entire mili-
tary structure, with a total personnel 
of 1570. Blood samples were taken at 
all 3 time points together with self-
administered questionnaires. 
3. Hospital staff from Tan Tock Seng 
Hospital, an acute care hospital with 
6 0 0 0 staff members, formed the third 
cohort. Staff members were recruited 
through e-mail notif ications and by 
word-of-mouth referrals. Blood samples 
were taken at all 3 time points along 
with self-administered questionnaires. 
Information on symptomatic episodes 
was augmented through sickness ab-
senteeism records for details such as 
dates of illness. 
4. Staff and residents from 2 long-
term care facilities, Jamiyah Home for 
the Aged and Peacehaven Nursing 
Home, were recruited by invitation. Be-
tween the 2 facilities are a total of 179 
staff members and 5 2 0 residents (200 
residents were able to give consent) who 
rarely go outside the facility In this co-
hort, only the first and third serum 
samples were taken, with question-
naires simultaneously administered by 
trained interviewers. 
Specimen Collection 
and Laboratory /Methods 
Venous blood was taken in 5- to 10-mL 
plain tubes. Serum samples were pre-
treated with receptor destroying en-
zyme (RDE III], Deka Seiken Co Ltd, 
Tokyo,Japan), 1:4 (vol/vol), at 37°C for 
16 hours, before enzyme inactivation 
by the addition of an equal volume of 
1 .6% trisodium citrate (AJax Chemi-
cals, Melbourne, Australia) and incu-
bation at 56°C for 30 minutes. 
The hemagglutination inhibition as-
say was performed according to stan-
dard protocols at the World Health Or-
ganization Collaborating Centre for 
Reference and Research on Influenza in 
M e l b o u r n e , Australia.^ Egg-grown 
A/California/7/2009 A ( H I N I ) pan-
demic virus was purified by sucrose gra-
dient, concentrated and inactivated with 
3 -propio lac tone , to create an influ-
enza zonal pool preparation (a gift from 
CSL Limited, Melbourne, Australia). 
Twenty-five microliters (4 hemagglu-
tination units) of influenza zonal pool-
A/California/7/2009 virus was incu-
bated at room temperature with an 
equal volume of RDE-treated serum. Se-
rum samples were titrated in 2-fold di-
lutions in phosphate-buffered saline 
from 1:10 to 1 :1280. Following 1 hour 
of incubation, 25 pL of 1% (vol/vol) tur-
key red blood cells was added to each 
well. Hemagglutination inhibition was 
read after 30 minutes. Titers were ex-
pressed as the reciprocal of the high-
est dilution of serum where hemagglu-
tination was prevented. W e defined 
seroconversion as a 4-fold or greater in-
crease in antibody titers. 
The hemagglutination inhibition as-
say was assessed on paired serum samples 
from 56 cases of 2009 inlluenza A(H 1N1) 
that were confirmed through reverse 
transcription-polymerase chain reac-
tion (RT-PCR): 28 participants from this 
© 2 0 1 0 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. 
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c o h o r t study, plus 7 outbreak-re lated 
cases and 2 1 clinical cases admitted to 
T a n T o c k S e n g H o s p i t a l . F o r t y - f i v e 
patients ( 8 0 % ) seroconverted to the pan-
demic strain, A/Cali fornia/7/2009. Only 
2 0 p a t i e n t s ( 2 0 % ) s e r o c o n v e r t e d to 
A/Brisbane/59/2007(H1N1) and 7 (13%) , 
to A A V i s c o n s i n / 1 5 / 2 0 0 9 ( H 3 N 2 ) . 
Data Analysis and Statistics 
P a r t i c i p a n t s w h o s e r o c o n v e r t e d be-
tween any s u c c e s s i v e pa irs o f b l o o d 
s p e c i m e n s (e i ther from basel ine to the 
second sample , second to third sample, 
or first to third sample ) were consid-
ered as ever having had serological evi-
dence of infect ion during the study pe-
riod. G e o m e t r i c m e a n t i ters ( G M T s ) 
were es t imated by assigning a value of 
5 for titers lower than 10 and a value 
of 1 2 8 0 for titers of 1 2 8 0 or higher. 
Episodes of acute respiratory illness 
were defined as new-onset illness with 
any respiratory s y m p t o m s of rh inor -
rhea, nasal congest ion , sore throat, or 
cough; and febrile respiratory illness was 
defined as an acute respiratory episode 
with self-reported fever or a body tem-
perature of 3 7 . 5 ° C or higher. The date 
of each illness episode was the earliest 
symptom onset date or s ickness absen-
teeism if onset dates were unavailable. 
Febrile respiratory illness episodes that 
preceded seroconversion were graphed 
by i l lness date against inf luenza epi-
d e m i c act ivity. L ikewise , i l lness epi-
sodes preceding seroconvers ion were 
used to estimate the proportion of sero-
converting individuals with acute respi-
ratory or febrile respiratory illness epi-
sodes. S ingapore inf luenza e p i d e m i c 
activity data were from laboratory sur-
veillance on the weekly proportion of in-
f l u e n z a - l i k e i l lness genera l p r a c t i c e 
samples testing positive for 2 0 0 9 influ-
enza A ( H I N I ) and the weekly number 
of influenza-like illness consults seen by 
a separate sentinel general practice net-
w o r k ' ® — t h e 2 data sets were mult i -
plied to give a weekly epidemic curve. 
As s o m e part ic ipants formed natu-
ral groupings, such as households and 
military units, and as contag ious dis-
ease status is nonindependent within 
groups, we accounted for nonindepen-
d e n c e using d u m m y variables corre -
s p o n d i n g to disease s ta tus of o t h e r s 
within the group. F o r the c o m m u n i t y 
cohort , we introduced 2 indicator vari-
ab les c o d i n g for 3 c a t e g o r i e s c o r r e -
s p o n d i n g to k n o w n s e r o c o n v e r s i o n 
s t a t u s for o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s in t h e 
h o u s e h o l d — a t least 1 o t h e r h o u s e -
hold m e m b e r s e r o c o n v e r t e d , no o n e 
else in the household seroconverted, or 
o ther permutat ions (no other house-
h o l d m e m b e r in the s t u d y or o t h e r 
m e m b e r s in the study but seroconver-
sion not k n o w n ) . F o r military camps, 
a variable indicat ing the proport ion of 
the other unit m e m b e r s who serocon-
verted was introduced. T h e same was 
d o n e for hosp i ta l s taf f , us ing f u n c -
t ional o p e r a t i n g uni t s ( 7 5 w a r d s or 
d e p a r t m e n t s ) . W e t h e n p e r f o r m e d 
Table 1 . Cohort Characteristics 
Community Military Hospital Staff Long-temi Care 
Tinning of blood draws in 2009 
Baseline June 22-2/3 June 22-July 1 June 22-July 7 July 17-27 
Second August 20-29 August 20-September 3" August 19-September 3 NA 
Third October 6-11 September 29-October 9 September 29-October 15 October 5-7 
Samples, No. (%) of participants 
Baseline 838 (100) 1213(100) 558(100) 300(100) 
Second 621 (74) 920 (76) 501 (90) NA 
Third 689 (82) 776 (64) 467 (84) 250 (83) 
All 3 samples 583 (70) 636 (52) 431 (77) NA 
£2 727 (87) 1060(87) 537 (96) 250 (83) 
No. (%) Of reviews completed'^ 4766 (95) 1680(69) 1098(98) 250 (83) 
Age, mean (range), y 43(21-74) 22 (17-62) 34 (20-67) 56 (18-109) 
Age in years. No. (%) 
15-19 0 554 (46) 0 
12(4) 
20-24 92(11) 473 (39) 110(20) 28(9) 
25-29 66(8) 93(8) 129 (23) 24(8) 
30-39 152 (18) 44(4) 164(29) 
47 (16) 
40-49 298 (36) 31 (3) 96(17) 14(5) 
50-59 166(20) 14(1) 52(9) 
32 (11) 
>60 64(8) 4(<1) 7(1) 
143(48) 
Sex, No. (%) 
Male 353 (42) 1175 (97) 92 (16) 
131 (44) 
Female 485 (58) 38(3) 466 (84) 
169(56) 
Seasonal influenza vaccine. No. (%) 
No 729 (87) 696 (57) 
52(9) 160(53) 
Yes 109(13) 517 (43) 
506(91) 140(47) 
^ m S e c t t o n d S ^ ^ community cohort participants; baseline samples for the remaining 815 participants used specimens banked on original recaiitment into ongoing 
research study on chronic disease causation. 
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univariate and mult ivariate logistic re-
gress ion using these d u m m y variables 
a longside basel ine ti ler, age, sex , and 
seasonal influenza vacc ine status to as-
sess their c o n t r i b u t i o n to seroconver -
s i o n ; odds rat ios ( O R s ) with asymp-
tot ic W a l d 9 5 % c o n f i d e n c e intervals 
(CIs ) and 2-sided P values are presented 
with statistical significance set at the .05 
level . ' " Multivariate analysis involved 
s tepwise logist ic regress ion , where in 
variables that did not improve model 
fit at P < . 1 0 were discarded. 
A sample size of 4 5 0 participants per 
c o h o r t was needed to give a power o f 
9 0 % to detect (with a 2-s ided P value 
of < . 0 5 ) seroconversion rates that were 
1 0 % higher for a given c o h o r t than the 
c o m m u n i t y s a m p l e , w h i c h was as-
sumed would have seroconversion rates 
of 2 0 % to 3 0 % (similar to the 1 9 5 7 pan-
d e m i c " ) - Target sample sizes were 6 0 0 
for hospital staff and long-term care fa-
cil ity c o h o r t s and 9 0 0 for the c o m m u -
ni ty c o h o r t to a l l o w for loss to fol-
l o w - u p r a t e s o f 2 5 % a n d 5 0 % , 
respectively. T h e military c o h o r t was 
substantial ly larger to al low c o m p a r i -
son of seroconvers ion rates in differ-
ent military units . 
W h e r e appropriate, 9 5 % CIs for pro-
portions were computed using the W i l -
son score-based method. '^ ' ' All statis-
tical ana lyses were p e r f o r m e d us ing 
S T A T A 1 0 . 0 (S ta taCorp, Col lege Park, 
T e x a s ) . 
Ethics Review 
W r i t t e n i n f o r m e d c o n s e n t w a s o b -
tained from all participants. T h e study 
w a s a p p r o v e d by t h e e t h i c s r e v i e w 
b o a r d s o f t h e N a t i o n a l H e a l t h c a r e 
G r o u p , S ingapore Armed Forces , and 
Nat ional Universi ty of S ingapore. 
RESULTS 
TABLE 1 descr ibes the 4 cohor t s . W e 
completed baseline collect ion from 8 3 8 
c o m m u n i t y p a r t i c i p a n t s by J u n e 27, 
2 0 0 9 , 1 2 1 3 military participants by July 
1, 2 0 0 9 , and 5 5 8 hospital participants 
by J u l y 7 , 2 0 0 9 , after s imultaneously 
start ing r e c r u i t m e n t on J u n e 2 2 , 2009 . 
T h e c o m m u n i t y c o h o r t - b a n k e d 
samples dated b a c k to J u n e 2 0 0 5 , with 
7 9 0 o f 8 3 8 s p e c i m e n s ( 9 4 % ) collected 
before May 26 , 2 0 0 9 , when the first im-
ported inf luenza 2 0 0 9 A ( H I N I ) case 
was detec ted in S i n g a p o r e . L o g i s t i c a l 
diff icult ies delayed base l ine collection 
of the 3 0 0 l o n g - t e r m care facilities co-
hort participants until J u l y 27 , 2 0 0 9 , but 
there were no c o n f i r m e d cases or ex-
cess influenza-like illness in either long-
term care facility before the collection 
date. All participants (except those from 
the l o n g - t e r m c a r e fac i l i t ies cohor t ) 
were recalled for the second sample col-
l ec t ion b e t w e e n A u g u s t 19 and Sep-
tember 3 , 2 0 0 9 , and the third sample 
co l lec t ion b e t w e e n S e p t e m b e r 2 9 and 
O c t o b e r 15, 2 0 0 9 . In each cohort , 80% 
Table 2. Baseline Titers by Cohorts, by Seasonal Influenza Vaccination in All Cohorts, and by Age Groups in the Community Cohort 






>40 GMT (95% CI) P Value 
Cohort 
Community 838 738 (88) 78(9) 22(3) 5.8 (5.6-6.0) 
Military 1213 921 (76) 178(15) 114(9) 7.4(7.1-7.7) < .001" 
Hospital staff 558 351 (63) 170 (30) 37 (7) 7.6(7.2-8.1) <.0011^ 
Long-term care facilities 300 252 (84) 28 (9) 20 (7) 6.4 (6.0-6.9) .007" 
Seasonal influenza vaccine 
Community 
No 756 666 (88) 73 (10) 17(2) 5.8 (5.6-6.0) - | 
.34"= 
Yes 82 72 (88) 5(6) 5(6) 6.1 (5.3-7.1) _ 
Military personnel 
No 696 538 (77) 91 (13) 67 (10) 7.4 (6.9-7.9) 
.98= 
Yes 517 383 (74) 87(17) 47(9) 7.4 (6.9-7.9) J 
Hospital staff 
No 52 39 (75) 11 (21) 2(4) 6.4 (5.6-7.4) n 
.07<= 
Yes 506 312(62) 159(31) 35 (7) 7.8 (7.3-8.3) J 
Long-term care facilities 
No 160 141 (88) 9(6) 10(6) 6.1 (5.5-6.7) n 
Yes 140 111 (79) 19(14) 10(7) 6.8(6.1-7.7) _ 
Age groups in community cohort, y 
20-24 92 73 (79) 14(15) 5(5) 6.7 (5.8-7.7) ^ 
25-29 66 53 (80) 10(15) 3(5) 6.6 (5.6-7.7) 
30-39 152 136 (89) 14(9) 2(1) 5.6 (5.3-6.0) 
,002'^ 
40-49 298 270(91) 20 (7) 8(3) 5.7 (5.4-6.0) 
50-59 166 148(89) 15(9) 3(2) 5.7(5.3-6.1) 
s 6 0 64 58(91) 5(8) 1 (2) 5.5(5.0-6.1) _ 
Abbreviations: CI, confidence interval, GMT, geometric mean antibody titers. 
®No detectable antibodies. 
'^Compared with community cohort using unpaired t test. 
Participants who did not have seasonal influenza vaccine compared with those who did using unpaired t test. 
Using linear regression with age as an explanatory value for GMT. 
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or more r e l umed for at leasl 1 fol-
low-up sample so that, except for the 
long-term care facilities cohort, the fi-
nal number of participants for which 
seroconversion data was available ex-
ceeded our targeted samp le sizes. 
Schedu led fo l low-up symp tom re-
views were also reasonably complete ex-
cept in the mi l i tary for wh i ch fol-
low-up reviews were restricted to those 
with follow-up blood samples. 
Military personnel were a mean age 
of 22 years (range, 17-62 years); hos-
pital staff, 34 years (range, 20-67 years); 
and the commun i ty cohort, 43 years 
(range, 21-74 years), whereas the long-
term care cohort, of which 54% (162/ 
300) were residents, were a inean age 
of 56 years (range, 18-109 years). Sex 
d i s t r i bu t i ons reflect the predomi-
nantly male workforce in the military 
(97%, 1175/1213) and female work-
force in the hospital staff (84%, 466/ 
558). Only 13% (109/838) in the com-
mun i t y cohort had previously ever 
received seasonal inf luenza vaccine 
compared with 91% (506/558) of hos-
pital staff, 43% (517/1213) of mili-
tary, and 47% (140/300) of partici-
pants from long-term care facilities. 
The baseline GMT for hospital staff 
was 7.6 (95% CI, 7.2-8.1); militar>' per-
sonnel, 7.4 (95% CI, 7.1-7.7); and staff 
and residents of long-term care facili-
ties, 6.4 (95% CI, 6.0-6.9), all of which 
were significantly higher than those of 
the communi ty cohort: 5.8 (95% CI, 
5.6-6.0; TABLE 2) . The G M T of in-
hospital staff who had received a sea-
sonal influenza vaccine was 7.8 (95% 
CI, 7.3-8.3); whereas the GMT of staff 
who had not received the seasonal vac-
cine was 6.4 (95% CI, 5.6-7.4; P= .07). 
In the largely unvaccinated commu-
nity cohort, younger age was signifi-
cantly associated with higher baseline 
titers (P = .002). 
The FIGURE shows that the epi-
demic curve peak for the communi ty 
cohort coincided with the national peak 
in influenza epidemic activity, whereas 
the military personnel epidemic peaked 
2 to 3 weeks earlier. Seroconversion oc-
curred mostly between the baseline and 
the second sample for the communi ty 
©2010 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. 
Figure. Epidemic Curves for Each Cohort Constructed From Febrile Respiratory Illness 
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Braces represent the sampling periods and are compared against influenza epidemic activity as observed through 
HI N1 -2009 genera! practice sentinel data. The H1N1 -2009 general practice sentinel sun/eillance data are con-
structed by multiplying the proportion of laboratory surveillance isolates that tested positive for HI N1 -2009 
from the Ministry of Health and the number of influenza-like illness consults per general practice from a sen-
tinel general practice network/® which gives the estimated number of genera! practice influenza-like illness 
consults that are influenza 2009 A(H1 N1) for that week. Epidemic activity appears to have peaked in the week 
starting on August 2, 2009, at an estimated 15.5 consults per general practice per week. 
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with 7 0 of 9 8 eventual seroconver-
s i o n s ( 7 1 % ; 9 5 % C I , 6 2 % - 7 9 % ) a n d f o r 
the military cohorts with 254 of 312 se-
roconvers ions ( 8 1 % ; 9 5 % CI, 7 7 % -
85%) compared with hospital staff with 
16 of 35 seroconversions (46%; 95% CI, 
3 0 % - 6 2 % ) ( T A B L E 3 ) . I n t h e l o n g -
term care facilities cohort, only 3 of 250 
( 1 . 2 % ; 9 5 % C I , 0 . 4 % - 3 . 5 % ) s e r o c o n -
verted, so this cohort was omitted from 
additional analysis. 
Table 3 also shows the proportions 
of those who seroconverted as an in-
dicator of the variation in risk of infec-
tion. In the community cohort, 13% se-
roconverted vs 29% in the military and 
7% in the hospital staff cohort. Com-
munity participants aged 20 through 24 
years were at higher risk than older par-
ticipants with 21% of those in commu-
nity and 24% of those in the military 
cohorts seroconverting vs 8% of those 
6 0 years or older in the community co-
hort. Furthermore, 44% of those aged 
15 through 19 years in the military co-
hort seroconverted. No discernible 
effect from prior seasonal influenza vac-
cination existed except for the mili-
tary cohort, for which 37% of unvac-
cinated participants seroconverted vs 
19% of those vaccinated. Participants 
with higher baseline titers had lower 
seroconversion r a t e s — 1 3 % of mili-
tary participants with titers of 4 0 or 
higher seroconverted vs 3 2 % with ti-
ters lower than 10. Seroconversion data 
were available for 2 2 3 participants re-
siding in the 106 households in the 
community cohort. Twenty-nine per-
c e n t ( 1 0 / 3 4 ; 9 5 % C I , 1 7 % - 4 6 % ) o f those 
living with another household mem-
ber who was known to have serocon-
v e r t e d v s 1 2 % ( 2 3 / 1 8 9 ; 9 5 % C I , 8 % -
18%) of those living in households in 
which no one else had seroconverted 
a n d 1 3 % ( 6 5 / 5 0 4 ; 9 5 % C I , 1 0 % - 1 6 % ) 
in other community participants for 
whom seroconversion data for other 
household members were not avail-
able had seroconversion. Because there 
was no significant difference in sero-
conversion rates for the latter 2 groups 
( P = . 7 9 ) , these were combined during 
multivariate analysis. 
On multivariate analysis (TABLE 4), 
having another household member who 
seroconverted remained associated with 
Table 3. Factors Associated W i t h Seroconversion by Cohorts 
Part ic ipants With Seroconvers ion by Cohor t 
1 








% (95% CI) 
1 
No. / ro ta l 
1 
% (95% 01) 
Detection of seroconversion by blood draw 
Baseline to second blood draw 70/621 11 (9-14) 254/920 28 (25-31) 16/501 3 (2-5) 
Second to third 16/584 3(2-4) 21/636 3 (2-5) 12/432 3(2-5) 
Baseline to third 83/690 12(10-15) 223/776 29 (26-32) 32/468 7 (5-9) 
Ever 98/727 13(11-16) 312/1060 29 (27-32) 35/537 7 (5-9) 
Age, y3 
15-19 115/259 44 (38-50) 
20-24 16/78 21 (13-31) 96/399 24 (20-28) 6/104 6(3-12) 
25-29 5/50 10(4-21) 11/75 15(8-24) 9/123 7(4-13) 
30-39 18/132 14(9-21) 1/37 3(0-14) 7/157 4 (2-9) 
40-49 43/267 16(12-21) 0/28 0(0-12) 10/95 11 (6-18) 
50-59 12/147 8(5-14) 1/11 9 (2-38) 2/51 4(1-13) 
£ 6 0 4/53 8(3-18) 1/4 25 (5-70) 1/7 14(3-51) 
Sex^ 
Male 45/295 15(12-20) 308/1028 30 (27-33) 5/90 6(2-12) 
Female 53/432 12(10-16) 4/32 13(5-28) 30/447 7 (5-9) 
Seasonal influenza vaccine® 
No 87/659 13(11-16) 227/616 37(33-41) 1/50 2(0-10) 
Yes 11/68 16(9-27) 85/444 19(16-23) 34/487 7(5-10) 
Baseline titers® 
< 1 0 93/631 15(12-18) 252/799 32 (28-35) 27/340 8(6-11) 
10 2/48 4(1-14) 30/91 33 (24-43) 8/126 6(3-12) 
20 3/27 11 (4-28) 17/71 24 (16-35) 0/36 0(0-10) 
> 4 0 0/21 0(0-15) 13/99 13(8-21) 0/35 0(0-10) 
Other household member®''' 
2 l 10/34 29(17-46) 
No one else 23/189 12(8-18) 
Other 65/504 13(10-16) 
Abbreviation: CI, confidence intervai. 
® Numerator is individuals who had ever seroconverted; denominator is individuals who had at least 1 follow-up sample (second, third, or both samples). 
''Other household member seroconverted: at least 1 other household member with seroconversion, no one else in household with seroconversion and 
other household member in the study or other members in the study but seroconversion data not available). 
other combinations (no 
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a h i g h e r h k e l i h o o d of i n f e c t i o n (ad-
jiisied OR, 3.32; 93% CI, 1.50-7.33). The 
p ropo r t i on wi th in the un i t w h o had se-
r o c o n v e r t e d w a s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h in-
creased risk of infect ion in the miUtary 
( a d j u s t e d O R , 1 .42 ; 9 5 % CI , 1 .27 -
1.59) bu t no t a m o n g hospi ta l s taff Af-
ter ad ju s t i ng for in fec t ions in the same 
mil i tary un i t , vacc ina t ion a n d sex were 
no longer s ignif icant , bu t older age re-
m a i n e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y p r o t e c t i v e (ad-
jus t ed OR, 0 .42 per 10 years; 95% CI, 
0.27-0.65), similar to the communi ty co-
hor t ( ad jus t ed OR, 0 .77 per 10 years; 
95% CI, 0 .64-0 .93) . Higher basel ine ti-
ters had lower l ikelihood of seroconver-
s ion in the c o m m u n i t y ( ad jus ted OR, 
0.48; 9 5 % CI, 0 .27-0 .85) , hospi tal staff 
( a d j u s t e d O R , 0 . 5 0 ; 9 5 % CI , 0 . 2 6 -
0.93), and military cohorts (adjusted OR, 
0.71; 95% CI, 0 .61-0 .81) . 
D u r i n g the s tudy per iod , acu te res-
p i ra tory a n d febrile resp i ra to ry i l lness 
ep i sodes w e r e m o r e c o m m o n for indi-
viduals w h o seroconver ted . In c o m m u -
nity pa r t i c ipan t s , 73% (72/98; 95% CI, 
64%-81%) of those w h o had se rocon-
ver ted r epo r t ed 1 or m o r e acu te respi-
ra to ry i l lness e p i s o d e s vs 4 3 % ( 2 6 9 / 
629; 9 5 % CI, 39%-47%) of those w h o 
had no t ( P < . 0 0 I ) , a n d 4 4 % (43 /98 ; 
9 5 % CI, 34%-54%) of those w h o had 
seroconverted had febrile respiratory ill-
ness ep i sodes vs 9% (56/629; 95% CI, 
7 % - l l % ) of t h o s e w h o h a d n o t 
( P < . 0 0 1 ) . A m o n g hospi ta l staff, 69% 
(24/35; 95% CI, 52%-8I%) of those w h o 
had se roconver t ed had acu te respira-
tory i l lness vs 15% (75 /502; 9 5 % CI, 
1 2 % - 1 8 % ) of t h o s e w h o h a d n o t 
( P < . 0 0 1 ) , a n d 51% (18/35; 95% CI, 
36%-67%) of those w h o had se rocon-
ver ted had febrile resp i ra tory i l lness vs 
8% (41/502; 95% CI, 6%- l 1%) of those 
w h o had not ( P < . 0 0 1 ) . T h e mil i tary 
c o h o r t r epo r t ed lower acu te respi ra-
tory i l lness and febrile respi ra tory ill-
ness rates: 31% (98/312; 95% CI, 27%-
37%) of those w h o had se roconver t ed 
had a c u t e r e s p i r a t o r y i l lness vs 24% 
(181/748; 95% CI, 21%-27%) of those 
w h o had no t (P = .02) , a n d 16% (50 / 
312; 95% CI, 12%-21%) of those w h o 
had se roconver ted had febrile respira-
tory illness vs 7% (56/748; 95% CI, 6%-
10%) of those w h o had no t ( P < . 0 0 1 ) . 
COMMENT 
To o u r knowledge , this is the first co-
hor t s tudy des igned to es t imate the ex-
tent of infec t ion wi th 2009 in f luenza 
A ( H I N I ) us ing serological assays. O u r 
s tudy s h o w s that at the end of the first 
ep idemic wave in S ingapore a subs t an -
tial p r o p o r t i o n of the S ingapore adu l t 
popu la t ion lack an t ibodies to the novel 
s t rain, w i th only 13% of the c o m m u -
n i t y c o h o r t h a v i n g s e r o l o g i c a l evi -
d e n c e of infec t ion . This in fec t ion rate 
e s t ima te is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the 11% 
clinical a t tack rate for S ingapore esti-
m a t e d f rom in f luenza - l ike i l lness re-
p o r t i n g ' and was fairly s imilar to esti-
ma tes of adu l t inc idence f rom a cross-
sect ional serological s t udy c o n d u c t e d 
after the first ep idemic wave of 2009 in-
f luenza A ( H I N I ) in the Uni ted King-
dom."* 
O u r s tudy also s h o w s the var ia t ion 
in i n f e c t i o n r i sks , w i t h y o u n g e r age 
g r o u p s a n d mil i tary pe r sonne l hav ing 
m u c h higher infect ion rates. The lower 
i n f e c t i o n ra tes in o lde r p a r t i c i p a n t s 
co r robora te o the r ep idemiologica l ob-
s e r v a t i o n s . B e c a u s e there was no 15-
to 19-year age g r o u p in the c o m m u -
nity cohor t , we are u n a b l e to c o n c l u d e 
w h e t h e r h igher infec t ion rates in the 
mili tary were d u e to the y o u n g e r age 
or increased transmission, a l though his-
torical p a n d e m i c data '^ and the s t rong 
associa t ion be tween infec t ion risk and 
level of int rauni t infect ions in our s tudy 
Table 4. Univariate and Multivariate Analysis for Factors Associated With Seroconversion in Community, Military, and Hospital Staff 
Crude OR (95% 01) P Value Adjusted OR (95% CI) P Value 
Community 
Age per 10 y 0.81 (0.67-0.97) .02 0.77 (0.64-0.93) .007 
Female sex 0.78(0.51-1.19) .25 
Had seasonal influenza vaccine 1.27(0.64-2.51) .50 
Baseline titer® 0.54(0.31-0.94) .03 0.48 (0.27-0.85) .01 
Other household member'' 2.86 (1,33-6.19) .007 3.32 (1.50-7.33) ,003 
Military 
Age per 10 y 0,25(0,15-0.41) <.001 0.42 (0.27-0.65) <.001 
Female sex 0,33 (0,12-0,96) .04 
Had seasonal influenza vaccine 0,41 (0.30-0,54) <.001 
Baseline titer^ 0.76 (0.66-0.87) <.001 0.71 (0,61-0.81) <.001 
Proportion in unit (per 10%)'' 1.56(1.40-1.72) <.001 1.42 (1.27-1.59) <.001 
Hospital 
Age per 10 y 1.06(0.76-1.46) .74 
Female sex 1.22 (0.46-3.24) .69 
Had seasonal influenza vaccine 3.68 (0.49-27.46) .20 
Baseline titer® 0.50 (0.26-0.93) .03 0.50 (0.26-0.93) .03 
Proportion in unit per 10%"^  1,24(0.83-1.85) .30 
Abbreviations: Ci. confidence interval; OR, odds ratio. 
^ For every unit increase in baseline titer, for »/hich the integer values 0 to 8 denote titers of < 10, 10, 20, 40, 80. 160, 320, 640, and 1280 or more, respectively. 
' 'Had at least 1 other household member vKho seroconverted compared w/lth all other community participants (including those from households for which no one else serocon-
verted. no other household member in the study, or other members in the study but seroconversion data not available). 
Proportion in unit vi/ho seroconverted. 
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point to greater transmission intensity 
in military populations. This suggests 
that special preventive measures in mili-
tary subpopulations may be justified in 
the event of influenza epidemics. The 
increased risk of infection for commu-
nity participants from households in 
which at least 1 other member sero-
converted was expected, although it was 
not possible to determine the direc-
tion of transmission in this study. 
In contrast, hospital staff and the 
long-term care facilities cohorts had 
lower infection rates. Besides the high 
baseline titers, hospital staff may also 
have been protected at work because of 
intense patient and visitor screening, 
use of personal protective equipment, 
and other infection control measures 
deployed during the e p i d e m i c . S u c h 
combination strategies may help pre-
vent influenza transmission, although 
it is difficult to attribute the specific 
effect of these interventions without 
control groups. Staff and residents of 
the long-term care facilities may like-
wise have been protected by similar 
measures, but other factors such as re-
duced host susceptibility in the older 
age groups should be considered, for as 
others have found, long-term care fa-
cilities were largely spared from 2009 
influenza A ( H I N I ) outbreaks . ' ' Be-
cause large segments of these popula-
tions lacked antibodies after the initial 
epidemic wave, outbreaks might oc-
cur in subsequent epidemic waves. 
Likewise, only 13% of the community 
cohort seroconverted, which supports 
the case for targeted vaccination in 
populations for which protection is de-
sired. 
In both the community cohort and 
hospital staff, about half the partici-
pants who seroconverted reported a fe-
brile respiratory illness episode. This is 
comparable with estimates of influenza-
like illness proportions among sero-
logically confirmed influenza cases from 
seasonal influenza s t u d i e s . F e b r i l e 
respiratory illness episodes were less 
common among nonseroconverters, 
showing that febrile respiratory ill-
ness is reasonably specific (but not very 
sensitive) for influenza during epidem-
i c s . " The large number of community 
participants with acute respiratory ill-
ness episodes who did not serocon-
vert may have had other infections; rhi-
novirus circulates throughout the year 
and is the most common identifiable 
cause of acute respiratory illness in Sin-
g a p o r e . T h e r e were proportion-
ately fewer febrile respiratory illness epi-
sodes in military personnel possibly due 
to underreporting for which illness data 
were based solely on sel f -adminis-
tered questionnaires. 
Using serological cohorts is one of the 
best ways to estimate infection rates, 
particularly for large outbreaks such as 
2 0 0 9 inOuenza A ( H I N I ) for which 
laboratory confirmation cannot be per-
formed for most cases. Our cohort study 
demonstrates that those with higher 
baseline titers have significantly lower 
infection rates, perhaps indicative of 
protec t ion against 2 0 0 9 inf luenza 
A ( H I N I ) infection. Our study also sug-
gests that baseline circulating antibod-
ies to 2009 influenza A ( H I N I ) exist in 
individuals without clinical evidence of 
prior infection (Table 2). Baseline an-
tibody tilers were marginally higher in 
vaccinated hospital staff, compatible 
with findings that 12% to 22% of adults 
experienced a 4-fold or greater increase 
in antibody titers to 2 0 0 9 influenza 
A ( H I N I ) after seasonal influenza vac-
cination." Our findings on age-specific 
prevalence of baseline antibodies are 
similar to those from China where only 
1 .7% of adults (serum samples col-
lectedJuly-August 2008) had preexist-
ing antibody titers of at least 40 to 2009 
influenza A ( H I N I ) on hemagglutina-
tion inhibition assay, with even lower 
responses in those 60 years or older.^^ 
In contrast, Hancock et aH' found that 
baseline antibodies were more preva-
lent in older adults in the United States, 
suggesting that further studies are 
needed to understand whether the 
discrepant observat ions are due to 
seasonal H l N l v a c c i n a t i o n , " expo-
sure to influenza, or other community-
specific factors. Notably, in commu-
nity participants aged 65 years or older 
( for w h o m v a c c i n a t i o n is r e c o m -
mended), only 11% reported ever hav-
ing received influenza vaccination. This 
corroborates previous estimates that in-
fluenza vaccine uptake in Singapore re-
mains low.^' 
One limitation of our study is the lack 
of a pediatric population due to the 
diff iculty in obta ining serial blood 
specimens in this age group; cross-
sectional surveys using residual samples 
may be more feasible for estimating 
chi ldhood infect ion rates. Further-
more, our community cohort may not 
be truly representat ive of the Sin-
gapore population because it largely 
compr i sed heal thy volunteers . Al-
though these factors preclude us from 
determining the actual infection rate in 
Singapore, our study allows us to re-
flne estimates on the numbers at risk, 
obtain better case fatality rate esti-
mates in adult age groups, and inform 
policy on vaccination. Finally, apart 
from the community cohort, the base-
line collection started after influenza 
2 0 0 9 A ( H I N I ) had begun to circu-
late, albeit at low levels. However, sub-
analysis of the military and hospital co-
horts found no evidence of higher 
baseline titers in participants whose 
baseline samples were collected later. 
In conclusion, our study shows wide 
variation in serologically determined in-
fection rates by cohorts and age groups, 
suggesting that context-specific risks of 
infect ion need to be taken into ac-
count and that interventions need to be 
tailored to the population at risk. Al-
though it appears that a large propor-
tion of the Singapore adult population 
remain susceptible to the 2009 influ-
enza A ( H I N I ) virus after the first epi-
demic wave, for a significant second 
wave to occur, a sufficient number of 
susceptible children may also be re-
quired for efficient transmission. These 
and other factors will need to be con-
sidered in the determination of opti-
mal pandemic vaccination strategies for 
influenza A(HINI).^® 
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Chapter Six 
Clinical Features of Influenza in Closed 
and Semi-closed Environments 
The previous seroepidemiology study showed that the military cohort had a 
substantially higher seroconversion rate compared to the general population. From 
previous studies, closed and semi-closed environments such as schools, militaries, and 
boarding facilities have shown the propensity for high attack rates. These are possible 
conduits of spread of influenza due to living and/or working in close proximity. This 
is not only unique to the 2009 pandemic, but also in other influenza epidemics across 
time. For example, on board one military ship, despite having a high influenza 
vaccination rate among the sailors of more than 95%, an antigenically distinct H3N2 
influenza virus resulted in a 42% attack rate within three weeks and substantial lost 
workdays which are critical on a ship at sea (1). In another military setting, influenza 
outbreaks affected up to 58% of the population in less than a month (2). Our previous 
study from March 2006 and March 2007 performed in the Singapore military found 
that influenza A accounted for about 24% and influenza B 12% of all acute 
respiratory infections (3). Other similar closed environments have also yielded high 
attack rates from influenza, as shown in one boarding school for girls in the United 
Kingdom which reported a 71% overall attack rate during an influenza outbreak (4). 
Schools also have high transmission and attack rates among children which may be 
due to their increased susceptibility to infection and the close interaction during 
various activities within the school environment, similar to the military setting. 
During the initial months of the 2009 pandemic, there were also several instances of 
substantial transmission in schools - in New York, United States, 33% of students in 
one school reported having influenza-like symptoms (5). At a vocational boarding 
school in China, the overall infection rate was 32%, and risk factors for infection 
included sharing a classroom and dormitory space (6). In Osaka, Japan, reports of an 
outbreak of the 2009 H l N l pandemic virus in about 100 children in a school, together 
with transmission to other schools, prompted mass school closures across the city (7). 
Schools are also equally affected during seasonal influenza epidemics. One earlier 
mathematical model ing study in Taiwan suggested that the reproductive number (Ro) 
- which is the average number of secondary cases that originate f rom an infected 
primary case in the absence of immunity - ranged from 2.8 to 16.9 in school settings, 
and was substantially higher than the 1.2 to 2.4 in various community settings (8). 
Another seasonal influenza epidemic in 2005/2006 in England resulted in an overall 
attack rate in schools of 24.1%, ranging from 14.6% to 44.9% across different regions 
within the country (9). In Singapore during the 1968 pandemic, a study at the National 
University of Singapore found an attack rate of 19.2%, ranging from 12.8% in female 
students to 36.4% in adult non-academic staff (10). 
Militaries have large populations across the world, often in closed or semi-closed 
settings which favor the rapid transmission of infectious diseases. The burden of 
respiratory infections such as influenza acquired in military populations is somewhat 
different f rom the community, due to the physical and mental challenges associated 
with military life (11). There is therefore a need to perform comprehensive 
surveillance for influenza in the military to understand the epidemiology and burden 
of disease, to guide preventive public health measures to reduce the impact. 
In the Singapore context, the military is an ideal platform to study the impact of 
influenza due to the existence of excellent surveillance platforms, and an existing 
influenza pandemic preparedness and response plan which had been built upon the 
2003 SARS outbreak in Singapore, together with guidance on influenza preparedness 
and response from the WHO (12). This preparedness and response plan resulted in 
interventions to be studied in later chapters. The Singapore military's semi-closed 
environment and the conscript population which forms the majority of the population 
provides results that are likely to be applicable in other closed settings such as schools 
which are of concern to policy makers worldwide. 
In addition, the military is important as a sentinel group for national surveillance. The 
previous study has shown that epidemics in the military can develop faster than the 
national epidemic, and military outbreaks can be detected earlier due to the living 
environment where most cases report to a single medical facility and outbreaks can 
easily be detected. In the 1968 pandemic in Singapore, early outbreaks were detected 
in similar closed environments in a military camp and an island fishing village 
(13,14). 
This study therefore aims to explore the epidemiology of influenza including 
incidence and seasonality, and the overall effectiveness of measures to reduce the 
impact of influenza. It shows the surveillance of influenza in the military during and 
after the 2009 pandemic, when it was mitially believed that the 2009 H l N l pandemic 
strain would be the dominant strain. It also determines the clinical features of 
influenza compared to non-influenza cases, and may be useful for clinicians 
identifying cases for clinical management. 
This study also reinforces the findings of Chapter Four in detailing the difficulties of 
using ILI to identify influenza cases for treatment or surveillance without laboratory 
diagnosis, although we did not evaluate the effectiveness of ILI as a surveillance tool. 
The ILI definition has often been used for influenza surveillance and also by 
clinicians to determine possible influenza infection for clinical management. A recent 
study by Kasper and colleagues looked at the accuracy of ILI as a tool in predicting 
influenza infections and found that the sensitivity was 73.8%, specificity 43.0% PPV 
39.5%) and NPV 76.5% (15). Other studies have found that fever and cough were the 
best predictive symptoms of influenza (16,17). The study by Monto and colleagues 
also found, as we did, that sore throat was a negative predictor of influenza (16). It is 
therefore important to look at the possible predictors of influenza among a range of 
possible influenza symptoms in the local setting. At the same time, all of these studies 
are based on subjects that were selected due to fever and respiratory symptoms in a 
clinical setting, limiting the ability of these studies to be generalized to milder 
influenza cases. Future studies should be expanded to include mildly symptomatic 
influenza cases including those without fever or respiratory symptoms, with study 
designs that include general community participant and all patients presenting to 
clinical facilities. 
Study 4 
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Abstract 
Introduction: Influenza Infections present with wide-ranging clinical features. We aim to compare the differences in 
presentation between influenza and non-Influenza cases among those with febrile respiratory illness (FRl) to determine 
predictors of influenza infection. 
Methods: Personnel with FRl (defined as fever>:37.5°C, with cough or sore throat) were recruited from the sentinel 
surveillance system in the Singapore military. Nasal washes were collected, and tested using the Resplex II and additional 
PCR assays for etiological determination. Interviewer-administered questionnaires collected information on patient 
demographics and clinical features. Univariate comparison of the various parameters was conducted, with statistically 
significant parameters entered into a multivariate logistic regression model. The final multivariate model for Influenza versus 
non-influenza cases was used to build a predictive probability clinical diagnostic model. 
Results: Sjy out of 2858 subjects recruited from 11 May 2009 to 25 Jun 2010 had influenza, of which 434 (52.9%) had 2009 
influenza A (H1N1), 58 (7.1%) seasonal influenza A (H3N2) and 269 (32.8%) Influenza B. Influenza-positive cases were 
significantly more likely to present with running nose, chills and rigors, ocular symptoms and higher temperature, and less 
likely with sore throat, photophobia, injected pharynx, and nausea/vomltlng. Our clinical diagnostic model had a sensitivity 
of 65% (95% CI: 58%, 72%), specificity of 69% (95% CI: 62%, 75%), and overall accuracy of 68% (95% CI: 64%, 71%), 
performing significantly better than conventional Influenza-like Illness (ILI) criteria. 
Conclusions: Use of a clinical diagnostic model may help predict influenza better than the conventional ILI definition 
among young adults with FRl. 
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Introduction 
In f luenza infect ions result in a wide r ange of clinical 
presenta t ions , f r o m the classical influenza-like illness (ILI), to 
mi lder resp i ra tory infect ions, a n d subclinical infections. D e t e r m i n -
ing the clinical p red ic tors of inf luenza infection is impor t an t for the 
diagnosis a n d m a n a g e m e n t of pat ients p resen t ing with respiratory-
illness, he lp ing to guide a p p r o p r i a t e antiviral t he rapy , a n d to avoid 
unnecessa ry ant ibiot ic use. T h i s is par t icular ly i m p o r t a n t in the 
y o u n g adul t popu la t ion , which const i tutes an economica l ly 
p roduc t ive age g r o u p w h e r e b y early t r ea tmen t m a y reduce work 
absentee ism [1]. T h e recent 2009 H l N l p a n d e m i c has shown that 
y o u n g adults have a h igher infection rate c o m p a r e d to o the r age 
g roups [2]. For essential publ ic services such as the military, police, 
civil defence , a n d hea l thcare with substantial p ropor t ions of y o u n g 
adults, early recogni t ion a n d t r ea tmen t m a y reduce service 
disrupt ions . 
T h e r e has been research descr ibing the dilTerences in s y m p t o m s 
be tween inf luenza a n d non- inf luenza cases. However , few have 
been p e r f o r m e d in tropical countr ies , where a large p ropor t ion of 
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the world's population reside. Influenza morbidity and mortality in 
tropical countries like Singapore has been shown to be comparable 
to temperate countries [3,4], Furthermore, there has also been 
substantial co-circulation of other etiologic agents that can 
similarly cause acute respiratory illnesses [5], While two recent 
tropical studies sought to difierentiate the symptoms of these 
clinical entities, they had only limited number of cases [6,7], and 
were based only on hospital attendances in the peri-pandemic 
period, wliere inclusion criteria might be atypical. 
Using data from a respiratory disease sentinel surveillance 
system in the Singapore military, we compare the differences in 
clinical presentation between influenza and non-influenza cases in 
> oung adults with febrile respiratory illness to determine predictors 
of influenza infection and aid case management especially where 
laboratory confirmation is not possible. 
Methods 
Singapore is a city state in tropical South-East Asia with 5 
million people, with all Singaporean males serving two years of 
military service after high school. These servicemen live in 
barracks-style accommodation during weekdays and return home 
during weekends, maintaining continued interaction between the 
military and the Singapore population. 
The Singapore military began a sentinel respiratory disease 
surveillance program in 4 major camps, including a recruit 
training camp, on 11 May 2009 (epidemiological-week 19), just 
before community spread of pandemic H l N l in late-June 2009 
[8,9]. All personnel who visited the primary healthcare clinics in 
these camps during the main consultation hours with febrile 
respiratory illness (FRI)—defined as the presence of fever >:37.5°C 
with cough or sore throat—were recruited. The use of FRI 
contrasts with the usual measure of influenza-like illness (ILI, 
defined as fever >38.0°C with cough or sore throat); our choice 
reflected the desire to capture other febrile cases that also result in 
substantial absenteeism; while limiting cases to those with fever as 
an indicator of potential severity and absenteeism. 
Repeat visits for the same illness episode as assessed by the 
consulting physician were excluded to avoid double counting. 
Nasal washes, collected separately from each side of the nose, were 
taken from consenting participants by trained medical staff, 
collected in viral transport media, and sent to the laboratory 
within 24 hours. Nasal washes were used as they have been shown 
to be equally or more sensitive than other methods such as nasal or 
throat swabs, and nasopharyngeal aspirates, in the detection of 
respiratory infections such as influenza [10-12]. 
In addition, interviewer-administered questionnaires were 
completed during the medical consultation, collecting information 
on patient demographics and clinical features. A follow-up phone 
questionnaire was conducted 2 weeks after the initial consultation 
to determine symptoms present during the entire course of illness. 
Written informed consent was obtained. The study was 
approved by the military's Joint Medical Committee for Research, 
and by the institutional review boards of the National University of 
Singapore, and the Australian National University. 
Laboratory Methods 
T o determine the etiology, we used the multiplex PGR strategy 
based on the Resplex assays described below, and performed 
additional singleplex PGR assays to determine the influenza 
subtype. 
Total nucleic acids were extracted from each specimen using 
the DNA minikit (Qiagen, Inc, Valencia, CA, USA) according to 
the manufacturer 's instructions. Five (ll of extract were tested with 
Resplex I and II (version 2.0, Qiagen, Inc., Valencia, CA, USA) 
for the presence of respiratory micro-organisms on the LiquiChip 
200 Workstation, again according to the manufacturer 's instruc-
tions. The Resplex I and II (version 2.0) assays are multiplex PGR 
assays coupled with bead array detection technology and can 
simultaneously detect and subtype 18 different viruses and bacteria 
including influenza A and influenza B [13-15]. 
Specimens that were Resplex II positive for influenza A were 
further subtyped with real-time PGR for HI or H3 (Singapore 
Ministry of Health), or for pandemic H l N l [16], Briefly, five nl of 
total genetic extracts were tested with the one-step Superscriptlll/ 
Platinum Taq kit (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA, USA) following the 
manufacturer's instructions on either the LightCycler machine 
from Roche or the Applied Biosystems real-time PGR machine 
(7500). 
Statistical Analysis 
We compared differences in overall clinical presentation 
between influenza and all non-influenza F'RI cases. Univariate 
comparison of demographic parameters, symptoms and signs was 
conducted using logistic regression to determine statistically 
significant parameters of interest. Potential confounding was 
addressed by performing multivariate analyses where character-
istics found to be statistically significant in univariate analyses were 
entered into a multivariate logistic regression model to identify 
independent clinical predictors, with non-significant terms in the 
multivariate analysis dropped one at a time starting with the 
highest /)-value. T o address another source of potential confound-
ing among the remaining variables, we assessed for interactions 
between these variables but none proved significant. All stadstical 
analyses were performed using Stata 9.0 (Stata Corp., College 
Station, TX, USA) and R (R Core Development Team). All tests 
were conducted at the 5% level of significance, with no explicit 
adjustment for multiple comparisons; instead, where appropriate, 
we present the expected number of false positive findings under 
the assumption that all null hypotheses are correct, a strongly 
conservative assumption. We report odds ratios (OR) and 
corresponding 95% confidence intervals (CI) where applicable. 
The final multivariate model for influenza versus non-influenza 
cases was used to build a predictive probability equation as a 
clinical diagnostic model to determine the likelihood of influenza 
infection given the clinical characteristics. For this we developed 
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve whence the area 
under the R O C (AUG) was calculated and two cut-off points 
determined: one maximizing the sum of sensitivity and specificity, 
the other maximising specificity while keeping sensitivity at 90%. 
Ten-fold cross-\'alidation was used to guard against over-fitting, 
with AUG, sensitivity and specificity scores averaged over the ten 
folds. 
Results 
A total of 2858 eligible subjects were recruited from 11 May 
2009 to 25 J u n 2010. Of these 2858 subjects, 2717 (95.1%) 
completed the telephone follow-up. The average age was 21 years 
old (SD 3.2), and 2853 (99.8%) were male. Of the 2858 subjects, 
there were 821 influenza cases, of which 434 (52.9% of all 
influenza cases) were 2009 pandemic influenza A (HlNl) , 58 
(7.1%) seasonal influenza A (H3N2), 269 (32.8%) influenza B, and 
10 (1.2%) seasonal influenza A (HlNl ) , with 6 co-infections and 
44 unsubtypable. 
There were a total of 70 influenza vaccine failures, defined as 
seasonal or pandemic influenza infections that occurred despite 
previous vaccination with the relevant seasonal or pandemic 
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Figure 1. Weekly FRI cases, by influenza RT-PCR positivity, in 2009/10 in the Singapore military. 
doi:l 0.1371/journal.pone.OOl 7468.g001 
vacc ine respectively. O F these, the re were 43 p a n d e m i c H l N l 
vacc ine fai lures, a l t hough 27 (63%) were \-accinated less t h a n 2 
weeks be fo re onse t of symptoms ; 11 H 3 N 2 vaccine failures, a n d 16 
in f luenza B vacc ine failures. T h e r e were n o statistically discernible 
d i f fe rences in in f luenza severity {fever a 3 8 . 0 ° C or breathlessness) 
for vacc ine fai lures c o m p a r e d to o t h e r in f luenza cases. 
F igure 1 shows the n u m b e r of F R I cases s ampled pe r week, a n d 
the p r o p o r t i o n of these cases tha t tested positive for inf luenza. P'or 
the n o n - i n f l u e n z a F R I cases, 289 (10 .1% of all subjects) were 
d i agnosed wi th coxsackie v i ruses /echovi ruses , 247 (8.6%) rh ino-
virus, 217 (7.6%) H . in f luenzae , 130 (4.5%) coronavi ruses , 76 
(2.7%) p a r a i n f l u e n z a viruses, 47 (1.6%) h u m a n m e t a p n e u m o v i r u s , 
27 N . meningi t id is , 12 S. p n e u m o n i a e , 5 adenoviruses , 2 R S V , 
a n d 1 bocavi rus . 
Clinical Features 
U n i v a r i a t e analyses c o m p a r i n g the clinical fea tures be tween 
in f luenza a n d non - in i l uenza cases a re p resen ted in Figure 2, while 
the mul t ivar ia te analyses ad jus t ing for possible c o n f o u n d e r s are 
p r e sen t ed in Table 1. 
F r o m the un ivar ia te a n d mul t ivar ia te analyses, inf luenza-
posit ive cases w e r e s ignif icandy m o r e likely to present with 
r u n n i n g nose, chills a n d rigors, a n d h igher t e m p e r a t u r e , a n d less 
likely to p resen t with sore th roa t , p h o t o p h o b i a , a n d injected 
p h a r y n x , c o m p a r e d to inf luenza-negat ive cases (Figure 2 a n d 
T a b l e 1). O c u l a r s y m p t o m s were significant o n univar ia te bu t only 
marg ina l ly so o n mult i \ -ar iate analysis, while n a u s e a / v o m i t i n g was 
bo rde r l i ne signif icant o n un ivar ia te bu t clearly significant on 
mul t iva r i a te analysis. Based on the finaf mode l ' s m a x i n u i m 
likelihood es t imates , we c rea t ed a diagnost ic index tha t p red ic ted 
in f luenza infect ion based o n clinical p resen ta t ion . T h e p red ic ted 
probabi l i tv of inf luenza infect ion (pi) was ca lcula ted as follows: 
lOln f ' = - 3 1 5 [sore th roa t ] + 6 [ runn ing nose] + 2 [ocular 
s y m p t o m s ] ' - ' 3 [ n a u s e a / v o m i t i n g ] -I-4[chil ls /r igors] - 7 [ p h o t o p h o -
bia] -I- 5 [ f e v e r > 3 7 . 8 ] -I- 8 [ f e v e r > 3 8 ] - 4 [ in jec ted pharvn.x]where 
[A] = f if the pa t i en t presents wi th tha t s y m p t o m or sign a n d 0 
o therwise . A score (on the r ight h a n d side) of 0 co r r e sponds to a 
5 0 % c h a n c e of in f luenza infect ion, -10 to a b o u t a 2 5 % chance , -5 
to a b o u t a 4 0 % c h a n c e . T h e fever t e rms are cumula t ive , i.e. a 
fever of 37.9 adds 5 to the score, while a fever of 38.2 adds 13. 
T h e A U G u n d e r ten-fold cross-val idat ion was 6 9 % (95% C I : 
6 1 % , 76%). Us ing a cut-off to max imize sensitivity a n d specificity, 
the m o d e l h a d sensitivity of 6 5 % (95% C I : 5 8 % , 72%), specificity 
of 6 9 % (95% C I : 6 2 % , 75%), a n d overall accu racy of 6 8 % (95% 
Clinical sign 
or symptom Proportion, by infection status 





Cougf i with phlegm 




Fever > 38.0 ° C 
Nausea/Vomit ing 
Breathlessness 











Inf luenza -ve 
Inf luenza +ve 
Figure 2. Univariate comparison of clinical signs or symptoms 
between influenza-positive and influenza-negative cases. 
Symptoms or signs are ranked by frequency for non-influenza cases. 
Empirical frequencies of presentation of each symptom or sign are 
presented in the rigtit column as bars, with 95% confidence intervals 
represented by whiskers. Symptoms or signs that are statistically 
discernibly different at the 5% level are displayed in bold font. With 21 
tests, the conservative expected number of false discoveries is 1.1. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.OOl 7468.g002 
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T a b l e 1. Multivariate analysis compar ing clinical features of 
influenza-positive with all influenza-negative FRI cases. 
Influenza Positive vs Negative* 
Parameters Adjusted Odds Ratio (95% CI) p value 
Sore throat 0.62 (0.48, 0.82) <0.001 
Running nose 1.86 (1.52, 2.29) <0.001 
Chills/rigors 1.52 (1.20, 1.91) <0.001 
Photophobia 0.49 (0.29, 0.83) 0.007 
Fever (S37.8 C) 1.64 (1.19, 2.26) 0.003 
Fever (£38 C) 2.15 (1.65, 2.80) <0.001 
Injected pharynx 0.69 (0.56, 0.86) <0.001 
Nausea/Vomiting 0.74 (0.59, 0.92) 0.007 
Eye symptoms 1.25 (1.01, 1.55) 0.04 
•Age, sore throat, running nose, sore eyes or eye pain, chills/rigors, 
photophobia, Fever £37.8 C, Fever £38.0 C, and injected pharynx were 
included in the analysis before non-significant terms were sequentially 
removed. With nine tests, the conservative expected number of false 
discoveries is 0.45. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.OOl 7468.t001 
CI: 6 4 % , 71%) u n d e r ten-fold cross val idat ion. T h e m o d e l allows 
for d i f fer ing cut-off specif icat ions using the ind ica ted cr i ter ia 
( Table 2). T h e relatively p o o r p e r f o r m a n c e of ILI a lone as a 
p red ic to r is no tab le . 
Discuss ion 
Dif fe ren t i a t ing b e t w e e n in f luenza infect ions a n d o t h e r febrile 
resp i ra to ry illnesses is a cha l lenge in clinical settings wi thou t 
l abo ra to ry assistance. In mos t s i tuat ions, it is no t feasible or cost-
effective to p e r f o r m P G R tests, while c h e a p e r rap id tests have 
l imited sensitivity [17,18]. It is the re fore i m p o r t a n t for clinicians to 
have clinical p re sen ta t ion -based guides to assist in d iagnos ing 
in f luenza cases for t r e a t m e n t a n d f u r t h e r m a n a g e m e n t , especially 
d u r i n g an ep idemic or p a n d e m i c . 
Inf luenza-pos i t ive a n d negat ive cases h a d several difl 'ering 
clinical p a r a m e t e r s . W e have f o u n d tha t inf luenza-posi t ive cases 
were m o r e likely to h a v e r u n n i n g nose c o m p a r e d to inf luenza-
negat ive cases, s imilar to the findings f r o m a n o t h e r genera l 
popu l a t i on s tudy in the t ropics [7]. T h i s is c o n t r a r y to prev ious 
belief tha t r u n n i n g nose is less c o m m o n in in f luenza c o m p a r e d to 
o t h e r viral resp i ra tory illnesses [19J. Likewise, in f luenza cases also 
h a d similar p reva l ence of c o u g h with s p u t u m c o m p a r e d to non-
inf luenza cases, also c o n t r a r y to p rev ious belief [19]. 
At the s a m e t ime, in f luenza cases w e r e m o r e likely to have 
h igher t e m p e r a t u r e a n d chills a n d r igors b u t less likely to present 
wi th sore th roa t , p rov id ing s u p p o r t i n g ev idence to a previous study 
by M o n t o a n d col leagues tha t o n e of the m o s t p red ic t ive symptoms 
of in f luenza is fever [20]. H o w e v e r , unlike t h a t s tudy, we did not 
find tha t c o u g h was a predic t ive s y m p t o m for inf luenza . Possible 
reasons for such a d i f fe rence inc lude the potent ia l ly different 
aet iologies for n o n - i n f l u e n z a cases in the t ropics a n d o t h e r regions, 
a n d also possible d i f fe rences in in f luenza p re sen ta t ion by region. It 
is t he re fo re i m p o r t a n t to va l ida te these pred ic t ive tools in the local 
set t ing w h e r e they a re used. 
In the absence of l abo ra to ry test ing, us ing o u r clinical diagnostic 
m o d e l e n a b l e d accu ra t e classification of u p to 7 6 % of all cases in 
o u r coho r t (Tab le 2). K e e p i n g sensitivity a t 9 0 % , we were able to 
ach ieve a high negat ive predic t ive va lue of 8 6 % , w h i c h is useful for 
clinicians in exc lud ing in f luenza cases. T h e posit ive predictive 
value, on the o t h e r h a n d , is low d u e to the subs tant ia l overlap in 
s y m p t o m s b e t w e e n in f luenza a n d n o n - i n f l u e n z a cases. T h e clinical 
d iagnost ic m o d e l p e r f o r m e d signif icantly be t t e r t h a n s tandard ILI 
cr i ter ia a m o n g o u r subjects wi th febri le resp i ra tory infections. It 
c an be easily a d a p t e d into va r ious t abu l a r o r e lect ronic formats for 
easy use by clinicians. Th i s , if t aken toge the r wi th specific policy 
a n d cost eva lua t ions in the local sett ing, m a y he lp guide initiation 
of anti-viral t r e a t m e n t o r isolation m e a s u r e s d u r i n g an epidemic or 
p a n d e m i c s i tuat ion while r e d u c i n g w r o n g t r e a t m e n t of non-
inf luenza cases to m i n i m i z e stockpile wastages . 
T h e s t rengths of o u r s tudy a r e its large s amp le size, high follow-
u p ra te , a n d h igh diagnost ic a s c e r t a i n m e n t , wi th etiological 
c o n f i r m a t i o n of all positive in f luenza cases. T h e r e are some 
l imitat ions to this s tudy, inc lud ing the na tu ra l bias towards febrile 
s y m p t o m a t i c cases d u e to the case def in i t ion . In f luenza cases do 
p resen t wi th mild o r a s y m p t o m a t i c infec t ion , bu t these cases will 
be difficult to ident i fy in a survei l lance p r o g r a m a n d a re less severe 
in clinical o u t c o m e . T h e results should t he re fo re be in terpre ted in 
the con tex t of febrile s y m p t o m a t i c infect ion r equ i r i ng physician 
consul ta t ion , w h i c h c a p t u r e the m o r e severe a n d impor t an t cases 
tha t affect absen tee i sm. 
In add i t ion , this s tudy p r e d o m i n a n t l y cons ide red y o u n g male 
adul ts . Whi l e we felt tha t t he re is n o ev idence tha t shows any 
di f ferences in p re sen ta t ion by g e n d e r , f u r t h e r studies a re required 
to d e t e r m i n e if similarly h igh d iagnos t ic a s c e r t a i n m e n t can be 
T a b l e 2. Utility of the predictive probability equation as a clinical diagnostic model in this study under 10-fold cross-validation 
compared with common l y used ILI criteria (for which no cross-validation is needed). 
Variable 
Sensitivity (%, 
and 9 5 % CIs) 
Specificity (%, 
and 9 5 % CIsI 
PPV (%, and 
9 5 % CIS) 
NPV (%, and 
9 5 % CIS) 
Overall accuracy 
(%, and 95% CIsI 
Predictive probability equation, maximising 65 69 43 85 68 
total sensitivity and specificity (58, 72) (62, 75) (39, 47) (83, 87) (64, 71) 
Predictive probability equation. 18 96 67 77 76 
maximising accuracy (8, 29) (93, 99) (57, 76) (75, 80) (74, 77) 
Predictive probability equation, 90 26 30 86 43 
setting sensitivity to 9 0% (89, 90) (20, 23) (28, 33) (83, 89) (38, 48) 
Fever £37.8 'C, cough or 84 36 34 84 48 
sore throat (78, 83) (34, 38) (31, 35) (80, 85) (47, 51) 
ILI (Fever £38.0 C, cough or 69 55 37 81 58 
sore throat) (64, 71) (53, 57) (35, 40) (79, 83) (57, 60) 
doi:l 0.1371/journal.pone.OOl 7468.t002 
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achieved in other age groups. Similarly, consultation biases may 
exist as the military population have medical consultation patterns 
that differ from the general population. We re-emphasize that 
diagnostic tools should be de\ elopcd in the setting where they are 
used. O the r potential biases include presentation biases from cases 
which rejected recruitment, presentations after recruitment hours 
which were not included, and losses to follow-up. Recall biases 
may exist as we obtained final clinical history two weeks after 
enrolment into the study, which we felt struck a balance between 
the risk of recall bias and the desire to capture comprehensively all 
symptoms during the illness period. 
Different diagnostic scores may need to be de\ eloped to account 
for local FRI aetiologies and socio-cultural-demographic differ-
ences, but so doing will rely on well-designed local sur\eillance 
programs. T h e best clinical syndrome to be used for surveillance is 
a potentially interesting question that may be explored by further 
related studies. 
Use of a predictive equation as a clinical diagnostic model can 
help better predict influenza than the conventional influenza-like 
illness definition among young adult military personnel with febrile 
respiratory illnesses. Until cheap, rapid and reliable point-of-care 
tests become widely available, clinical scores der i \ed from large 
cohort studies may be of reasonable clinical utility. 
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Chapter Seven 
Preparedness and Response to Influenza 
Epidemics and Pandemics 
From the evidence included in the previous chapters, influenza epidemics and 
pandemics have wide-ranging impacts globally. In response to the threat posed by 
influenza, and the likelihood of pandemics occurring, many countries have developed 
influenza pandemic preparedness and response plans, following guidance from WHO 
(1,2). However, the interventions used in many of these plans are based on limited 
scientific data, and mathematical modeling studies. This chapter describes some of the 
key pharmaceutical and public health interventions that have been used in influenza 
pandemic preparedness and response and are the subject of the subsequent studies, 
and concludes with a systematic review of the literature on mathematical modeling 
studies that estimate the effectiveness of these interventions. 
Pharmaceutical Interventions 
An integral part of preparedness plans, pharmaceutical interventions include: the 
stockpiling of antiviral drugs and prototype pandemic vaccines; the development of 
vaccine production capabilities to produce pandemic vaccines; and advanced purchase 
agreements with pharmaceutical companies to make these drugs or vaccines available 
when needed. Stockpiling of antiviral drugs in particular is widely adopted in well-
resourced nations to prepare for an influenza pandemic. These stockpiles provide 
population level protection as a partially effective drug may still have a substantial 
impact in reducing spread or severe infections at the population level. 
Antiviral drugs 
The most widely used antiviral drugs against influenza currently are the 
neuraminidase inhibitor class of drugs. The two currently approved drugs in 
widespread use are oseltamivir and zanamivir, which are effective for the treatment of 
seasonal influenza and prophylaxis to prevent infection (3,4). It is also effective 
against the 2009 H l N l pandemic strain and H5N1 influenza which is a zoonosis of 
concern in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe (5-7). Several other 
investigational neuraminidase inhibitors, including intravenous or intramuscular 
peramivir, and inhaled CS-8 and T-705 are currently in advanced development (8). 
The development of drugs with non-oral and non-respiratory routes of administration 
such as peramivir (intravenous or intramuscular) and intravenous zanamivir is also 
important especially for severely ill patients, and the intramuscular formulations can 
also serve to increase compliance in the outpatient setting (9). 
Oseltamivir is easily administered orally and has been the most commonly stockpiled 
drug among countries and inter-govemmental agencies. However, seasonal H l N l 
viruses prior to the 2009 pandemic have shown high levels of resistance to 
oseltamivir, (10) and there is also reduced sensitivity of H5N1 viruses to the drug 
(11). In particular, seasonal H l N l viruses with a His274Tyr mutation have over 350-
fold loss of susceptibility to oseltamivir (3). I f higher or more prolonged doses were 
required during an epidemic or pandemic, existing stockpiles which were mostly 
computed based on normal-dose therapy would be rapidly depleted. However, 
oseltamivir is still effective against the 2009-HlNl pandemic strains even though 
there have been individual reports of resistant cases (12-15). 
Zanamivir is also being increasingly stockpiled as it remains effective for treatment of 
and prophylaxis against oseltamivir-resistant strains including variants with 
His274Tyr or Asn295Ser due to a difference in binding sites (3) on the NA protein 
which are not affected by the oseltamivir resistant binding-site configurations. 
However, the oral inhalation device that delivers the drug may be difficult to use in 
the young and in the elderly, and may cause bronchospasm in those with pre-existing 
chronic respiratory conditions. As the Singapore Government had stockpiled larger 
quantities of oseltamivir compared to zanamivir, the first line drug of choice for 
influenza was oseltamivir, and consequently oseltamivir was used in all of the studies 
in this thesis where antivirals were indicated. 
Another class of antivirals that are also effective against influenza is the adamantanes, 
such as amantadine and rimantadine. These drugs were effective during the 1968 
Hong Kong pandemic and have been widely used previously. However, recent 
circulating H3N2, 2009 H l N l and influenza B viruses are resistant to the adamantine 
class of antivirals despite the lack of clinical use of these drugs in recent years for 
influenza treatment (5). Despite this, they have a potential role as combination therapy 
with neuraminidase inhibitors for treatment of influenza cases when the virus is 
susceptible to adamantanes, or when the circulating strain is oseltamivir-resistant and 
zanamivir is medically contra-indicated (16,17). Their limited use for seasonal 
influenza may also result in increased effectiveness as combination therapy due to 
possibly less selective pressure towards resistant strains in the future. 
Vaccines 
The current influenza vaccines in use for seasonal influenza prevention are the 
trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine which is administered by injection, and the live 
attenuated influenza vaccine which is administered by nasal spray. These vaccines 
contain three separate influenza strains - one each from influenza A / H I N I , influenza 
A/H3N2, and influenza B. The strains selected for each vaccine formulation are those 
that are predicted by the WHO to be in circulation in the coming influenza seasons. 
There are two vaccine formulations released each year - one ahead of the Northern 
Hemisphere winter season, and the other ahead of the Southern Hemisphere winter 
season. As the vaccine strains are based on predictions, actual matches to the 
circulating influenza strains vary from season to season, and consequently the 
preventive effectiveness of the vaccine is higher for better vaccine matches (18). The 
tropics pose a substantial challenge in the selection of the Northern or Southern 
Hemisphere vaccine formulations, and the timing of vaccination, because of the 
multiple peaks each year and high baseline incidence. There is, however, little 
evidence in the tropics on the effectiveness of one vaccine formulation over the other 
or the ideal timing for vaccine. One Brazilian study using data from 1999 to 2007 
found that the influenza season in Brazil starts before the Southern Hemisphere 
winter, and that using the composition and timing of the Northern Hemisphere 
vaccine may increase protection against influenza from 30% to 65% compared to the 
Southern Hemisphere vaccine that was usually used (19). More studies using virus 
data from different tropical regions and across different time periods are required to 
determine the historical matching of the annual vaccine formulations and timing for 
vaccination. 
New vaccine development programs have also focused on a range of influenza strains 
with pandemic potential (20). Whole vimses, live attenuated intranasal application, 
cell culture production systems, antigen sparing techniques and a range of adjuvant 
are being explored (20). Stockpiling of candidate pandemic vaccines before a 
pandemic may reduce the overall spread and impact of the pandemic if the stockpiled 
vaccine strains are reasonably matched to the actual pandemic strains. Thus, countries 
have been considering stockpiling H5N1 vaccines against currently circulating H5N1 
strains in anticipation that the H5N1 strain would result in a future pandemic (21-23). 
However, the cost-effectiveness of such a strategy is highly dependent on the efficacy 
of the vaccine and the matching to the pandemic strain, and the time to the next 
pandemic due to stockpile costs. This has been shown in an economic evaluation 
publication that I did in 2009 (24). A vaccine with the ability to generate cross-strain 
reactivity and prime immunity in individuals before an outbreak is another potential 
pandemic immunization strategy (20). This will be further discussed in Chapter Eight. 
New vaccines with: greater cross-protection against conserved viral regions; vaccine 
libraries for rapid production of candidate vaccines; better adjuvant and antigen-
sparing strategies for greater production capacity; and administrative modes for 
improved immunogenicity and cross- protection (23,25) are alternative approaches 
that merit consideration. As many countries currently purchase vaccines from 
overseas-based manufacturing facilities; supplies may be inadequate during a 
pandemic. Increasing vaccine manufacturing capacity, vaccine stockpiling and 
priming with pre-pandemic vaccine may protect communities before actual pandemic 
vaccines become available. 
Addressing bacterial co-infections 
Antibiotics should also be considered as part of pandemic preparedness stockpiles 
(26). In 1918, pandemic victims had a high incidence of bacterial pneumonia with 
multiple bacterial pathogens (26,27). However, several European pandemic 
preparedness plans did not include antibiotics and most did not consider the required 
quantity (28). Stockpiles should cover common locally circulating bacterial infections. 
and may include amoxicillin/clavulanate, doxycycline, cephalosporins, 
fluoroquinolones, macrolides or co-trimoxazole (29). Likewise, routine vaccination 
against bacterial infections such as Streptococcus pneumoniae. Hemophilus influenzae 
h, and Neisseria meningitidis for at-risk populations should be considered (29). This 
will reduce the impact of bacterial infections, including in unvaccinated groups as one 
study showed, the presence of less pneumococcal infection among adults after 
introduction of childhood pneumococcal vaccination (30). 
Non-Pharmaceutical (Public Health) Interventions 
Non-pharmaceutical measures have been widely used to reduce the spread and impact 
of influenza and other infectious diseases for a long time. Examples include the use of 
quarantine during the plague epidemic in Europe in the 14"^  Century, to the 
combination of different measures used during the 1918 influenza pandemic. These 
public health measures are important as they work via different mechanisms to 
pharmaceutical interventions and can be complimentary with synergistic effects in 
reducing the spread of influenza. At the same time, pharmaceutical interventions may 
not be available in sufficient quantity in all settings, especially in less resourced areas, 
or they may not be available in a timely manner. A good example of the latter is the 
availability of vaccines to a new pandemic strain which could take months to develop. 
Public health interventions therefore play an important role in reducing the impact of 
influenza, especially in the absence of anti-viral drugs or vaccines. The following 
describes some of the common measures that have been used for influenza epidemic 
and pandemic preparedness and response. 
Many population or individual measures have been used to reduce the spread of 
influenza. Although these measures have been widely used, there has been a lack of 
scientific evidence for their actual effectiveness before the 2009 pandemic. Much of 
the existing evidence has been obtained from observational examples from the 
1918 pandemic showing the possible effectiveness in early, combined, and sustained 
measures in reducing influenza spread in an era before the availability of 
pharmaceutical interventions (31-33). 
Personal hygiene measures 
Personal hygiene measures are often recommended as part of universal hygiene and 
infection control, despite a lack of clear evidence in specifically preventing the spread 
of influenza (34). These measures include hand washing before meals; avoiding hand 
contact with eyes, nose, or mouth; covering nose and mouth when sneezing or 
coughing; and seeking early medical treatment (including self-isolation) when ill. A 
systematic literature review found that frequent hand washing was generally effective 
in reducing transmission of respiratory viruses (35), and hand washing has been 
shown to be associated with 6% to 44% reduction in non-specific respiratory 
infections (36). Hand washing has also been shown to be highly effective in 
preventing the transmission of SARS, another disease with respiratory transmission 
(37,38). However, adding virucidal or antiseptic agents to normal hand washing may 
not increase its effectiveness (35), even though alcohol disinfectants have been shown 
to inactivate influenza viruses (39). As few of these measures have been rigorously 
studied during actual influenza epidemics, more research is needed. In addition, 
personal hygiene measures should be supported by other strategies. 
Personal Protective Equipment 
The use of personal protective equipment such as masks, gloves, and gowns has also 
been found to be effective in reducing respiratory virus transmission (35). 
Specifically, facemasks have been used by healthcare workers and the general 
population in an attempt to reduce the spread of infection from an infected individual, 
or to reduce the exposure to and risk of infection of other individuals. One systematic 
review found that there is some evidence supporting the use of masks in infccted 
individuals to reduce the spread of influenza to other individuals (40). For the 
prevention of risk of infection, one study in Australia found that the use of respiratory 
masks, both surgical masks and non-fit tested FFP2 masks (equivalent to N-95 
masks), significantly reduced the risk of ILIs (41). A household study in Hong Kong 
found that the use of facemasks by all household members together with hand hygiene 
reduced influenza transmission - if initiated within 36 hours after the index case's 
clinical illness onset (40). However, both studies also mentioned that adherence to use 
was also an issue. Among the different types of masks, a randomized control trial in 
Canada showed that there was no significant difference in influenza infection rates 
among hospital nurses caring for potential influenza patients wearing surgical masks 
or FFP2 masks (42). 
Social distancing 
Different forms of social distancing have been used in previous influenza pandemics 
but their impact remains dependent on multiple factors and is mostly unproven during 
epidemics. The use of contact tracing and quarantine has been used to contain the 
spread of different diseases for centuries and is a well-accepted concept. However, it 
is often difficult to show the effectiveness of these measures in a field setting. 
Reducing mass gatherings have also been recommended but there are no studies that 
have conclusively proven the effectiveness of this measure. School closures as a form 
of social distancing in a closed setting with high infection rates may be effective if 
undertaken early, decisively and for prolonged periods (43,44). However, schools 
have to be closed early and for long periods and contact among children outside of 
school will have to be similarly reduced, resulting in substantial socio-economic cost. 
Travel restriction 
Transmission of influenza in aircraft has been previously described (45-47). A recent 
paper from Australia showed that airline passengers had an increased risk of 
contracting influenza of 3.6% in they sat within two rows of a symptomatic infected 
individual, and 7.7% if they were within two seats (48). However, there is little 
epidemiological evidence to show that international air travel restriction by itself is 
effective in reducing or delaying the spread of influenza. In addition, screening and 
quarantining travelers entering international borders, widely used in many ports of 
entry around the world, did not substantially delay virus introduction in past 
pandemics (34). Although modeling studies have suggested the potential for border 
controls to prevent influenza entry into a country (49), studies have shown the low 
positive predictive value and limited efficacy in detecting febrile passengers early in 
the course of a pandemic when fever prevalence among travelers entering a country is 
less than 1% (50,51). Screening of travelers may also be inadequate if performed 
during the virus incubation period or for subclinical infection, or if the travelers are 
using medications which reduce febrile symptoms. Screening at entry points is 
therefore by itself insufficient to prevent the entry of influenza into a country (52). 
Instead of entry screening, WHO recommends exit screening at ports during the early 
pandemic phases (53). However, such measures may not be feasible once the 
pandemic is well underway, will be disruptive to the flow of people, and will not be 
100% sensitive and specific. 
Mathematical Models 
In the absence of adequate field epidemiological studies, mathematical modeling 
studies are useful to provide a glimpse of the possible outcomes of different 
interventions when used individually or in combination. Although models are not a 
complete reflection of reality, they provide decision makers with additional data to 
suggest which interventions may be effective. At the same time, effective models 
require good input data from epidemiological and clinical studies and do not negate 
the importance of performing field studies. The following study looks at some of 
these mathematical modeling studies which compare the effectiveness of individual 
and combination strategies to reduce the spread and impact of influenza in a broad 
variety of settings. The effect of combining individual measures in different 
combinations can be observed from such modeling studies. These studies have 
allowed policy makers to develop their preparedness and response plans with greater 
confidence in the face of limited scientific evidence. 
However, many of these mathematical modeling studies are based on specific 
geographical areas and make many assumptions about the transmission and spread of 
the influenza virus, the mixing of individuals within the populations, and the 
operational aspects of the interventions. Therefore, while they are useful to guide 
decision making, the interventions must be tested in real-life situations to provide 
evidence of their effectiveness. This is the basis for the rest of the studies in this thesis 
and described in further detail in the subsequent chapters. 
Study 5 
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Abstract 
Background: Individual strategies in pandemic preparedness plans may not reduce the impact of 
an influenza pandemic. 
Methods: W e searched modeling publications through PubMed and associated references from 
1990 to 30 September 2009. Inclusion criteria were modeling papers quantifying the effectiveness 
of combination strategies, both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical. 
Results: Nineteen modeling papers on combination strategies were selected. Four studies 
examined combination strategies on a global scale, 14 on single countries, and one on a small 
community. Stochastic individual-based modeling was used in nine studies, stochastic meta-
population modeling in five, and deterministic compartmental modeling in another five. As part of 
combination strategies, vaccination was explored in eight studies, antiviral prophylaxis and/or 
treatment in 16, area or household quarantine in eight, case isolation in six, social distancing 
measures in 10 and air travel restriction in six studies. Two studies suggested a high probability of 
successful influenza epicenter containment with combination strategies under favorable conditions. 
During a pandemic, combination strategies delayed spread, reduced overall number of cases, and 
delayed and reduced peak attack rate more than individual strategies. Combination strategies 
remained effective at high reproductive numbers compared with single strategy. Global cooperative 
strategies, including redistribution of antiviral drugs, were effective in reducing the global impact 
and attack rates of pandemic influenza. 
Conclusion: Combination strategies increase the effectiveness of individual strategies. They 
include pharmaceutical (antiviral agents, antibiotics and vaccines) and non-pharmaceutical 
interventions (case isolation, quarantine, personal hygiene measures, social distancing and travel 
restriction). Local epidemiological and modeling studies are needed to validate efficacy and 
feasibility. 
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Background 
Many countries have developed pandemic preparedness 
plans in response to the threat from pandemic influenza 
111, to attempt containment of the virus or to reduce the 
pandemic's impact. The influenza A ( H l N l - 2 0 0 9 ) pan-
demic has underscored the importance of such plans, with 
the World Health Organization (WHO) calling for the 
activation of pandemic plans worldwide |2|. Although the 
WHO has made public guidelines for developing pan-
demic plans [3], the comprehensiveness and standards of 
pandemic plans differ widely across different countries 
and continents |4-6]. To ensure the success of these plans, 
it is necessary to adopt a combination of different strate-
gies. 
Although there are existing historical data on the possible 
success of strategies used in previous pandemics such as 
personal hygiene, school and workplace closures, and 
social distancing, these are often anecdotal and difficult to 
interpret |7,8|. Mathematical models provide a platform 
for the assessment of multiple interventions in an envi-
ronment where individual parameters can be altered. The 
recent increase in mathematical modeling studies on pan-
demic interventions suggests the effectiveness of these 
strategies and provides guidance for policy makers. 
Although the 2009 pandemic has spread rapidly, these 
combination strategies can be applied in populations yet 
to be severely affected, for the second wave, or for the next 
pandemic |9,10]. This systematic review aims to deter-
mine the individual components that constitute combina-
tion strategies, and the quantitative impact of these 
combination strategies in reducing pandemic spread and 
morbidity. 
Methods 
This study explored available mathematical modeling 
publications on the effectiveness of combination strate-
gies for an influenza pandemic. To obtain papers on the 
effectiveness of combination strategies, data for this 
review were identified by the authors through searches of 
the PubMed search engine for English language articles 
and articles translated into the English language. The 
authors used the following search terms to focus on mod-
eling studies, and those which had a focus on pandemic 
preparedness and strategies - influenza and pandemic and 
{preparedness or strateg* or model*); influenza and modeling 
or modelling. The search included all published articles 
listed on PubMed from 1990 to 30 September 2009 -
there were few articles on influenza pandemic planning or 
modeling before this period. 
Abstracts were reviewed where available to determine if a 
study met the inclusion criteria and the full manuscript 
was obtained for further scrutiny. Snowball searches by 
hand were performed on the reference lists of articles 
meeting the inclusion criteria to find additional studies. 
The inclusion criteria were primary mathematical mode-
ling papers that compared and reported the quantitative 
effectiveness of combination strategies (two or more strat-
egies used together) versus individual strategies for 
human pandemic influenza. Mathematical modeling 
papers were those which used quantitative predictive 
methods to determine the likely impact of strategies, and 
had descriptions of these methods which could be repro-
duced or verified. All influenza preparedness strategies 
were considered, including pharmaceutical and non-
pharmaceutical public health strategies. These articles 
would allow clear comparison on the advantages of com-
bination strategies over and above the impact of individ-
ual strategies. An explanation of some of the key strategies 
are found in the appendix. 
Mathematical modeling articles that described the effec-
tiveness of multiple singular strategies but did not analyze 
the quantitative effect of combination strategies were 
excluded. Articles that referred to general pandemic pre-
paredness without quantitative evidence, or provided 
only qualitative discussion were also excluded. Reviews 
without primary data, articles in abstracts without full 
publication, and unpublished studies were excluded as 
their methodology and results could not be verified. 
Mathematical models are based on input variables which 
are assumptions made based on available evidence in spe-
cific scenarios. One important assumption is the repro-
ductive number (Ro), which is the average number of 
secondary infections generated by a single case in a com-
pletely susceptible population. No attempt was made in 
this review to homogenize data across studies for compar-
ison; on the contrary, the heterogeneity of data provides 
public health professionals with evidence of the effective-
ness of strategies across a wide range of assumptions and 
scenarios. We have instead listed the different types of 
models used, and the scenarios, interventions, and coun-
tries where they were applied. 
Results 
The search yielded a total o f 1,920 papers including over-
laps. Of these, 162 used mathematical modeling tech-
niques and on closer review, 144 were excluded based on 
the exclusion criteria listed in Methods. The remaining 18 
studies were included for analysis, together with one addi-
tional study identified from the snowball searches (Figure 
1). The selected modeling papers that show the effective-
ness of combination strategies in increasing the impact of 
individual strategies are listed in Additional files 1 and 
2[11|. The following sections highlight key findings on 
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Figure I 
Flow diagram for selection of combination strategy 
modeling studies. 
the effectiveness of combination strategies in these mode-
ling studies on pandemic influenza. 
Source containment 
Zoonotic influenza such as H5N1 influenza is endemic in 
several countries, and there is interest in containing a 
highly virulent pandemic at the earliest sign of localized 
efficient human-to-human transmission. Two key mode-
ling studies suggested a high probability of success for 
rapid containment of an influenza epicenter with combi-
nation strategies under favorable conditions |9,10|. These 
studies formed the basis for the epicenter containment 
strategies recommended by the WHO. Longini showed 
that antiviral prophylaxis alone could contain a pandemic 
influenza virus with reproductive number (Ro) less than 
1.7; while 7 0 % household quarantine alone was effective 
up to Ro of 1.7. A combination of quarantine and anti-
viral prophylaxis was effective up to Ro of 2.1; while a 
combination of pre-pandemic vaccination, household 
quarantine and antiviral prophylaxis was effective for Ro 
of 2.4 |9|. Ferguson found that antiviral prophylaxis for 
contacts only would have a 9 0 % chance of containing a 
virus with a Ro less than 1.25, while antiviral prophylaxis 
for contacts and all individuals in a 10 km zone would 
have a 9 0 % chance with Ro less than 1.7 110|. Combined 
anti-viral prophylaxis and either school and workplace 
closures or area quarantine provided a similar chance of 
containment with Ro of 1.7 to 1.8, while a combination 
of all three strategies would contain a virus with Ro of 1.9 
and allow for greater initial surveillance errors 110|. 
Reducing pandemic spread 
Combination strategies can be used to reduce the global 
spread of the influenza virus 112,13|. Redistribution o f 
limited antiviral drugs can help contain pandemics or 
reduce the global attack rate (AR) |12|. If global antiviral 
stockpiles are limited, non-cooperative strategies where 
countries keep their antiviral stockpiles for their own use 
can only contain a pandemic influenza virus with Ro less 
than 1.5; in contrast, if redistribution of 2 5 % of stockpiles 
from countries that have them to countries that do not, a 
pandemic with Ro up to 1.9 may be contained, and over-
all AR reduced by 2 5 % at higher Ro 112|. 
Another example of combination strategy is reduction of 
pandemic spread through air travel. Suspension of 9 9 . 9 % 
of air travel can only delay individual national epidemics 
by up to four months, while a combination of local strat-
egies reducing influenza transmission by 4 0 % can delay 
pandemic spread by up to 10 months |13|. A combina-
tion of vaccination and travel restrictions may delay epi-
demic growth, allowing vaccination of susceptible 
individuals 114|. With a pandemic starting in July in Asia, 
the number of United States (US) metropolitan cases was 
102.4 million - 0 . 1 % daily vaccination alone reduced this 
to 73.0 million, and vaccination together with travel 
restriction reduced this to 56.9 million |14]. 
Combination strategies may have substantial impact in 
reducing the global spread of resistant viruses. For exam-
ple, if the probability of emergence of anti-viral drug 
resistance was 1%, antiviral monotherapy was associated 
with overall AR of 6 7 % and resistant AR (RAR) of 3 8 % 
115]. In contrast, early combination chemotherapy was 
associated with reduced AR of 5 8 % and RAR of 2%, while 
sequential multi-drug chemotherapy was associated with 
AR of 5 7 % and RAR of 3%. 
Mitigating pandemic impact 
During the pandemic, several studies found that combi-
nation strategies delayed the spread of the virus, reduced 
the overall number of cases, and delayed and reduced the 
peak AR much more than individual strategies which may 
be ineffective if used alone 116-19|. 
A study using individual-based modelling in the United 
Kingdom and United States examined the effects of anti-
viral treatment and prophylaxis, vaccination, case isola-
tion, household quarantine, school and workplace 
closure and travel restrictions in pandemics with Ro of 1.7 
to 2.0. it found that external or internal travel restrictions 
alone would delay spread by two to three weeks only if 
more than 9 9 % effective 116|. Reactive school and work-
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place closures alone did not impact on overall AR, but 
reduced peak AR by about 4 0 % ; antiviral treatment and 
prophylaxis within the household reduced overall AR by 
3 5 % and peak AR by 4 5 % . ; while household quarantine 
alone reduced overall AR by 1 0 % and peak AR by 2 0 % . 
Combinat ion antiviral treatment and prophylaxis, and 
household quarantine reduced overall AR by 4 0 % and 
peak AR by 6 0 % . Combinat ion school and workplace clo-
sure, antiviral treatment and prophylaxis, and household 
quarantine reduced overall AR by more than 6 0 % and 
peak AR by more than 8 0 % . Combinat ion antiviral treat-
ment and prophylaxis, school closure and 2 0 % pre-pan-
demic vaccination reduced overall AR by more than 6 0 % 
and peak AR by more than 7 5 % . Combinat ion antiviral 
treatment and prophylaxis, household quarantine, school 
and workplace closure, and effective border control 
reduced overall AR by more than 7 0 % and peak AR by 
more than 9 0 % |16|. 
Similady, another individual-based stochastic simulation 
model in Chicago evaluating the effects o f antiviral treat-
ment and prophylaxis, quarantine, isolation, school clo-
sure, community and workplace social distancing showed 
that social distancing alone may reduce overall AR by 6 0 % 
for pandemic Ro of 1.9 but combination antiviral treat-
ment and prophylaxis, quarantine, social distancing, and 
school closure could reduce overall AR by more than 9 0 % 
for similar pandemic Ro of 1.9 117|. 
Another study in France examined the effects o f antiviral 
treatment and household prophylaxis, vaccination, 
household quarantine, school and workplace closure at 
the individual and community level |20|. Treatment only 
with anti-viral drugs did not affect AR substantially. Anti-
viral prophylaxis o f 9 0 % of household contacts reduced 
AR by 5 0 % . Vaccination o f 7 0 % of the population within 
one day reduced AR by 8 0 % . A combination o f antiviral 
treatment and prophylaxis, and household quarantine 
reduced AR by 9 0 % |20|. 
An Australian individual-based stochastic simulation 
model assessed the effects o f non-pharmacological pan-
demic mitigation measures o f case isolation, school clo-
sure, workplace non-attendance and community contact 
reduction |21|. For a pandemic with Ro of two, school 
closures alone reduced AR by 2 0 % , case isolation by 4 0 % , 
workplace non-attendance by 15%, and social distancing 
by 2 5 % . In contrast, combinat ion o f all these measures 
reduced AR by more than 9 5 % [211. 
A deterministic compartment model using InfluSim based 
on a small community o f 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 population assessing 
the effects o f antiviral treatment, case isolation and social 
distancing showed that case isolation and social distanc-
ing could reduce overall AR by 2 5 % , and antiviral treat-
ment alone by 2 0 % , compared with a reduction of 4 0 % 
with a combinat ion o f case isolation, social distancing 
and antiviral treatment 118|. The triple combinat ion strat-
egy could delay the peak by one month compared with 10 
days for the first two strategies 118]. 
Another study using a deterministic model with a stochas-
tic simulation component based on Italy examined the 
effects o f household antiviral prophylaxis, pre-pandemic 
vaccination, and social distancing via closure o f all 
schools, public offices and public meeting places [22], In 
a pandemic with an attack rate o f 3 5 % , vaccination alone 
reduced AR by up to 1 0 % even at vaccine efficacy levels of 
7 0 % ; antiviral prophylaxis alone for even the entire pan-
demic duration reduced AR by up to 6 % only; and social 
distancing alone reduced AR by less than 1%. However, a 
combination o f all three measures reduced AR by up to 
3 0 % |22|. 
Intervention effectiveness with changes in Ro 
The relative success o f interventions depends on the trans-
missibility o f the pandemic, which is c o m m o n l y reflected 
in the Ro. In an influenza pandemic with higher Ro, the 
effectiveness o f interventions is reduced and individual 
interventions are c o m m o n l y ineffective. However, across 
most scenarios, combinat ion strategies maintain some 
effectiveness as shown clearly in the studies on contain-
ment by Longini |9| and Ferguson [10] . 
A stochastic agent-based discrete-time simulation model 
in the United States examining the effect o f antiviral 
prophylaxis, vaccination, school closure and travel restric-
tion found that for a pandemic influenza virus with Ro of 
2.4, unlimited antiviral prophylaxis and best vaccination 
program may reduce cases by 6 4 % and 3 4 % respectively, 
while school closure within seven days o f pandemic onset 
may reduce cases by 14%, social distancing within seven 
days by 6%, and travel restrictions exceeding 9 0 % was 
ineffective 119|. However, a combinat ion strategy of all of 
these measures may reduce cases by 9 9 . 8 % 119]. The effec-
tiveness o f any strategy in delaying the pandemic or reduc-
ing the AR is highly dependent on the Ro. For example, for 
a pandemic with Ro o f 1.6, individual strategies o f proph-
ylaxis, vaccination, or school closures had very high effec-
tiveness [19|. However, once the Ro increased beyond 2.0 
(which is similar to the Ro for the 1918 pandemic), indi-
vidual strategies were much less effective, whereas combi-
nation strategies still maintained effectiveness across a 
range o f Ro. 
An individual-based model in Italy assessing the effects of 
household, school and workplace antiviral prophylaxis, 
vaccination, international air travel restriction, social dis-
tancing via school closure and closure o f some public 
offices showed that without any interventions, importa-
tion o f pandemic influenza would occur 3 7 to 77 days 
after the first case elsewhere in the worid. Air travel restric-
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tion would delay introduction by one week to one month. 
For a pandemic with Ro of 1.7, travel restriction and social 
distancing did not affect overall AR, household prophy-
laxis reduced AR by 50%, and vaccination reduced AR by 
0 to 40%. A combination of antiviral prophylaxis, social 
distancing, vaccination, and travel restriction reduced AR 
by more than 90% [23). For a pandemic with Ro o f 2.0, 
travel restriction in fact increased overall AR by 1% and 
peak AR by 20%. Household prophylaxis reduced AR by 
35%, whi le vaccination reduced AR by 0 to 30%. A com-
bination of antiviral prophylaxis, social distancing, vacci-
nation, and travel restriction reduced AR by 80%. 
Disadvantages of individual measures 
An individual-based stochastic model in Hong Kong look-
ing at the effects o f antiviral prophylaxis, case isolation 
and household quarantine reported that in a pandemic 
with Ro of 1.8 and AR o f 74%, household quarantine 
could reduce AR to 49%; household quarantine and isola-
tion to 43%; household quarantine with anti-viral proph-
ylaxis to 44%; household quarantine, isolation and anti-
viral prophylaxis to 40% which was recommended. 
Although adding contact tracing and quarantine of all 
contacts to the latter combination strategy reduced AR to 
34%, the number o f people under quarantine would be 
excessive. Therefore, contact tracing was not recom-
mended |24|. 
Another study examining the effects of antiviral treatment 
and prophylaxis, home quarantine and social distancing 
based on a community o f a mill ion population with the 
assumption that pandemic influenza was introduced by 
an undetected airline passenger, found that if a pandemic 
Ro was 3.0, individual interventions would result in 
increased transmission while combination measures may 
break community transmission (25|. This was similarly 
shown by Ciof i and colleagues for a pandemic with Ro of 
2.0 123). 
A deterministic compartmental model evaluating the 
effects o f antiviral treatment and prophylaxis, vaccination, 
case isolation and air traffic reduction globally demon-
strated that individual strategies such as case isolation and 
air travel restrictions may result in higher peak AR even 
though overall AR could be reduced 126|. 
A study in Taiwan evaluated the effects o f enhanced venti-
lation, use o f respiratory mask and vaccination on pan-
demic influenza transmission in a school |27|. 
Vaccination alone o f 80% of children was effective in pre-
venting the spread o f the virus but this was only if a suita-
ble vaccine was available, which is often not the situation. 
A combination o f masks and ventilation, or a combina-
tion o f vaccination and masks achieved similar effective-
ness |27]. 
Discussion 
Many model ing studies were performed as a result o f 
H5N1 influenza threat and an impending pandemic, but 
all have used parameters based on historical pandemics 
and existing studies on the influenza transmission. In 
addition, these studies provided sensitivity analyses across 
a wide range of influenza parameters. As such, they are 
directly relevant to the 2009 influenza pandemic which 
has an Ro o f between 1.2 to 1.6 |28], similar to the 1957 
and 1968 influenza pandemic |16|, and for future pan-
demics. At the same time, the 2009 influenza pandemic 
provides the opportunity to study unknown variables to 
validate and refine these models. 
All of these model ing studies in various settings, and 
using different models and assumptions, consistently 
show that combination strategies are more effective com-
pared to individual strategies. Given the lack o f good 
experimental, observation or controlled studies on these 
strategies, and the difficulties of performing trials during a 
pandemic, it is difficult for policy makers to know the 
effectiveness of their policies. These modeling studies pro-
vide policy makers with a suggestion of the effectiveness 
of different combination strategies. At the same time, new 
models will have to be developed using local data to pro-
vide realistic outcomes for local settings. The diverse 
methodology available from these studies provides suffi-
cient information for countries to build and validate their 
results locally. 
Although the use of individual-based and other stochastic 
models provide better data resolution, deterministic mod-
els mentioned in this review show similar outcomes 
118,22,23,27]. These deterministic or simple stochastic 
compartmental models are much easier to build and may 
provide rapid results for policy making. This is especially 
true in countries where the vast amounts o f data required 
for individual-based and complex stochastic models may 
not be available compared with high-income countries 
where most sophisticated models were built. 
The use of combination strategies necessitates the availa-
bility of resources and feasibility for each individual com-
ponent. For example, stockpiling of pharmaceutical 
agents is an integral part of preparedness plans and cur-
rently widely adopted in well-resourced countries. The 
increase in anti-viral drug resistance underscores the 
importance of combination drug use and provides policy 
makers with recommendations for their stockpiles |15|. 
Combination stockpiles of sufficient amounts of different 
antiviral drugs such as oseltamivir, zanamivir and ada-
mantanes will allow for early combination chemotherapy 
or sequential multidrug therapy which was modeled to be 
effective against antiviral resistance when a small second-
ary stockpile was used to augment a primary stockpile 
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|15|. The United States Federal stockpile is composed o f 
8 0 % oseltamivir and 2 0 % zanamivir, and several million 
doses o f rimantadine from previous stockpiles |29j. The 
United Kingdom has purchased additional antiviral drugs 
to ensure it has a total stockpile for 5 0 % o f its population, 
comprising 6 8 % oseltamivir and 3 2 % zanamivir |30|. 
Bacterial pneumonia results in substantial morbidity and 
mortality among pandemic influenza cases |31,32|. Anti-
biotics should therefore be considered for stockpiling 
|311. Stockpiles should take into account c o m m o n locally 
circulating bacteria, and recommended amounts range 
from 10 to 2 5 % o f the population [33|. In contrast to anti-
viral drugs that are not widely used, antibiotics can be part 
o f a rolling stockpile which ensures sufficient stockpiles 
without expiry issues. Vaccination against bacterial infec-
tions should likewise be considered. 
From the effectiveness o f combinat ion strategies in reduc-
ing global spread o f influenza or resistant viruses [12-15|, 
resource-rich countries should consider redistributing 
their resources for the greater global benefit and their own 
benefit if they have yet to be affected by the pandemic. 
Controll ing local outbreaks through combinat ion strate-
gies can reduce global spread, and countries affected early 
during the pandemic should be provided with assistance 
|13|. 
Vaccines are part o f many combinat ion strategies and 
modeling has shown that introduction of a vaccine four 
months after the pandemic virus has arrived has limited 
effectiveness, while stockpiling prototype pandemic vac-
cines could reduce overall AR [16|. Therefore countries 
were stockpiling H5N1 vaccines as candidate pandemic 
vaccines (34 ,35) . However, if the pandemic influenza 
virus is totally different from the vaccine virus, the vac-
cines would be o f negligible effectiveness. Investments are 
needed to develop new vaccines with greater cross-protec-
tion against conserved viral regions; vaccine libraries to 
quickly produce candidate vaccines; better adjuvants and 
antigen-sparing strategies to increase production capacity; 
and modes o f administration for improved immuno-
genicity and cross- protection |36,37|. 
Although some individual strategies may seem very effec-
tive, they may not be feasible and models assist policy 
makers in avoiding potentially disastrous decisions. 
Social distancing has been widely used in epidemics [7| 
but their impact remains unclear and highly dependent 
on disease severity, transmission, and risk groups affected. 
Local interventions such as school closures may be effec-
tive if done early, decisively, and for prolonged periods 
[20 ,38 -40 ] . A United Kingdom model based on a 1957-
like pandemic showed more than 2 0 % case reduction if 
the Ro were low ( < 2 ) and schools were closed early, but 
less than 1 0 % case reduction in pandemics with high Ro 
|38|. A French study showed that prolonged closure and 
limiting contact among children outside school may 
reduce cases by 1 7 % and peak AR by 4 5 % (39|. However, 
school closures and limiting social contact may be socio-
economical ly difficult to achieve. Another study found 
that total closure o f schools and workplaces reduced AR 
by 9 5 % . However, the soc io-economic impact would be 
unimaginable |20|. Similarly, most model ing studies 
found that travel restrictions alone did not impact overall 
AR 113 ,16 ,19 ,23] . Reducing air travel has been modeled 
to be effective in delaying pandemic spread if nearly 100% 
reduction can be achieved [13 ,16] , and will be difficult if 
not impossible to achieve 141|. If used alone, local epi-
demic severity may increase because restriction-induced 
travel delays can push local outbreaks into high epidemic 
season [ 14[. 
Although combinat ion strategies are more effective than 
individual measures, not all combinat ion strategies may 
be feasible. Active surveillance, isolation o f cases, and 
quarantine o f close contacts are important interventions 
during epicenter containment. These interventions may 
reduce the Ro of the disease to below o n e and contain the 
outbreak. However, it is often difficult to ensure total 
compliance with these measures and if used alone, will 
result in missed cases due to surveillance failures, isola-
tion facility exposures, and quarantine failures as shown 
in the SARS experience [42] . A Hong Kong modeling study 
found that although contact tracing and quarantine of all 
contacts was effective, it was not feasible because the 
number o f people under quarantine would be excessive 
[24] . Therefore combinat ion strategies enable policy mak-
ers to leverage on the effectiveness o f some measures and 
reduce potential negative impact o f others. 
For combinat ion strategies to work, they have to be tai-
lored for each scenario at organizational, community, 
national, and international levels. To facilitate integration 
o f interventions into effective combinat ion strategies, 
more evidence is needed through targeted research, for 
example, the effectiveness o f non-pharmaceutical inter-
ventions (e.g. personnel cohorting, school closures or 
reduction in air travel). In the absence o f definitive stud-
ies, mathematical modeling studies provide an effective 
means o f assessing the effectiveness o f these strategies. 
A limitation o f this study is the restriction o f our searches 
to the PubMed database. While we have made attempts to 
include additional articles from snowball searches, there 
is the potential for other published or unpublished stud-
ies to be missed from other databases and private sources. 
Other intrinsic l imitations o f model ing studies exist, and 
include the fact that they are based on theoretical epide-
miology and not fully based on clinical or epidemiologi-
cal evidence. For example, widespread use o f pandemic 
vaccines raises safety concerns, and widespread use of 
antiviral drugs raises concern for antiviral resistance. Viral 
Page 6 of 8 
(page number not for citation purposes) 
BMC Medicine 2009, 7:76 http://www.biomedcentral.eom/1741-7015/7/76 
t r ansmiss ion du r ing t r ea tmen t wi th anti-viral drugs is also 
not well u n d e r s t o o d . It is therefore i m p o r t a n t to pe r fo rm 
clinical and ep idemiolog ica l s tudies du r ing p a n d e m i c or 
seasonal in f luenza to u n d e r s t a n d the effectiveness and 
impact of these in tervent ions . Models are also highly 
d e p e n d e n t o n the a s s u m p t i o n s and inpu t variables, and 
are specific for a local context. However, if these limita-
t ions are u n d e r s t o o d by decis ion makers, mode l ing pro-
vides a reflect ion of the poss ible ou tcomes , helps to 
del ineate poss ible strategies for inclusion, and avoids 
costly errors. 
Conclusion 
Model ing s tudies s h o w that c o m b i n a t i o n strategies 
increase the effectiveness of individual strategies, guard 
against indiv idual failures, and may reduce socio-eco-
n o m i c impact . In the initial phases of an inf luenza pan-
demic, c o m b i n a t i o n strategies provide the oppo r tun i t y to 
conta in the novel virus or delay its spread, a l lowing unaf-
fected areas wi th in a count ry and o ther countr ies to acti-
vate preventive strategies. Dur ing a pandemic , 
c o m b i n a t i o n strategies a l low for di f ferent strategies to 
have synergistic effect in reducing the impact of p a n d e m i c 
inf luenza, and the soc io -economic impact of individual 
intervent ions. Finally, c o m b i n a t i o n strategies protect 
against fai lure of individual in tervent ions and shou ld be 
considered in preparedness plans. 
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Reproduct ive n u m b e r (R) - N u m b e r of secondary infec-
t ions genera ted by a single pr imary infect ion. The basic 
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Ro Strategies Compared Outcome Measures Brief Results 
Longini Stochastic Containment Thailand, 4 1.1 to 2.4 Household, school. 1) Cases o Quarantine + pre-pandemic vaccination, + anti-viral prophylaxis 
et al, individual- of pandemic workplace antiviral 2) Containment effective in containing virus of up to Ro = 2.4 compared to <1.7 for 
Science, based model influenza prophylaxis, pre- proportion individual strategies 
2005 epicenter pandemic 3) Escapes 
9 vaccination, area 
quarantine 
Ferguson Stochastic Containment Thailand, 4 1.1 to 1.9 Geographical antiviral 1) Cases o Blanket anti-viral prophylaxis of entire country will contain virus with 
et al, individual- of pandemic prophylaxis, school 2) Probability of Ro<3.6 but not feasible 
Nature, based model influenza and workplace elimination o Combined anti-viral prophyalxis + school and workplace closure + area 
2005 epicenter closure for 21 days. quarantine is 92% effective (95% CI 91% to 97%) at containing virus 
10 area quarantine for 21 with Ro = 1.9 and allows for greater surveillance errors, compared to 
days Ro <1.25 to 1.7 for individual measures 
Colizza et Stochastic Global Global, 4 1.1 to 2.3 Redistribution of anti- 1) Cases 0 In the event that anti-viral stockpiles are limited, non-cooperative 
al, PLOS meta- cooperative onwards viral stockpiles 2) Days to arrival strategies can only contain pandemics with Ro<1.5. 
Med, population strategies 3) Days to peak o Cooperative strategies (where countries redistribute 25% of the drugs 
2007 compartment to other countries in need) can contain pandemics up to Ro = 1.9 and 
11 model even at higher Ro = 2.3 reduces overall AR by 25%. 
Cooper Stochastic Air travel Global, 4 Not Air travel and local 1) Days to peak o Even with 99.9% of air travel suspended, epidemics in individual 
et al. meta- versus local onvi/ards applicable interventions countries would be delayed by 102 days (IQR 61, 133). 
PLOS population measures (isolation, behavior o Reduction in transmission of influenza by 40% using combination of 
Med, compartment change, antiviral use) local strategies could delay the pandemic's spread by 262 days (IQR 
2006 model to reduce influenza 105, 349). 
12 transmission 
Epstein Stochastic Air travel United 1.4 to 1.7 Travel restrictions and 1) Cases o When travel restrictions are imposed with Ro = 1.7, mean days to 
eta l , meta- and States, 4 vaccination 2) Days to arrival arrival of the pandemic increased by two to three weeks if originates in 
PLOS population vaccination onw^ards 3) Days to peak Hong Kong or Sydney but no impact if originates in London. 
One, compartment o Vaccination-only does not substantially impact FPT but reduces total 
2007 model number of cases by 27 to 81 % depending on country of origin. 
13 o Combination of vaccination and travel restrictions delays arrival by 0 to 
5 weeks and reduces cases by 43 to 84% 
Wu et al. Stochastic Anti-viral Global, 1.8 Treatment with 1) Overall attack o At probability of emergence of drug resistance (pA) of 0.1, 40% 
PLOS individual- resistance 4 onwards oseltamivir. rate (AR) treatment and Ro = 1.8, monotherapy has AR 72% (95% CI 71%, 73%) 
Med, based zanamivir, and 2) Resistant and RAR 66% (95% CI 60%, 71%), early combination chemotherapy 
2009 multiple- adamantanes attack rate has AR 63% (95% CI 63%, 63%) and RAR 18% (95% CI 18%, 18%), 
14 compartment (RAR) sequential multi-drug chemotherapy has AR 63% (95% CI 63%, 33%) 
model and RAR 17% (95% CI 15%, 18%). 





Strategy Country, W H O 
Pandemic Alert 
Phase 
Ro Strategies Compared Outcome Measures Brief Results 












5 & 6 
1.4-2.0 External or internal 
travel restrictions, 
school and workplace 
closures until 3 weeks 






for 14 days 
1) Overall AR 
2) Peak daily AR 
3) Days to peak 
With Ro of between 1.7 to 2.0, 
external or internal travel restrictions 
alone delays spread by 3 to 4 weeks 
but only if 99% effective. 
Combination treatment + household, 
school, work prophylaxis + school 
closure + effective border controls 
reduces overall AR by >70% and 
peak AR by >90%, compared to 
reduction in AR by <35% and park 
AR by <45% with individual 
strategies 












United States, 5 
& 6 




of contacts for 10 
days, school closure, 
workplace and 
1) Attack rate Social distancing alone reduced 
overall AR by 40-65% for Ro=3.0 to 
60% for Ro=1.9 
Combination of treatment + 
prophylaxis + case isolation + contact 
quarantine + school closure + social 
distancing reduced overall AR of 53-
community social 
distancing (closing 
theaters, reduced visits 
to restaurants, shops 
and public locations, 
banning mass 
gathering) 
85% for virus with Ro=3.0 and >90% 
for Ro=1.9 
Duerr et al, 










Germany, 5 & 
6 
2.5 Case isolation, anti-
viral treatment, social 
distancing (school and 
day care center 
closure, canceling 
mass gathering events, 
behavioral changes) 
1) Cases 
2) Days to peak 
0 Case isolation + social distancing + 
anti-viral treatment delays peak by 1 
month and reduces overall AR by 
40%, compared to delay for <2 weeks 
and reduction in AR by 20% with 
individual strategy 













United States, 5 
& 6 









2) Days to peak 
o Travel restrictions are generally 
ineffective 
o For Ro= 1.6, combination of all 
measures will reduce cases by almost 
100% compared to 23% for social 
distancing to 99% for unlimited 
prophylaxis or best vaccination 
program 
behavioral changcs) o For Ro=2.4, combination of all 
measures will reduce cases by 99.8% 
compared to 6.3% for social 
distancing to 64% for unlimited 
prophylaxis and 34.2% for best 
vaccination program 



















until 7 days from last 
case 
1) Cases 
2) Attack rate 
3) Days to peak 
o For Ro= 1.8, combination of all 
measures reduce overall attack rate 
(AR) by 55% compared to 33% with 
quarantine only 












New Zealand, 5 
& 6 




distancing (school and 
workplace closure), 
household quarantine 
1) Attack rate 
2) Reduction in 
reproductive 
number (R) 
o For Ro=2.0, individual interventions 
would keep effective R between 0.95 
to 2.0. Combination strategics would 
reduce R to between 0.4 to 0.8. 














1.6-2.4 Transmission control 
measures (increased 
personal hygiene, 




o Transmission control measures alone 
reduces infections, hospitalizations 
and deaths by about 30% 
o Antiviral drugs and vaccines in 
model individuals), antiviral 
treatment and 
prophylaxis, vaccine 
sufficient quantities can lead to >99% 
decrease in outcomes 
o Combination of all 3 measures reduce 
impact by an additional 40-80% 
compared to antiviral drugs and 
vaccines only 












Australia, 5 & 
6 





1) Attack rate 
2) Peak daily AR 
o Combination of all 4 strategies 
reduced the overall AR by >90%, 
compared to 15% to 40% with 
individual interventions 













in air travel 
1) Attack rate o Case isolation reduces A R by 9%, air 
travel restrictions by 1% 
o Addition of treatment to the above 
reduced A R by additional 10%, while 
addition of vaccination and treatment 
reduced AR by additional 60% 

















quarantine, school and 
workplace closures 
1) Attack rate 
2) Days to peak 
o Combination of anti-viral treatment, 
prophylaxis of household contacts, 
and household quarantine rcduced AR 
by 83% (range 75% to 99%). 
o Treatment along reduced AR by 7% 
(range 5-9%), while household 
prophylaxis rcduccd A R by 2 3 % (20-
2 4 % ) 
o Only total c losure of schools and 
workp laces was as e f fec t ive , reduc ing 
A R b y 7 9 % ( 6 1 - 9 9 % ) 
Ciof i ct al, 
P L O S One , 
2008 
22 
Determinis t ic 
compar tmen t 
model 
Combina t ion 
of pandemic 
strategies 
Italy, 5 & 6 1.4-2 Vaccinat ion, 
household antiviral 
prophylaxis , air travel 




off ices) for 4 weeks 
starting f rom 4 weeks 
af ter pandemic 
1) Attack rate 
2) Peak daily AR 
3) Days to peak 
o R o = l .7, air travel restr ict ion of 9 0 % 
rcduccd A R by 0 % ; c losure of 
schools /workplaces by 0 % , 
prophylaxis by 49 .9%, vaccinat ion 
within I month by 42 .2%. 
o Ro=2.0 , air travel restrict ion of 9 0 % 
reduced A R by 0 % ; c losure of 
schools /workplaces by 0 % , 
prophylaxis by 35 .7%, vaccinat ion 
within 1 month by 30 .0%. 
o Combina t ion of prophylaxis , 
school /workplace closures, 
vaccinat ion, and air travel restr ict ions 
reduces A R by > 9 0 % for all Ro 
Rizzo et al, 
Ep idemio l 
Infect . 2 0 0 8 
21 
Determinis t ic 
compar tmen t 
model 
Combina t ion 
of pandemic 
strategies 





vaccinat ion, social 
distancing (closure of 
1) Attack rate 
2) Avoided cases 
o For pandemic with 3 5 % AR, 
vaccinat ion reduced A R by 0.8 to 
21 .9%, prophylaxis by 0.3 to 5 .4%, 
and social d is tancing by 0.3 to 1.7% 
schools for 3 weeks, 
public offices for 4 
weeks, and public 
meeting places for 8 
weeks) at 2, 4 and 8 
weeks after pandemic 
o Combination of all 3 methods 










of strategies in 
schools 






Wearing of masks, 
ventilation of schools, 
vaccination 
1) Cases 
2) Peak of pandemic 
o Masks and ventilation reduces AR by 
25-35% and delays epidemic peak by 
10-15 days, 
o Vaccination, combination of masks 
and ventilation, or combination of 
vaccination and masks prevented 
epidemics from occurring 
Chapter Eight 
Influenza Vaccine Cross-Reactivity 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, vaccination is the mainstay of influenza 
prevention and there is a wide body of evidence showing the effectiveness of 
influenza vaccination in generating antibodies to the influenza strain it targets. 
However, one important question is the amount of cross-reactivity an influenza 
vaccine has against other influenza strains. While there is current interest in the 
production of a universal influenza vaccine that can provide protection against 
muhiple influenza subtypes (1,2), with the current vaccines it is also of interest to 
determine if seasonal influenza vaccination can provide possible protection against 
strains of the same subtype from other influenza seasons. Similarly, this may provide 
some reflection on the possible impact of stockpiling of candidate pandemic vaccines 
(for example H5N1 vaccines) in reducing the overall spread and impact of the 
pandemic if the actual pandemic strains are of the same subtype but not completely 
matched. 
In the context of the 2009 pandemic, the pandemic virus is the same subtype ( H l N l ) 
as the seasonal H l N l strains that have been in circulation since 1977. However, the 
2009 H l N l pandemic virus has antigenic properties that are substantially different 
from seasonal strains as it contains a combination of genes from the re-assortment of 
human, avian, and swine influenza viruses (3). The 2009 pandemic virus is therefore 
more closely related to the earlier generations of the 1918 pandemic H l N l virus. On 
the other hand, the recent seasonal H l N l strains first emerged in 1977 and were less 
related to the 1918 pandemic virus. As such, a study in the United States found that 
less than 10% of adults and almost no children had any cross-reactive antibodies, but 
up to a third of the elderly have been shown to have cross-reactive antibodies to the 
2009 H l N l virus which could be due to exposure to older strains related to the 1918 
H l N l strains (4). 
The following study provides a good platform to test the possible cross-reactivity of 
current seasonal H l N l influenza vaccines against the novel pandemic H l N l strain, 
and an older 1918-origin strain. The findings will provide evidence of the importance 
of seasonal influenza vaccination in possibly providing protection against other strains 
within the same subtype, even during subsequent pandemics if they contain similar 
component genes. This is especially important in tropical countries such as Singapore 
where seasonal influenza vaccination levels have been low (5). It will also lend some 
support to the concept of stockpiling of pre-pandemic vaccines, ahead of any future 
availability of universal vaccines. 
Study 6 
This article was published in Vaccine, 28(42) 
Lee VJ, Tay JK, Chen MIC, Phoon MC, Xie ML, Wu Y, Lee CXX, Yap J, Sakharkar 
KR, Sakharkar MK, Lin RT, Lin C, Kelly PM, Leo YS, Tan YJ, Chow VTK. 
Inactivated trivalent seasonal influenza vaccine induces limited cross-reactive 
neutralizing antibody responses against 2009 pandemic and 1934 PR8 H l N l strains, 
pages 6852-7, Copyright (2010) Elsevier. 
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Cross-reactive neutralizing antibodies 
Influenza A H l N l 
Seasonal influenza vaccine 
A B S T R A C T 
Background: In June 2009, w e conducted a prospect ive s tudy in S i ngapore on 51 ind iv idua l s to deter-
m i n e their sero log ic re sponses before and fo l l ow ing receipt of the 2 0 0 9 Sou the rn H e m i s p h e r e seasonal 
inf luenza vaccine. 
Materials and methods: Paired s e r u m samp le s were obta ined before and 3 - 4 w e e k s after vacc inat ion. V i r u s 
microneutra l i zat ion as says we re per fo rmed to quant i fy ant ibodies against A/Br i sbane/59/2007 vaccine, 
p a n d e m i c H 1 N 1 - 2 0 0 9 and A/Puerto Rico/08/34 H 1 N 1 strains. 
Results: Post-vaccinat ion, 43%. 12% and 2 4 % of subjects d i sp layed a 4 - fo ld or greater rise in neutra l i z ing 
an t i body titers aga inst the three strains, respectively. There w a s a pos it ive correlat ion a m o n g ind iv idua l s 
w h o s h o w e d increased titers to both pandemic H 1 N 1 - 2 0 0 9 and A/Puerto Rico/08/34 (p < 0.001). Howeve r , 
this correlat ion w a s not obse rved for A/Br isbane/59/2007 w i t h either strain. The relative conse rva t ion 
a n d accessibi l ity of predicted B-cell ep i topes m a y exp la in the l imited cross-react iv i ty of the ant ibod ies 
directed aga inst c o m m o n H l N l epitopes. 
Conclusions: These results suggest that seasonal inf luenza vacc inat ion confers a certain degree of c ro s s -
protect ion to other H l N l strains. The correlat ion in cross-react ive ant ibody titers to A/Puerto Rico/08/34 
a n d p a n d e m i c H l N l - 2 0 0 9 impl ies that p rev ious exposu re to p re -1957 H l N l stra ins m a y confer s o m e 
protect ion aga inst the 2 0 0 9 pandemic strain. 
® 2 0 1 0 Elsevier Ltd. All r ights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
The 2009 influenza pandemic was caused by a novel virus 
strain with a unique combination of genes. Genomic analysis of the 
influenza A p a n d e m i c H l N I - 2 0 0 9 ( p d m H I N l -2009 ) virus revealed 
a combination of genes from Eurasian and classical swine lin-
eages, and triple-reassortant viruses that have circulated in swine 
for the past 10 years [Ij. Classical swine H l N l viruses were first 
isolated in 1930, and are antigenically highly similar to the recon-
• Corresponding author at: Biodefence Center. Singapore Armed Forces, 701 Tran-
sit Road #04-01, Singapore 778910. Singapore. Tel.: +65 97928896. 
E-mail address: vernonljm@hotmail.com (V.J. Lee). 
0264-410X/$ - see front matter ® 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved, 
doi: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2010.08.031 
structed 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic virus (21. In the late 
1990s, classical swine H l N l viruses reassorted with human H3N2 
and avian influenza viruses, resulting in a triple-reassortant H3N2 
virus |3-5|. Subsequent reassortment between this H3N2 virus and 
classical swine H l N l virus, resulted in triple-reassortant swine 
H1N2 viruses [6]. Genes from this triple-reassortant swine H1N2 
virus and the Eurasian swine H l N l virus culminated in the pdm 
H1N1-2009 v irus[ l j . 
Human H l N l viruses circulated from 1918 until 1957, progres-
sively accumulating mutations resulting in marked antigenic drift 
|7]. Human H l N l viruses which reemerged in 1977 were similar 
to those in the 1950s, and underwent further antigenic evolution 
|8]. Hence, current seasonal human H l N l strains exhibit significant 
antigenic differences from the original 1918 pandemic virus. 
V.J. Lee et al. / Vaccine 28 (2010) 6852-6857 6853 
It is not surprising that a tinird of elderly >65 years old had pre-
existing cross-reactive antibodies to pdm H IN1 -2009 most likely 
attributed to the latter's classical swine H l N l genes, compared to 
<10% for adults and virtually none for children. The high baseline 
titers found in the elderly suggest that previous exposure to related 
H l N l virus strains may have contributed to cross-reactive antibody 
responses [9,10], Although seasonal influenza vaccines target sea-
sonal H l N l strains, there is some evidence that they may generate 
cross-reactive antibodies against pdm H lN l - 2009 . A case-cohort 
analysis comparing seasonal vaccine coverage between pdm H I N1 -
2009 cases and the general population estimates that seasonal 
vaccination may be 10% effective in preventing pdm H l N l - 2 0 0 9 
influenza [11], while another study showed a more modest effect 
of 3% [ 12]. A frequency matched case-control study suggested that 
seasonal influenza vaccine may protect against severe forms of 
pandemic illness, with a significantly lower mortality rate among 
vaccinated cases [13]. Following vaccination with the 2007-2008 
or 2008-2009 seasonal influenza vaccine, 12-22% of adults aged 
18-64 years, <5% of those 60 years or older, and almost none among 
those less than 18 years displayed seroconversion to pdm H l N l -
2009 [91. However, questions have been raised as to how much 
these observations can be attributed to selection bias [14]. 
The pdm H l N l - 2 0 0 9 strain provides an opportunity to under-
stand antibody cross-reactivity between different influenza strains. 
This is of particular relevance in view of increasing global use 
of seasonal influenza vaccines, as well as the possible utility of 
pre-pandemic vaccination [15,16|. This paper aims to determine 
serological response and cross-reactivity after administration of 
the 2009 Southern Hemisphere influenza vaccine, to the vaccine 
H l N l strain, as well as cross-reactivity against the pdm H I N1 -2009 
strain, and the 1934 H l N l Puerto Rico/08/34 or PR8 strain. 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1. Study design and cohort 
We conducted a prospective study in the Singapore Armed 
Forces (SAF, a conscript military which enlists all males in 
Singapore after completion of high school) on a group of 51 
individuals who were vaccinated on 5 June 2009. The study 
was completed by 25 June 2009, soon after the first case of 
community transmission in Singapore on 18 June 2009 [17|, 
and none of the study subjects or others within the military 
camp had pandemic influenza during that period. All were vac-
cinated with the trivalent 2009 Southern Hemisphere influenza 
vaccine comprising A/Brisbane/59/2007(HlNl)-lil<e virus; 
A/Brisbane/10/2007(H3N2)-lil<e virus; and B/Brisbane/60/2008-
like virus. 
Blood samples (5-10 ml each) were taken from each indi-
vidual just before vaccination was performed, and 3 - 4 weeks 
after vaccination to allow for sufficient immunological response. 
Serum was extracted from the samples on the same day, aliquoted 
and stored at - 8 0 °C for subsequent testing. A questionnaire 
was also administered to collect data on demographics, previous 
influenza vaccinations, and post-vaccination adverse effects. Writ-
ten informed consent was obtained, and this study was approved 
by the SAFJoint Medical Committee (Research), and the Australian 
National University's ethics review board. 
2.2. Virus microneutralization assay 
Using this assay, the paired serum samples were tested 
against three representative H l N l strains. We used a Sin-
gapore isolate, A/Singapore/GP101/2009(HlNl) which has 
99% identity in the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase to the 
A/Brisbane/59/2007(HlNl)-like vaccine strain (GenBank acces-
sion numbers CY068676-CY068677). The pandemic H l N l - 2 0 0 9 
strain A/Singapore/GP2651/2009(HlNl) was isolated in Singapore 
(GenBank accession numbers CY049640-CY049647). A/Puerto 
Rico/08/34(H1N1) or PR8 is a commonly propagated virus from 
the 1918 pandemic lineage. Influenza virus strains were prop-
agated in embryonated chicken eggs or Madin-Darby canine 
kidney (MDCK) cells. The standard microneutralization assay 
was performed in M D C K cells which were seeded into 96-well 
plates and incubated at 37 C and 5% CO2 for 24 h. Sera were 
heat-inactivated at 56 C for 30min, and 2-fold serial dilutions 
made in Eagle's minimum essential medium ( M E M ) starting 
with the 1:8 dilution. Equal volumes of virus (100 TCID50) were 
incubated with diluted serum samples at 35 °C and 5% CO2 for 
2h. The cells were washed thrice, and serum-free M E M con-
taining TPCK-trypsin (3n,g/ml) was added. The virus-serum 
mixtures (50 (xl each) were inoculated into the cell monolayers, 
and incubated at 35 °C and 5% CO2 for 72 h. The neutralizing 
titer was defined as the reciprocal of the highest dilution of 
serum at which the infectivity of 100 TCID50 of the virus for 
MDCK cells was completely neutralized in 50% of the wells. 
For quality control, neutralization tests were repeated for sev-
eral selected pairs of serum samples, and the results remained 
consistent. 
2.3. B-cell epitope prediction and homology modelling 
B-cell epitope prediction was performed in an attempt to 
explain why antibodies raised against one strain of H l N l virus 
may be able to neutralize a different H l N l strain. Out of three dif-
ferent prediction servers (BCPred, BepiPred and ABCPred), BCPred 
was selected to predict B-cell epitopes of the hemagglutinin (HA), 
neuraminidase (NA) and matrix 1 ( M l ) proteins across the three 
strains of H l N l |18-20]. The locations of the highly conserved 
20-mer epitopes predicted by BCPred were mapped in the mod-
els of the corresponding proteins of A/California/04/09 strain of 
pdm H lN l - 2009 . The amino acid sequences of the components 
of A/California/04/09 were entered into BLASTP to retrieve the 
sequences of proteins with homologies of at least 40%, and the PDB 
and FASTA files of similar sequences were then obtained from the 
RCSB Protein Data Bank (PDB). MODELLER was used for homology 
or comparative modelling of three-dimensional protein structures, 
and automatically calculates a model containing all non-hydrogen 
atoms [21]. 
2.4. Statistical analyses 
We investigated possible cross-reactivity of antibodies by cor-
relating pre-vaccination antibody titers to different strains, and 
the strength of the antibody response to different strains follow-
ing immunological challenge with the seasonal influenza vaccine. 
We defined the log of the relative increase in antibody titers 
to each strain as the main outcome of interest. Titers <8 were 
assigned a value of 4. The relative increase was computed by 
dividing the post-vaccination titer for each subject by the pre-
vaccination titer. We then used linear regression to investigate if 
the log of the relative increase in antibody titers to each of the 
H l N l strains was associated with the log of the relative increase 
in antibody titers, as well as the log of pre-vaccination antibody 
titers to either of the other two strains. We also used linear regres-
sion to investigate if there was any correlation in pre-vaccination 
and post-vaccination antibody titers on a log scale. All statistical 
analyses were performed with STATA 10.0 for Windows (STAT-
ACORP, College Park, TX) with the level of significance set at 
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Table 1 
Post-vaccination change in virus neutralization antibody titers to three influenza viruses, stratified by pre-vaccination titer. 
No. of 
subjects 
Change in titer No. wi th post-vaccination 
titers >32 (%) 
Geometric mean titer" 
No. wi th >2- fo ld 
increase (%) 







A/Brisbane/59/07 H l N l 
Pre-vaccination titers < 32 0 _ _ _ _ -
Pre-vaccination titers > 32 50 39 (78%) 22 (44%) 50 (100%) - 302 (226.405) <0.001 
All subjects 50 39 (78%) 22 (44%) 50 (100%) 100(85.118) 302 (226.405) <0.001 
A/Puerto Rico/08/34 H l N l 
Pre-vaccination titers <32 36 25 (69%) 12(33%) 13(36%) 5 ( 5 , 7 ) 14 (10.21) <0.001 
Pre-vaccination titers > 32 15 5 (33%) 0 (0% ) 15(100%) 38 (33 ,45 ) 49 (40.58) 0.104 
All subjects 51 30 (59%) 12(24%) 28 (55%) 10 (7 ,13 ) 20 (15 .28 ) <0.001 
Pandemic H l N l - 2 0 0 9 
Pre-vaccination titers <32 42 26 (62%) 6 (14%) 9 (21%) 8 ( 7 , 9 ) 15(11.19) <0.001 
Pre-vaccination titers > 32 9 3 (33%) 0 (0% ) 8 (89%) 51 (34,76) 51 (34.76) 1.000 
All subjects 51 29 (57%) 6 (12%) 17(33%) 11 (8.14) 18(14.24) <0.001 
Nth root of the product of n numbers whe re n is the sample size; p-values by paired t-test for di f ference between pre- and post-vaccination titers on geometr ic scale. 
3. Results 
Of the 55 personnel initially recruited in the study, 51 (92.7%) 
provided both pre- and post-vaccination samples. The remaining 
four dropouts did not complete the study as they we re subse-
quently sent on overseas courses or had since left the military. One 
subject did not have post-vaccination A/Brisbane/59/2007 titers 
due to insufficient sample for testing. The average age was 23.75 
( inter-quarti le range of 20-28, range of 19-46 years). Only 5 (9.8%) 
had a history of previous seasonal influenza vaccination. None of 
the participants reported any severe adverse ef fects after vaccina-
tion. 
graphically in Fig. 2. Subjects wi th high pre-vaccination titers to 
A/Brisbane/59/2007 demonstrated a w ide range of titers to pdm 
H l N l - 2 0 0 9 ; in contrast, individuals wi th high pre-vaccination 
titers to PRS were more likely to also exhibit high pre-vaccination 
titers to pdm HI N1 -2009 than those with low pre-vaccination titers 
to PRS (Fig. 2A and B). Furthermore, w e observed a much stronger 
correlation of increase in titers between PRS with pdm H l N l -
2009, as compared to A/Brisbane/59/2007 with pdm HIN1-2009, 
as wel l as a positive correlation between post-vaccination titers to 
PRS and to pdm H l N l - 2 0 0 9 (Fig. 2C-F). Post-vaccination, 13 sub-
jects (25.5%) showed high neutralizing antibody titers ( > 3 2 ) to both 
strains. 
3.1. Cross-reactive neutralizing antibody responses prior to and 
after seasonal vaccination 
The pre- and post-vaccination titer distributions are shown 
in Fig. 1. Fol lowing vaccination with the trivalent inactivated 
seasonal influenza vaccine, 44%, 24% and 12% of vaccinees dis-
played a >4- fo ld rise in neutralizing antibody titers against the 
A/Brisbane/59/2007, pdm H1N1 -2009 and PRS strains, respectively 
(Table 1). The ratio of the geometr ic mean titers (GMT ) post-
vaccination compared to pre-vaccination was about 3- fo ld for 
A/Brisbane/59/2007, whi l e that of pdm H l N l - 2 0 0 9 and PRS was 
about 2-fold. Upon stratified analysis, the rise in antibody titers 
against the pdm H1N1 -2009 and PRS strains occurred in those sub-
jects wi thout high pre-vaccination titers (<32), in concordance with 
previous work showing that further increase in titers is less likely 
to be observed in individuals w h o already had high pre-vaccination 
titers [22]. 
3.2. Correlation of the neutralizing antibody titers against the 3 
HlNl viruses 
Table 2 correlates the relative increase in antibody titers 
be tween the di f ferent H l N l strains. In line wi th our findings in 
Table 1, post-vaccination increase in titers was negatively asso-
ciated wi th higher pre-vaccination titers to the same strain, but 
not to other strains. However , subjects w h o showed increased 
antibody titers against PRS had a significant and positive cor-
relation to increased titers against pdm H l N l - 2 0 0 9 (p<0.001) . 
Pre-vaccination antibody titers to PRS and pdm H l N l - 2 0 0 9 were 
also posit ively correlated, as w e r e post-vaccination antibody titers. 
This apparent cross-reactivity be tween antibodies to PRS and 
pdm H l N l - 2 0 0 9 , but lack of cross-reactivity be tween antibod-
ies to pdm H l N l - 2 0 0 9 and A/Brisbane/59/2007, is illustrated 
30 



























A/Brisbane/59/07 H l N l 
64 128 256 512 1024 >1024 
A/Puerto Rico/08/34 H l N l 
16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 >1024 
Pandemic HlNl-2009 
llll... 
<8 16 32 128 256 512 1024 >1024 
Virus neutralisation titers 
• Pre-vaccination Post-vaccination 
Fig. 1. Distribution of virus neutralization titers in pre- and post-vaccination sera for 
( A ) A/Brisbane/59/08 HIN1 , (B) A/Puerto Rico/08/34 H1N1 and (C) Pandemic H1N1 -
2009. No. of samples is 51 except for the post-vaccination sera for A/Brisbane/59/08 
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Fig. 2. Correlat ion of increase in antibody titers among (A) A/Bnsbane/59/08 H I N l . (B ) A/Puerto Rico/08/34 H I N1 and (C) Pandemic H I N l -2009 . Relat ive increase in titres 
s h o w n on a log scale. 
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Table 2 
Correlation between log of relative increase in antibody titers, log of pre-vaccination titers, and between log of pre-vaccination and post-vaccination titers for different 
strains. 
N Coefficient p-Value 
Pre-vaccination titers vs increase in titers 
A/Brisbane/59/2007 H l N l vs A/Brisbane/59/2007 H I N l ^ 50 0.027 -0 .274 0.250 
A/Bnsbane/59/2007 H I N1 vs A/Puerto Rico/08/1934 H l N l 51 0.005 -0.107 0.629 
A/Brisbane/59/2007 H l N l vs Pandemic H l N l - 2 0 0 9 51 0.001 -0 .035 0.857 
A/Puerto Rico/08/1934 H l N l vs A/Brisbane/59/2007 H l N l 50 0.023 -0 .142 0.288 
A/Puerto Rico/08/1934 H1N1 vs A/Puerto Rico/08/1934 H1N1 51 0.078 -0.237 0.048 
A/Puerto Rico/08/1934 H l N l vs Pandemic H l N l - 2 0 0 9 51 0.056 -0.177 0.093 
Pandemic H I N 1 -2009 vs A/Brisbane/59/2007 H l N l 50 0.000 -0.014 0.926 
Pandemic H l N l - 2 0 0 9 vs A/Puerto Rico/08/1934 H l N l 51 0.046 -0 .205 0.133 
Pandemic H l N l - 2 0 0 9 vs Pandemic H lN l - 2009 ' ' 51 0.119 -0.290 0.013 
Pre-vaccination titers vs pre-vaccination titers 
A/Brisbane/59/2007 H l N l vs A/Puerto Rico/08/1934 H l N l 51 0.032 0.325 0.207 
A/Brisbane/59/2007 H l N l vs Pandemic H l N l - 2 0 0 9 51 0.023 -0 .245 0.285 
A/Puerto Rico/08/1934 H l N l vs Pandemic H l N l - 2 0 0 9 51 0.194 0.390 0.001 
Increase in titers vs increase in titers 
A/Brisbane/59/2007 H l N l vs A/Puerto Rico/08/1934 H l N l 50 0.052 0.213 0.110 
A/Brisbane/59/2007 H1N1 vs Pandemic H1N1 -2009 50 0.004 0.052 0.658 
A/Puerto Rico/08/1934 H l N l vs Pandemic H l N l - 2 0 0 9 51 0.246 0.436 <0.001 
Post-vaccination titers vs post-vaccination titers 
A/Brisbane/59/2007 H l N l vs A/Puerto Rico/08/1934 H l N l 50 0.009 0.104 0.521 
A/Brisbane/59/2007 H l N l vs Pandemic H I N l - 2 0 0 9 50 0.020 -0.127 0.332 
A/Puerto Rico/08/1934 H l N l vs Pandemic H l N l - 2 0 0 9 51 0.102 0.258 0.023 
' Pre-vaccination titer vs increase in titer for the same strain. 
3.3. B-cell epitope prediction and homology modelling reveal 
consensus and potentially accessible epitopes 
Using B-cell epitope prediction, the predicted M l epitope was 
identical across all three H l N l strains. Although a few amino 
acids in the HA and NA epitopes were different among the three 
strains, the differences involved amino acids with similar proper-
ties. Hence, the epitopes predicted for HA, M 1 and M 2 are relatively 
conserved across the three strains, while homology modelling 
revealed their locations on potentially accessible regions. The rela-
tive conservation and accessibility of the predicted B-cell epitopes 
may explain the limited cross-reactivity of the antibodies directed 
against common H l N l epitopes. 
4. Discussion 
In our healthy young adult study population, 78% showed a 
2-fold or greater rise in antibody titer to the A/Brisbane/59/2007 
vaccine strain. This is consistent with other seasonal vaccine stud-
ies using microneutralization with live virus where ~60% have 
increased antibody titers |23|. We found that our young military 
population had high pre-existing antibody titers to the seasonal 
influenza strain, indicating likely exposure to seasonal viruses. We 
also observed that those with higher pre-vaccination titers to pdm 
H l N l - 2 0 0 9 and PR8 strains were less likely to have a multiple-fold 
rise in post-vaccination antibody titers to the same strain, as has 
been reported in vaccine efficacy studies [22]. 
Following seasonal influenza vaccination, 12% and 24% of vac-
cinees showed 4-fold or greater rise in antibody titer to the pdm 
H I N1 -2009 and PR8 strains, respectively. There is currently debate 
regarding the effectiveness of seasonal influenza vaccination in 
providing protection against the 2009 pandemic strains, with dif-
ferent studies reporting varying results [11-14]. On the basis of 
neutralizing antibodies serving as surrogate markers of host protec-
tion, our study indicates that seasonal influenza immunization may 
confer some degree of cross-protection, albeit much lower than the 
matched vaccine strain. Another study documented similar results, 
with 78% of adults aged 18-40 years who were immunized with the 
2008/09 seasonal influenza vaccine demonstrating seroconversion 
against the vaccine strain, compared with 12% of vaccinees who 
revealed seroconversion against A/California/05/2009 [9], 
Moreover, by comparing pre-vaccination antibody titers 
together with rise in titers between three temporally and geograph-
ically separate H I N1 strains, our study provides additional insights 
into cross-protection between influenza strains. There was a statis-
tically significant positive correlation in pre- and post-vaccination 
antibody levels and rise in antibody levels between PR8 and pdm 
H lN l -2009 , whereas no statistically significant relationship was 
observed between A/Brisbane/59/2007 and pdm H lN l - 2009 . The 
pdm H l N l - 2 0 0 9 strain is thought to be more similar to pre-1957 
H l N l strains, and we have found a significant correlation in anti-
body titer increases between pdm H1N1 -2009 and PR8 to support 
this notion. Previous exposure to pre-1957 H l N l strains is pos-
tulated to provide some protection against the 2009 pandemic 
strains, and may explain the lower attack rates among the elderly 
during the 2009 pandemic 124], The evidence presented for cross-
reactivity between pdm H l N l - 2 0 0 9 and PR8, and lack of similar 
cross-reactivity between more recent seasonal H l N l strains and 
pdm H l N l - 2 0 0 9 is also consistent with the origins of seasonal 
H l N l strains circulating prior to the 2009 pandemic. Pandemic 
H l N l - 2 0 0 9 is more related to PR8, as the origins are from classi-
cal swine influenza viruses that have remained antigenically quite 
stable from the 1930s to late 1990s [1]. Our homology modelling 
suggests that the mechanism for cross-protection may lie in the 
highly conserved epitopes located in relatively accessible regions 
of the hemagglutinin and other proteins within the three strains. 
However, the reasons for a proportion of individuals showing 
high pre-vaccination antibody titers to PR8 and pdm H l N l - 2 0 0 9 
are unclear, since all our participants were born after 1957. Some 
individuals also demonstrated rise in antibody titers to PR8 and 
pdm H l N l - 2 0 0 9 following administration of the seasonal vaccine. 
This observation lends further credence to the relatedness of the 
two strains. Another explanation could be host diversity in anti-
body responses, with different individuals generating antibodies 
that can react with different strains following natural infection or 
vaccination with seasonal H l N l strains. 
Indeed, cross-protection of seasonal influenza vaccine against 
the H5N1 subtype has also been demonstrated in mice, resulting in 
reduced virus titer and increased survival 125]. This is attributed to 
humoral immunity elicited by the N1 neuraminidase component of 
human H l N l viruses [26|. A prospective study during the 1957 pan-
demic (during which a shift from subtype H l N l to H2N2 occurred) 
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s u g g e s t e d t h a t a c c u m u l a t e d i m m u n i t y f r o m p r e v i o u s i n f l u e n z a 
i n f e c t i o n s c o n t r i b u t e d t o r e d u c e d i n f e c t i o n r a t e s 127|. F r o m o u r 
s t u d y , t h e p o s t - v a c c i n a t i o n c o r r e l a t i o n i n a n t i b o d y t i t e r s b e t w e e n 
P R 8 a n d p d m H I N 1 - 2 0 0 9 r a i s e s t h e i n t r i g u i n g p r o s p e c t o f t h e e f fec-
t i v e n e s s o f v a c c i n e s i n c o r p o r a t i n g h i s t o r i c a l i n f l u e n z a s t r a i n s f o r 
g e n e r a t i n g m o r e b r o a d - b a s e d a n t i b o d y r e s p o n s e s a g a i n s t f u t u r e 
i n f l u e n z a s t r a i n s . S u c h v a c c i n e s w o u l d b e p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l w h e n 
a n t i g e n i c d r i f t l e a d s t o n e w i n f l u e n z a v i r u s e s s i m i l a r t o h i s t o r i -
ca l i n f l u e n z a v i r u s e s , o r w h e n a p a n d e m i c s t r a i n m o r e r e l a t e d t o 
h i s t o r i c a l i n f l u e n z a v i r u s e s a p p e a r s , a s w a s t h e c a s e w i t h p d m 
H I N T - 2 0 0 9 . 
L i m i t a t i o n s o f o u r s t u d y i n c l u d e t h e s m a l l s a m p l e s i z e a v a i l a b l e , 
a n d t h e l i m i t e d a g e g r o u p w h i c h w e r e d u e t o t h e l a c k o f i n d i v i d u -
a l s w h o s o u g h t s e a s o n a l v a c c i n a t i o n j u s t b e f o r e t h e 2 0 0 9 p a n d e m i c 
w a v e i n S i n g a p o r e . A d d i t i o n a l s t u d i e s s h o u l d b e p e r f o r m e d i n v a r-
i o u s a g e g r o u p s a n d s e t t i n g s t o v a l i d a t e t h e s e r e s u l t s . M o r e o v e r , 
c l i n i c a l s t u d i e s s h o u l d b e c o n d u c t e d t o a s s e s s t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s 
o f v a c c i n a t i o n i n p r e v e n t i n g a c t u a l i n f e c t i o n d u e t o d i f f e r e n t v i r a l 
s t r a i n s . M o r e s t u d i e s a r e n e e d e d t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e a c t u a l q u a n -
t u m o f p r o t e c t i o n p r o v i d e d b y p r e v i o u s i n f l u e n z a e x p o s u r e , t h e 
c r o s s - p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t v a r i o u s i n f l u e n z a s t r a i n s f o l l o w i n g n a t -
u r a l i n f e c t i o n a n d i n f l u e n z a v a c c i n a t i o n , a n d t h e c l i n i c a l e f f i c a c y 
a n d d u r a b i l i t y o f c r o s s - r e a c t i v e a n t i b o d y r e s p o n s e s i n p r e v e n t i n g 
i n f e c t i o n a n d / o r a m e l i o r a t i n g d i s e a s e . 
5. Conclusions 
O u r s t u d y h a s s h o w n t h a t s e a s o n a l i n f l u e n z a v a c c i n a t i o n g e n -
e r a t e s c r o s s - r e a c t i v e a n t i b o d i e s a g a i n s t t h e 2 0 0 9 p a n d e m i c a n d 
1 9 3 4 P R 8 H I N 1 s t r a i n s . N e u t r a l i z i n g a n t i b o d y r e s p o n s e s w e r e p o s i -
t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o s t r a i n s . B i o i n f o r m a t i c a n a l y s e s 
o f H I N T h e m a g g l u t i n i n a n d o t h e r p r o t e i n s m a y e x p l a i n t h e p h e -
n o m e n o n o f l i m i t e d a n t i b o d y c r o s s - r e a c t i v i t y . 
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Chapter Nine 
Effectiveness of Oseltamivir Ring 
Prophylaxis 
Oseltamivir prophylaxis is another key intervention in influenza preparedness and 
response plans, and has been shown to be effective in preventing influenza infection 
in individuals while on the anti-viral drug (1,2). One proposed use of oseltamivir 
prophylaxis is in rapid containment of an epicenter of novel influenza in combination 
with other public health strategies (3,4). These two modeling studies suggested the 
possibility of success of rapid containment to prevent the spread of a novel influenza 
virus from its origins under favorable conditions of early detection and a low 
reproductive number (RQ). Rapid containment would involve a combination of 
pharmaceutical and public health measures including the use of oseltamivir ring 
prophylaxis within the boundaries of the containment area to reduce the spread of 
influenza. In spite of the many pandemic preparedness and response plans that 
adopted the concept of rapid containment, including WHO guidance (5), there is no 
epidemiological evidence on the effectiveness of such a strategy in real life. 
However, rapid containment was not a feasible strategy to prevent the spread of the 
2009 pandemic due to the late detection of the epidemic in Mexico, in which the 
geographical extent of initial spread was too large to make any attempt at containment 
reasonable. At the same time, the principles of rapid containment could be applied to 
situations other than preventing the spread of novel influenza from its origins. In other 
settings where spread of influenza beyond an initial outbreak nidus is undesirable, and 
where the continuation of activities within the outbreak area is required, rapid 
containment principles could be applied. This would include outbreaks within 
essential service facilities such as militaries, hospitals, and civil-defenses; and also in 
schools and educational institutions to prevent long-term absenteeism. In such 
situations, other possible measures to reduce spread such as individual-level 
quarantine were not feasible as they would hinder the activities and performance of 
the group. Ring prophylaxis with oseltamivir provides an ideal solution as it would 
prevent the spread of influenza within the geographically circumscribed area while 
still allowing for the continuation of activities. At the same time, it will have to be 
combined with early identification of cases for isolation, and social distancing to 
prevent the spread of influenza beyond the prophylaxis area. 
The following study tests this hypothesis in the first documented evidence of ring 
prophylaxis to reduce the spread of an influenza outbreak, while preventing 
absenteeism. It shows the use of ring prophylaxis in four separate outbreaks in the 
Singapore military which were performed as part of the pandemic preparedness and 
response strategy. This study conclusively shows the effectiveness of oseltamivir ring 
prophylaxis as a strategy to reduce the impact of influenza outbreaks in similar 
settings. 
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B A C K G R O U N D 
From June 22 through June 25, 2009, four outbreaks of infection with the pandemic 
influenza A ( H l N l ) virus occurred in Singapore military camps. We report the effi-
cacy of ring chemoprophylaxis (geographically targeted conta inment by means of 
prophylaxis) with oseltamivir to control outbreaks of 2009 H l N l influenza in semi-
closed environments . 
M E T H O D S 
All personnel with suspected infection were tested and clinically isolated if infection 
was conf i rmed. In addition, we administered postexposure ring chemoprophylaxis 
with oseltamivir and segregated the affected military units to contain the spread of the 
virus. All personnel were screened three times weekly both for virologic infection, by 
means of nasopharyngeal swabs and reverse-transcriptase-polymerase-chain-reaction 
assay with sequencing, and for clinical symptoms, by means of questionnaires. 
R E S U L T S 
A total of 1175 personnel were at risk across the four sites, with 1100 receiving osel-
tamivir prophylaxis. A total of 75 personnel (6.4%) were infected before the inter-
vention, and 7 (0.6%) af ter the intervention. There was a significant reduction in the 
overall reproductive number (the number of new cases attributable to the index 
case), f rom 1.91 (95% credible interval, 1.50 to 2.36) before the intervention to 0.11 
(95% credible interval, 0.05 to 0.20) a f te r the intervention. Three of the four out-
breaks showed a s ignif icant reduction in the rate of infection af ter the intervention. 
iMolecular analysis revealed that all four outbreaks were derived f rom the New York 
lineage of the 2009 H l N l virus and that cases within each outbreak were due to trans-
mission rather than unrelated episodes of infection. Of the 816 personnel treated 
with oseltamivir who were surveyed, 63 (7.7%) reported mild, nonrespiratory side ef-
fects of the drug, with no severe adverse events. 
C O N C L U S I O N S 
Oseltamivir ring chemoprophylaxis, together with prompt identification and isola-
tion of infected personnel, was effective in reducing the impact of outbreaks of 2009 
H l N l inf luenza in semiclosed sett ings. 
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2 0 0 9 PANDEMIC I N F L U E N Z A A ( H l N l ) 
virus has spread rapidly worldwide, despite 
initial a t tempts at containment through 
screening, isolation, and quarantine.^"' Many coun-
tries moved rapidly into the mitigation phase after 
the outbreak was detected, which affected essen-
tial services, especially in the health and education 
sectors. Mexico, the first country affected, shut 
down all major public services for a week to halt 
transmission of the virus. Other large outbreaks 
in population centers had a similar effect on es-
sential services. Even though pandemic vaccines 
are available, the lack of availability during a pan-
demic results in incomplete global protection. 
Mathematical models of the efficacy of con-
tainment measures in an influenza epicenter have 
been described,'*'^ although these measures ulti-
mately proved ineffective at preventing the spread 
of the 2009 pandemic H l N l virus. However, con-
tainment measures may be effective within spe-
cific closed environments, such as schools, health 
care settings, or military installations, all of which 
have a high risk of transmission."^ Chemoprophy-
laxis with a neuraminidase inhibitor has been ef-
fective in preventing the household transmission 
of influenza,^ and modeling studies have predicted 
that well-timed chemoprophylaxis could signifi-
cantly reduce the rate of absenteeism among 
health care workers due to illness, to maintain 
business continuity.^ 
Although antiviral "ring chemoprophylaxis" 
strategies (aimed at geographically targeted con-
tainment by means of prophylaxis) were predicted 
to be effective in mathematical models, data are 
needed to document their actual effectiveness dur-
ing a pandemic. We therefore describe our expe-
rience in responding to four outbreaks of the 2009 
pandemic influenza A (H lNl ) virus in military 
camps (including one in a health care setting) and 
evaluate the role of oseltamivir "ring chemopro-
phylaxis" in attenuating transmission of the virus. 
M E T H O D S 
Singapore is a city-state of 4.84 million people.^ 
All Singaporean men perform 2 years of military 
service after high school, at 18 to 19 years of age. 
Most military personnel live in barracks-style ac-
commodations on weekdays and return home on 
weekends, resulting in an interaction between the 
military community and the Singapore population. 
Singapore identified its first imported case of 
infection with the 2009 pandemic influenza A 
(H lNl ) virus on May 27, 2009,'° and the first 
transmission to the local community was reported 
on June 18, 2009." In line with World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) recommendations,'^ Singapore 
began the transition to mitigation on July 1, 
2009 ." The Singapore Armed Forces (SAP) iden-
tified its first imported case of infection on June 
15, 2009, and its first four outbreak clusters (out-
breaks I, II, III, and IV) involving local transmis-
sion from June 22 to 25, 2009. 
N A T I O N A L P R O T O C O L S A N D M A N A G E M E N T 
A suspected case of 2009 H l N l influenza was 
defined as influenza-like illness (temperature 
>38.0°C with cough or sore throat) with an onset 
of symptoms within 7 days after travel to an af-
fected area, close contact with a person with con-
firmed infection, or contact with a local cluster of 
infected persons." Laboratory confirmation of sus-
pected cases was performed by means of real-time 
reverse-transcriptase-polymerase-chain-reaction 
(RT-PCR) assay or viral culture.''^ 
Until July 1, 2009, all persons with suspected 
infection with the 2009 H l N l virus were screened 
with the use of RT-PCR assay, according to na-
tional p r o t o c o l s , a n d patients with confirmed 
infection were isolated in hospitals to prevent 
transmission. Contact tracing was performed to 
identify close contacts, defined as persons who 
had had unprotected exposure, within 2 m, to an 
infected patient for 1 hour or more since the day 
before the onset of symptoms."* Most contacts 
were quarantined at home for a 7-day period. 
S A F P R O T O C O L A N D M A N A G E M E N T 
Performing its function as a critical national re-
source, the SAF implemented additional interven-
tions to contain the spread of the 2009 H l N l 
virus. Primarily, "ring prophylaxis" with oseltam-
ivir (Tamiflu, Roche), at a dose of 75 mg daily, 
was administered to coworkers of the patient 
with confirmed infection for a period of 10 days 
after exposure." The oseltamivir had been pur-
chased and stockpiled several years previously as 
part of the SAF influenza-pandemic preparedness 
plan. A coworker was defined as a member of the 
same military unit, where contact opportunities 
were substantial even if they did not fulfill the 
Singapore Ministry of Health criteria for close 
contact. This wider definition was prompted by 
difficulties in identifying actual contacts and the 
N E N G L J M E D 3 6 2 : 2 3 N E J M . O R G J U N E I O , 2 0 1 0 2 1 6 7 
Downloaded from www.nejm.org on June 9, 2010 . For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
Copyright © 2010 IVIassachusetts IVIedical Society. All rights reserved. 
The N E W E N G L A N D J O U R N A L 0 / M E D I C 1 N E 
practicalities of rapidly administering prophylaxis. 
Larger prophylaxis rings were instituted if cases 
were present in multiple units. In addition, inter-
actions between affected units and other units 
were reduced within the camp, by allocating to 
each unit different times of arrival, departure, and 
meal delivery. 
EPIDEMIOLOGIC INVESTIGATION 
Our investigation of the outbreaks was approved 
by the SAF Joint IVledical Committee, as well as the 
National University of Singapore and the Austra-
lian National University institutional review boards. 
Written informed consent was obtained from all 
persons for whom follow-up nasopharyngeal swabs 
were obtained, and oral assent was provided by 
all others during the surveys. 
The four outbreaks occurred in different loca-
tions: one in each of three military units and one 
at a camp medical center. All personnel with sus-
pected infection were tested and isolated in the 
hospital if the test was positive. In addition, all 
asymptomatic personnel in the same unit were 
screened through the collection of nasopharyngeal 
swabs, three times a week, to detect subclinical 
infections.^' A written questionnaire was admin-
istered at each screening visit, as well as after the 
completion of prophylaxis, to collect data on de-
mographic characteristics, medical history, activ-
ity patterns, and clinical symptoms. Screening was 
performed until no additional cases were identi-
fied for 3 days after the last previously identified 
case or after the end of the 10-day prophylaxis 
period, whichever was later. After the prophylaxis 
period, a telephone questionnaire was adminis-
tered to personnel who had left camp before the 
screening was completed. 
MOLECULAR DIAGNOSIS AND SEQUENCING 
Nasopharyngeal swabs were collected, resuspend-
ed in 2.0 ml of viral-transport medium, and sent 
for RT-PCR testing, all within a 24-hour period. The 
RT-PCR assay involved protocols with the swine 
HI forward-reverse primer set and probe.^ ® Posi-
tive samples with sufficient RNA underwent whole-
genome sequencing according to a previously re-
ported a p p r o a c h . T h e resulting sequences were 
used to generate phylogenetic trees with the use 
of Molecular Evolutionary Genetics Analysis 4 soft-
ware.^" All sequenced samples were screened for 
known and suspected mutations that would con-
fer oseltamivir resistance, including the H274Y 
mutation. Additional methods are described in the 
Supplementary Appendix (available with the full 
text of this article at NEJM.org). 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Following the statistical argument of Cauchemez 
and colleagues,^^ we assumed that each case of 
2009 H l N l influenza leads to new cases, distrib-
uted as a Poisson variate with a mean of A or AG 
in the absence or presence of intervention, re-
spectively, as well as a specific form for the gen-
eration interval. The A variable represents the re-
productive number (the mean number of new cases 
attributable to the index case) in the absence of 
intervention, and A0 the reproductive number af-
ter intervention. Analysis was performed accord-
ing to the Bayesian paradigm,^^ and with the use 
of the statistical programming language R.^' The 
Supplementary Appendix describes that analysis 
as well as the methods used to quantify the 
strength of the intervention effect, obtain credi-
ble intervals, and evaluate the hypothesis of a re-
duction in infection rates after intervention (i.e., 
0<1). For measures of statistical significance, we 
report the posterior hypothesis probabilities as 
described in the Supplementary Appendix. 
R E S U L T S 
A total of 82 confirmed cases of infection with the 
2009 pandemic influenza A (HlNl) virus were 
identified during the four outbreaks (Table 1). 
OUTBREAK 1 
From June 21 to 22, 2009, four personnel (B, C, 
E, and F in Fig. 1) tested positive for 2009 HlNl 
influenza. Three (B, E, and F) had performed over-
night guard duty together on June 18, 2009. Four 
more (A, G, H, and I) were confirmed to be infect-
ed during initial investigations. The remaining 
208 coworkers were given oseltamivir prophylaxis; 
of these, 81 were identified as close contacts and 
were quarantined at home. During the outbreak, 
three more personnel tested positive, of whom two 
(D and J) had not been initially identified as close 
contacts. Of the remaining 205 personnel, 185 
(90.2%) completed the course of prophylaxis. Four-
teen personnel reported minor respiratory symp-
toms; 11 tested negative for 2009 HlNl influenza 
and 3 were not tested. The other personnel contin-
ued working in the camp, and none tested posi-
tive, as assessed by testing three consecutive na-
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Table 1. Summary of the Four Outbreaks of2009 H l N l Influenza and Efficacy of Oseltamivir Prophylaxis and Other Interventions.* 
Variable Total Outbreak 1 Outbreak 2 Outbreak 3 Outbreak 4 
Total no. of personnel 1175 216 47 219 693 
Confirmed cases — no. (%) 82 (7.0) 11 (5.1) 6 (12.8) 2 (0.9) 63 (9.1) 
Before intervention — no. (%) 75 (6.4) 8 (3.7) 6 (12.8) 2 (0.9) 59 (8.5) 
After intervention — no. (%) 7 (0.6) 3 (1.4) 0 0 4 (0.6) 
Posterior hypothesis probability <0.001 0.11 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Symptomatic personnel (excluding confirmed cases) 
Tested and negative — no. (%) 23 (2.0) 11 (5.1) 0 1 (0.5) 11 (1.6) 
Not tested — no. (%) 47 (4.0) 3 (1.4) 0 4 (1.8) 40 (5.8) 
Mi ld respiratory symptoms only 40 (3.4) 1 (0.5) 0 4(1.8) 35 (5.1) 
Reported fever with respiratory symptoms 7 (0.6) 2 (0.9) 0 0 5 (0.7) 
Completion of oseltamivir prophylaxis — no./total no. 
{%}•( 
929/974 (95.4) 185/205 (90.2) 41/41 (100) 186/193 (96.4) 517/535 (96.6) 
Confirmed cases and symptomatic personnel who 
were not tested:!: 
Total — no./total no. 115/1161 14/216 6/47 5/218 90/680 
Before Intervention — no./total no. (%) 85/1161 (7.3) 10/216 (4.6) 6/47 (12.8) 3/218 (1.4) 66/680 (9.7) 
After intervention — no./total no. (%) 30/1076 (2.8) 4/206 (1.9) 0 2/215 (0.9) 24/614 (3.9) 
Posterior hypothesis probability <0.001 0.02 <0.001 0.09 <0.001 
* The posterior hypothesis probabilities were calculated for the comparison of the incidence of infection before intervention and after inter-
vention, as described in the Supplementary Appendix. 
•fThe number of subjects who completed the oseltamivir prophylaxis regimen excludes those with confirmed infections and those who could 
not be contacted. 
:l:The number of confirmed cases and symptomatic personnel who were not tested excludes 14 symptomatic personnel who could not re-
member the date of onset of their illness. The percentage of confirmed cases and symptomatic personnel who were not tested before inter-
vention is based on the total number with data; the percentage after intervention is based on the total number with data minus the number 
identified before intervention. 
sopharyngeal swabs obtained over a 1-week period. 
Overall, 11 of the 216 personnel (5.1%) were in-
fected (Fig. 1). 
O U T B R E A K 2 
In a military medical center, 6 of 47 health care 
workers tested positive from June 24 to 25, 2009. 
Because health care workers were essential for the 
medical center to function, oseltamivir prophy-
laxis was administered to the remaining 41 per-
sonnel, who continued to work while wearing per-
sonal protective equipment (N95 mask, gloves, 
gown, and cap). All 41 health care workers com-
pleted the prophylaxis, and none had evidence of 
infection on testing of three consecutive nasopha-
ryngeal swabs obtained over a 1-week period. 
O U T B R E A K 3 
On June 23, 2009, the index patient presented with 
influenza-like illness and tested positive. On June 
20, 2009, he had visited a nightclub in Singapore 
(where there was a separate outbreak).^" One oth-
er asymptomatic case in the unit was confirmed 
during initial investigations. The remaining 217 
personnel in the unit were immediately started 
on prophylaxis, and active surveillance was per-
formed, consisting of testing of two nasopharyn-
geal swabs obtained over a 3-day period. None 
tested positive. After prophylaxis, telephone sur-
veillance was performed, with 193 of the 217 per-
sonnel (88.9%) successfully contacted; 186 of 193 
(96.4%) had completed the prophylaxis. Only one 
soldier reported fever; he tested negative. 
O U T B R E A K 4 
A unit of 693 army-reserve personnel entered the 
camp from the community on June 22, 2009, for 
5 days of training. From June 25 to 26, a total of 
59 personnel presented with fever and respiratory 
symptoms and tested positive. The index patient 
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Figure 1. Timing of Events and Cases during Outbreak 1, According to 
Date of Onset of Influenza. 
Generations 1 and 2 are the first and second generations, respectively, 
of 2009 H l N l influenza spread from the three presumed index cases. 
could not be conclusively identified. Prophylaxis 
was begun in the remaining 6 3 4 personnel, who 
were given home leave after completion o f train-
ing on June 26. They were followed by means o f 
telephone surveillance. Throughout the outbreak 
period, a total o f 63 personnel (9.1%) had con-
f irmed infection (Fig. 2). After prophylaxis was 
completed, the remaining 630 unaffected person-
nel were surveyed by m e a n s o f telephone; 535 
(84.9%) responded, o f whom 517 (96.6%) reported 
having completed the prophylaxis. A total o f 41 
respondents reported having respiratory symp-
toms, and 10 reported having fever with respira-
tory symptoms. O f these personnel , six and five, 
respectively, were tested; all tests were negative. 
M O L E C U L A R S E Q U E N C I N G 
The use o f whole-genome sequencing allowed for 
a molecular epidemiologic analysis, as previously 
described.^' Whole-genome sequences were used 
to identify the relatedness o f the isolated viruses 
and to suggest clusters o f transmission to further 
describe the conditions o f the outbreak (Fig. 3). 
Each o f the four outbreaks formed a distinct 
cluster, with the closest international strains de-
rived from the New York l ineage A/New York/18/ 
2009(H1N1). Outbreak 4 comprised two viral clus-
ters, one New York-like and the other s imilar to 
the Singapore local-nightclub c l u s t e r " ; s trains 
isolated during the other outbreaks matched Sin-
gapore strains closely. The whole -genome se-
quences o f viruses from outbreak 2 were tightly 
clustered, suggesting a single causal virus, where-
as the local components o f outbreaks 1, 3, and 
4 were from introductions o f highly related Sin-
gapore strains, not repeated introductions o f dis-
t inct viruses. The molecular evidence strongly 
supports the results o f our epidemiologic inves-
tigation, which bear out the premise that the out-
breaks consisted o f transmitted cases o f infec-
tion rather than unrelated cases. 
All seven conf irmed cases with an onset after 
osel tamivir prophylaxis occurred within 4 days 
after the intervention. The affected patients had 
complied with the prophylaxis; at the time o f in-
fection, they were switched to a treatment dose. 
In six o f the seven cases, there was sufficient ge-
netic material for sequencing. None o f the se-
quenced samples (37 in total, including these 6) 
had any known or suspected mutations that might 
have conferred resistance to oseltamivir (includ-
ing the H274Y mutation). 
R A T E S O F I N F E C T I O N A N D E F F I C A C Y 
O F I N T E R V E N T I O N S 
The overall proportion o f personnel with infection 
before the oseltamivir prophylaxis and the other 
interventions were instituted was 6 . 4 % across all 
four military units (Table 1). After prophylaxis 
was begun, in combination with home leave co-
ordination o f schedules to avoid contact a m o n g 
the units at the camp, seven more cases were con-
f irmed (0 .6% o f the study population). After in-
tervention, the infection rate was reduced to 5 . 9 % 
o f the original rate ( 9 5 % credible interval, 2.5 to 
10.9), (posterior hypothesis probability, <0.001). 
Guided by the phylogenetic analyses, we used 
mathematical modeling to investigate the effect o f 
the interventions on the course o f the outbreaks. 
I f we considered only confirmed cases, the global 
estimate o f the reproductive number before inter-
vention was 1.91 ( 9 5 % credible interval, 1 .50 to 
2 .36) . There was a s ignif icant reduction in the 
reproductive number after intervention, to 0 .11 
(95% credible interval, 0.05 to 0.20) (posterior hy-
pothesis probability, <0.001). I f untested, symp-
tomat ic cases were included, the reproductive 
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number before the interventions was 1.85 (95% 
credible interval, 1.48 to 2.24), with a significant 
reduction after intervention, to 0.28 (95% credible 
interval, 0.20 to 0.38) (posterior hypothesis prob-
ability, <0.001). 
The rate of infection was clearly reduced as 
a result of interventions in outbreaks 2, 3, and 
4 (Table 1). In outbreak 4, ring prophylaxis co-
incided with the sending home of personnel; 
thus, to test the effectiveness of prophylaxis, we 
projected the distribution of one further genera-
tion of cases, using the posterior mean of the re-
productive number during the preintervention pe-
riod (Fig. 2). The two distributions we estimated 
represent what we would expect if the apparent 
efficacy of the interventions was due to chance 
alone or due to the isolation measures, not the 
oseltamivir prophylaxis. The large discrepancy be-
tween these distributions and the observed tra-
jectory of the epidemic strongly suggests that the 
sharp drop in rate of infection was due to prophy-
laxis, which reduced the transmission of the virus, 
as well as isolation (rather than isolation alone). 
S I D E E F F E C T S OF OSELTAMIVIR 
We surveyed a total of 816 personnel for side ef-
fects of oseltamivir prophylaxis. In all, 63 (7.7%) 
reported mild, nonrespiratory symptoms (Table 2). 
No neuropsychiatric events or severe adverse 
events were reported. 
D I S C U S S I O N 
Many essential services are provided by persons 
who work in semiclosed or closed environments 
where influenza outbreaks can be rapid and 
severe.'^'^'^ In an influenza outbreak among Tai-
wanese military recruits, the rate of infection was 
57.7%"; an influenza A (H3N2) outbreak on a U.S. 
Navy ship had an infection rate of 42%.^® High 
rates of infection are also reported at schools, 
which are similarly enclosed. One boarding school 
had 56 cases (in 6.5% of the population) a week 
after the index case occurred,^^ and another had 
an overall rate of infection of 71%.'" During a New 
York City school outbreak of the 2009 pandemic 
influenza A (HlNl) virus, 35% of students report-
ed symptoms of influenza-like illness.'^ In our 
study, during outbreak 4, 59 cases occurred with-













Date of Onset of Influenza 
Figure 2. Epidemiologic Data and Model Projections for Outbreak 4, 
According to Date of Onset of Influenza. 
The numbers of cases of 2009 H l N l influenza during outbreak 4 are 
shown. Also shown (as circles) are predicted numbers of cases on the basis 
of assumptions that the apparent effect of the interventions was due to ei-
ther chance alone ("no control") or to the release of the personnel to home 
("home leave only"), rather than to the oseltamivir prophylaxis. I bars indi-
cate 95% credible intervals of the predicted values. 
Two modeling studies of the containment of 
pandemic epicenters, al though not specifically 
based on closed communities, have predicted the 
effectiveness of ring prophylaxis."'^ The effective-
ness of antiviral prophylaxis has not been well 
documented in outbreak situations outside the 
household setting.^^ The use of postexposure pro-
phylaxis with oseltamivir in close household con-
tacts of patients with seasonal influenza resulted 
in protective efficacies of 68%' and 89%' ' against 
clinically diagnosed influenza. Early prophylaxis 
with amantadine also reduced the incidence of 
influenza, and its associated mortality rate, in 
outbreaks at long-term care facilities.'' ' 
For the 2009 influenza pandemic, H l N l ob-
servations suggest that antiviral prophylaxis ad-
ministered in contacts within households, schools, 
and workplaces is effective in slowing transmis-
sion.'^ In the present study, we have shown that 
ring prophylaxis with oseltamivir given after ex-
posure in military camps, including a health care 
setting, was effective, allowing training and op-
erations to continue while substantially reducing 
the risk of fur ther generations of cases during 
prophylaxis. The settings studied have the poten-
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Figure 3. Phylogenetic Relationships among the Viruses Identified during the Four Outbreaks with the Use 
of Whole-Genome Sequencing. 
Numbers in parentheses indicate the identifier of the substrain; the letters refer to the patient identifiers used in 
Figure 1. Strains from each outbreak are denoted in a unique color. Numbers at each node in the tree indicate the 
bootstrap value (reflecting the robustness of the evidence support ing the clade of which that node is the root). The 
scale bar denotes the number of DNA base substitutions (a measure of evolutionary divergence). 
2 1 7 2 N E N G L J MED 3 6 2 : 2 3 NEJM.ORG J U N E I O , 2 0 1 0 
R I N G P R O P H Y L A X I S F O R 2 0 0 9 H l N l I N F L U E N Z A O U T B R E A K S 
tial for intense transmission and are similar to 
environments such as hospital wards, boarding 
schools and other schools, and long-term care 
facilities. The initial response to outbreak 1 also 
reflects the limitations of quarantining only people 
considered to be close contacts of an affected pa-
tient, since some cases were identified in patients 
who were contacts, but not close contacts as de-
fined by the Singapore Ministry of Health. Ring 
prophylaxis, based on spatial proximity, was more 
effective in controlling the spread of disease than 
was an exclusive focus on close contacts. 
The pandemic (HlNl ) 2009 vaccine is now 
available^''; however, antiviral prophylaxis may be 
considered as an additional strategy in reducing 
the pandemic's effects, especially in areas in which 
the supply of vaccine is limited. Furthermore, this 
strategy may be important in future epidemics and 
pandemics, either before vaccines are available or 
when there is a poor match between the vaccine 
and circulating strains. 
The threshold for initiating neuraminidase-
inhibitor prophylaxis has not been well defined. 
For outbreaks 1, 2, and 3 in our study, prophylaxis 
was initiated early and was followed by rapid ces-
sation of the outbreak. This was possible because 
of rapid detection through health education, sur-
veillance through daily measurement of tempera-
ture and monitoring of symptoms, and laboratory 
testing. Although outbreak 4 was not detected 
early, postexposure prophylaxis was effective in 
breaking the chain of transmission and probably 
helped prevent a higher rate of infection. 
Study limitations include the facts that the data 
were observational and that multiple interven-
tions were applied simultaneously. The relative 
strength of the nonpharmaceutical interventions 
as compared with prophylaxis could only be in-
ferred through modeling. However, it would have 
been difficult to use prophylaxis as the sole con-
trol measure, owing to external pressure to do 
everything possible to halt transmission and the 
spontaneous social-distancing measures people 
take. Although the best efforts were made to en-
sure consistency of the data collection and use of 
interventions across the four outbreaks, local cir-
cumstances influenced the study activities and 
should be considered part of any investigation of 
outbreaks. In addition, monitoring data were in-
complete for some outbreaks, because personnel 
completed their training and were given home 
Table 2. Side Effects of Oseltamivir Prophylaxis. 
Personnel 
Side Effect (N = 8ie) 
no. (%) 
Diarrhea 14 (1.7) 
Headache 9 ( 1 . 1 ) 
Nausea or v o m i t i n g 22 (2.7) 
D izz iness 5 (0.6) 
Epigastr ic pain 4 (0.5) 
Drows iness 8 (1.0) 
M i l d al lergic react ion (rash) 6 (0.7) 
leave; we subsequently performed telephone sur-
veillance instead to obtain as much information as 
possible. 
The use of oseltamivir prophylaxis as a con-
tainment measure may be limited to semiclosed 
or closed communities, since transmission in 
communities in the general population may sub-
sequently lead to further outbreaks. In the board-
ing school where the use of amantadine prophy-
laxis significantly reduced the number of influenza 
cases, the number of cases increased after the 
prophylaxis was stopped.^® However, the overall 
rate of infection was significantly lower than ex-
pected, and cases were spread out over time, re-
ducing the peak rate of absenteeism. 
Our experience provides evidence that early case 
detection and the use of antiviral ring prophy-
laxis effectively truncate the spread of infection 
during an epidemic, giving empirical support to 
theoretical mathematical models. Aggressive pro-
phylaxis may be justifiable to provide protection 
from an infiuenza strain that causes severe dis-
ease or to protect vulnerable populations such as 
frail or elderly residents of long-term care facili-
ties or persons in closed or semiclosed environ-
ments such as schools, prisons, and military 
camps. Finally, containing the pandemic's spread 
may postpone the onset of substantial illness and 
distribute temporally the burden on the health care 
system until other control measures, such as vac-
cine, become available. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX 
Oseltamivir ring prophylaxis for containment of Influenza A (HlNl -2009) 
outbreaks 
Vernon Lee et al 
Laboratory Methods 
Molecular Diagnosis 
Nucleic acid material for each specimen was extracted using the DNA minikit 
(Qiagen, Inc, Valencia, CA, USA) according to manufacturer's instructions. Five |.il 
of nucleic acid was subjected to PCR testing for HlNl -2009 , according to the SWHl 
Forward/Reverse primer set and probe (1). This one-step PCR was perfonned with the 
Superscript 111 RT/Platinum Taq mix (Invitrogen Corporation, CA, USA) on the real-
time PCR system (Applied Biosystems 7500, USA). 
The PCR thermocycling conditions were 50°C for 30mins, 9 5 ^ for 2min, followed 
by 45 cycles of PCR amplification of 9 5 ^ for 15sec and 55°C for 30sec. A 
florescence growth curve crossing the threshold line within 40 cycles is indicative of a 
positive resuh. 
Molecular Sequencing 
For the whole genome sequencing, viral RNA from the diagnostic swabs or RNA 
extracted from MDCK cell cultures was reverse-transcribed to cDNA and then 
amplified by PCR using H lNl -2009 specific primers. PCR products were sequenced 
using GIS flu-resequencing microarrays manufactured by Roche Nimblegen in an 
approach described previously (2,3). These sequences were used to generate 
phylogenetic trees and genetic relatedness using the Neighbour-Joining algorithm and 
Maximum Composite Likelihood Nucleotide Substitution model with 10,000 
bootstrap replicates using the MEGA 4.0 software (4). More information on the 
genetic analysis tool can be found at http://mendel.bii.a-
star.edu.sg/METHODS/fiumapIntro.html. 
Statistical Methods 
Following the argument in Cauchemez et al (5), we assume that in the absence of 
control each case creates a number of new cases distributed as a Poisson variate with 
mean / , and that the time between onset of the primary and all secondary cases are 
independently distributed with a discretised gamma distribution, which we 
parametrised from the posterior mean mean [sic] and variance of the gamma 
distribution fitted to the data provided by Moser (6). We further assume that after the 
intervention at time r (which varies by outbreak), the mean number of cases is 10. By 
Renyi's splitting theorem (7), the number of new cases with onset on day j is Poisson 
with mean 
J ] axe^^^'-^^wii - j ) 
i<3 
where c, is the number of cases with onset on day /, H'(/) is the probability mass 
function for the generation interval of length t, and l {Aj = 1 if A is true and 0 
otherwise. From this the likelihood function follows by taking the product of this 
over days and outbreaks. The posterior distribution of the parameters conditional on 
the data is taken to be proportional to this, i.e. a pseudo-objective improper flat prior 
on the parameters / and / £ is assumed. Therefore this analysis was performed within 
the Bayesian paradigm using improper flat priors on the parameter space - ie. 
p(>L,e)'^  1 if X>0 and e > 0 , and 0 otherwise; the likelihood function has a finite 
integral and so the posterior is proper (8). 
The posterior distribution is estimated via Markov chain Monte Carlo integration (9). 
The hypothesis of an effect, 0 < 1, is assessed via posterior hypothesis probabilities 
(10) by direct calculation from the posterior sample of piO > 1 | data). In the same 
fashion, marginal 95% credible intervals are obtained. 
To distinguish the effects of ring prophylaxis from that of sending soldiers home for 
outbreak IV, we calculate the probability distribution of the fitted model from the start 
of interventions in which only one subsequent generation of contacts is allowed. 
These use the posterior mean for the secondary infection rate, in the absence of 
control, and are derived via Monte Carlo simulation. 
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Chapter Ten 
Seroconversion and Asymptomatic 
Infections during Oseltamivir Prophylaxis 
The landmark study in the previous chapter showed that influenza anti-viral ring 
prophylaxis within a group can reduce the spread of influenza such that the infection 
rate during the prophylaxis period is greatly reduced. At the same time, one of the 
possible issues with anti-viral prophylaxis is the possibility of creating an 
immunologically naive group which may result in large outbreaks after ceasing 
prophylaxis, especially when the group is constantly being exposed to the epidemic 
ranging in the external population. 
A mathematical model that I built several years ago with a colleague, using a 
representation of a public hospital in Singapore, showed that premature cessation of 
prophylaxis before the pandemic's peak resulted in higher peak infection rates 
compared to no prophylaxis use (1). In addition, it may also stretch the overall burden 
of disease across time, thus reducing the strain on resources and disruption of services 
at any one point in time (1). However, there is currently a lack of epidemiological 
evidence to show the infection rates in such groups post-ring prophylaxis, and 
whether cessation of prophylaxis may cause a surge in cases. 
At the same time, prophylaxis failures (failure of the anti-viral prophylaxis to prevent 
infection while the individual is on prophylaxis) have been documented but most are 
identified through the development of clinical illness among individuals receiving 
prophylaxis. However, asymptomatic seroconversion may occur during prophylaxis, 
either as a result of natural asymptomatic infection which has been known to occur as 
mentioned in Chapter One, or due to the suppression of clinical symptoms due to the 
anti-vira! drug given as prophylaxis. Such asymptomatic infections may confer 
immunity against the influenza strain, and increase the overall effectiveness of 
antiviral prophylaxis in protecting the group even after cessation. There is likewise a 
lack of evidence on the seroconversion rates post-prophylaxis and it is important to 
explore this possibility during a real-life outbreak. 
The outbreaks in the Singapore military provide a good opportunity to explore these 
phenomena as there were many groups that were given anti-viral ring prophylaxis as 
part of the pandemic response plans for outbreaks in essential personnel during the 
early stage of the national epidemic. The ring prophylaxis was given for 10 days and 
since they were started early during the national epidemic, were ceased long before 
the ep idemic ' s peak and during increasing transmission in the community. The fact 
that the military servicemen left the camps on weekends meant that they were exposed 
to the growing epidemic in the general population post-prophylaxis. This presents an 
ideal opportunity to observe the two issues that were mentioned above. Serial 
serological samples were obtained from three of these groups and the results of the 
study are presented in the following manuscript. 
The results suggest that prophylaxis does result in asymptomatic infections of about 
50%, although the numbers were small. There was also no significant difference in the 
post-seroconversion geometric mean titers (GMT) of the index cases (with clinical 
infection) and post-prophylaxis seroconverters compared to those who seroconverted 
during prophylaxis. This shows that seroconversion during prophylaxis may confer 
similar protection against future infection. More importantly, there was no substantial 
increase in the subsequent infection rates post-prophylaxis, even when compared to 
other cohorts in the military which has been shown in Chapter Five. This provides 
initial evidence that post-exposure ring prophylaxis, even if for short durations to 
terminate the spread of influenza in the early phases of the pandemic, is feasible and 
does not necessarily result in subsequent spread of the virus. This provides an 
additional strategy to supplement pre-exposure prophylaxis which has been included 
in many national preparedness plans but is fraught with issues of timing and 
availability of sufficient anti-viral drugs. 
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Seroconversion and asymptomatic infections 
during oseltamivir prophylaxis against Influenza A 
H1N1 2009 
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Paul A Tannbyah', Anne Kelso^ and Mark I Chen® 
Abstract 
Background: Anti-viral prophylaxis is used to prevent the transmission of influenza. We studied serological 
confirmation of 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) infections during oseltamivir prophylaxis and after cessation of prophylaxis. 
Methods: Between 22 Jun and 16 Jul 09, we performed a cohort study in 3 outbreaks in the Singapore military where 
post-exposure oseltamivir ring chemoprophylaxis (75 mg daily for 10 days) was administered. The entire cohort was 
screened by RT-PCR (with HA gene primers) using nasopharyngeal swabs three times a week. Three blood samples 
were taken for haemagglutination inhibition testing - at the start of outbreak, 2 weeks after completion of 10 day 
oseltamivir prophylaxis, and 3 weeks after the pandemic's peak in Singapore. Questionnaires were also administered to 
collect clinical symptoms. 
Results: 237 personnel were included for analysis. The overall infection rate of 2009 Influenza A (HI Nl) during the 
three outbreaks was 11.4% (27/237). This included 11 index cases and 16 personnel (7.1%) who developed four-fold or 
higher rise in antibody titres during oseltamivir prophylaxis. Of these 16 personnel, 8 (3.5%) were symptomatic while 
the remaining 8 personnel (3.5%) were asymptomatic and tested negative on PCR. Post-cessation of prophylaxis, an 
additional 23 (12.1 %) seroconverted. There was no significant difference in mean fold-rise in GMT between those who 
seroconverted during and post-prophylaxis (11.3 vs 11.7, p = 0.888). No allergic, neuropsychiatric or other severe side-
effects were noted. 
Conclusions: Post-exposure oseltamivir prophylaxis reduced the rate of infection during outbreaks, and did not 
substantially increase subsequent infection rates upon cessation. Asymptomatic infections occur during prophylaxis, 
which may confer protection against future infection. Post-exposure prophylaxis is effective as a measure in mitigating 
pandemic influenza outbreaks. 
Background 
Anti-viral prophylaxis has been used as a strategy to pre-
vent the transmission and spread of influenza. Post-expo-
sure prophylaxis with oseltamivir, a commonly used 
neuraminidase-inhibitor, has been shown to be effective 
in preventing the development of clinical disease against 
seasonal influenza when used against household contacts 
[1,2]. Pre-exposure prophylaxis has also been successfully 
used in the community [3], and in households [4] to pre-
" Correspondence; vernonljm@hotmaiLcom 
' Biodefence Centre, Ministry of Defence, Transit Road, Singapore 778910, 
Singapore 
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article 
vent transmission of influenza. For the 2009 pandemic, 
post-exposure prophylaxis has been used in household 
and community contacts of pandemic influenza cases [5], 
as well as in pandemic influenza outbreaks in closed envi-
ronments [6]. 
One of the uncertainties with prophylaxis is the risk of 
maintaining an immunologically naive population which 
may increase the possibility of outbreaks after the cessa-
tion of prophylaxis. One mathematical model showed 
that premature cessation of prophylaxis before the pan-
demic's peak resulted in higher peak infection rates com-
pared to no prophylaxis use [7], However, prophylaxis 
may delay the spread of the virus such that the overall 
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infection rate in the affected group is reduced, and may 
spread out the burden of disease, thus reducing the strain 
on resources and disruption of services. Currently, there 
is little evidence on the actual outcome of prophylaxis in 
such situations. 
Chemoprophylaxis failures have been previously docu-
mented but mostly by the development of clinical influ-
enza illness among individuals receiving prophylaxis 
[1,4]. However, influenza may also result in asymptomatic 
infections [8], and one previous study showed that 
asymptomatic infections while receiving oseltamivir pro-
phylaxis do occur [3], Asymptomatic sero-conversion 
may confer protection and increase the overall effective-
ness of antiviral prophylaxis in protecting individuals and 
cohorts even after cessation by increasing herd immunity. 
W e performed a study in the tropical city-state of Sin-
gapore to determine symptomatic and asymptomatic 
serological confirmation of 2009 Influenza A ( H l N l ) 
infections during oseltamivir prophylaxis and after cessa-
tion of prophylaxis, in 3 separate outbreaks. The findings 
will be important in the application of future chemopro-
phylaxis strategies. 
Methods 
We performed an observational cohort study in the Sin-
gapore military from 22 Jun 09 to 16 Jul 09. The Singa-
pore military has a mix of regular employees and 
conscript personnel where all males are required to serve 
after high school. These personnel live in camps during 
the week and return home on weekends, resulting in a 
semi-closed community with exposures to the national 
community. The Singapore military identified its first 
imported case of 2009 Influenza A ( H l N l ) on 15 Jun 
2009, and on 22 Jun 2009 identified its first outbreak clus-
ter with local transmission. 
In line with national protocols, cases of 2009 Influenza 
A ( H l N l ) were determined via laboratory confirmed 
infection by real-time reverse transcription polymerase 
chain reaction (RT-PCR) or viral culture [9]. In addition 
to the national protocol of hospital or home isolation of 
cases during the early containment phase of the local epi-
demic [10], the Singapore military used the strategy of 
geographical oseltamivir ring chemoprophylaxis of 
affected military units with 10 days of oseltamivir 75 mg 
once a day, and cohorting of the entire units (as a form of 
social distancing) to prevent spread. 
Epidemiological Investigations 
The study was performed among 252 personnel involved 
in 3 separate 2009 Influenza A ( H l N l ) outbreaks, 
whereby post-exposure oseltamivir ring chemoprophy-
laxis was administered. At the onset of each outbreak, a 
10 day course of post-exposure oseltamivir chemopro-
phylaxis was given to each cohort and they continued to 
function in their normal capacity. The entire cohort was 
screened by RT-PCR using nasopharyngeal swabs three 
times a week, until no further positive cases were discov-
ered for three days. All confirmed cases were given a 
minimum of 7 days home medical leave. The rest of the 
cohort continued their regular schedule, including stay-
ing in camp during weekdays and returning home during 
weekends. 
In addition, three samples of 5 to 10 ml of venous blood 
were taken from each participant in for serological test-
ing. The first baseline sample was taken at the start of 
outbreak. The second sample was taken between 2 to 3 
weeks after the completion of oseltamivir prophylaxis. 
This t imeframe allowed sufficient time for seroconver-
sion from infections during prophylaxis, while reducing 
the likelihood of seroconversion from infections after 
prophylaxis [11]. The third sample was taken 3 weeks 
after the peak of the pandemic in Singapore [12], between 
4 to 6 weeks after the completion of prophylaxis, to assess 
for any additional seroconversion after prophyalxis. 
Questionnaires were administered to collect data on 
demographics, medical history, and clinical symptoms. 
Written informed consent was obtained from partici-
pants, and the study was approved by the Singapore mili-
tary's Joint Medical Committee (Research) and the 
Australian National University's ethics review board. 
Laboratory Analysis 
The nasopharyngeal swabs collected were resuspended in 
3.0 ml of universal transport medium (Copan Diagnostics 
Inc., USA) and sent for laboratory testing. Total nucleic 
acid material was extracted using the DNA minikit (Qia-
gen, Inc, Valencia, CA, USA) according to manufacturer's 
instructions and subjected to real-time PCR testing for 
the presence of H l N l - 2 0 0 9 [13]. Briefly, 5ul of nucleic 
extract was PCR-amplified with 0.8 uM of each of the for-
ward (5 ' -GAC AAA ATA ACA AAC GAA G C A A C T GG 
- 3') and reverse primers (5 ' -GGG A G G C T G T T T ATA 
G C A CC-3') in the presence of 0.2 uM probe (5'-6-car-
boxyfluorescein-GCA T T C G C A AT(BHQ)G GAA AGA 
AAT G C T G G -3') using the Superscript III RT/Platinum 
Taq mix (Invitrogen Corporation, CA, USA) according to 
manufacturer's instructions. The reverse transcription 
(RT) was carried out at 50°C for 30 mins, the reaction 
denatured at 95°C for 2 mins, and PCR-amplified with 50 
cycles consisting of 95°C for 15 sec and 55°C for 30 sec. 
The RT-PCR testing was carried out on a real-time PCR 
system (Applied Biosystems 7500, USA), A positive result 
is defined by a fluorescence growth curve that crosses the 
threshold line within 4 0 cycles. Sensitivity of this assay is 
about 100 copies of RNA genome equivalents per reac-
tion (95% confidence level) [14|. 
For the blood samples, serum was extracted and tested 
by haemagglutination inhibition (HI) according to stan-
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dard protocols ( W H O CC, 1982) at the W H O Collabo-
rating Center for Reference and Research for Influenza in 
Melbourne, Australia. The serum was pretreated with 
receptor destroying enzyme (RDE) (Deka Seiken Co. Ltd., 
Tokyo, Japan) at 1:4 (volume/volume), and the enzyme 
inactivated by addition of an equal volume of 1.6% tri-
sodium citrate (Ajax Chemicals, Australia). Egg-grown 
A/California/7/2009 A ( H l N l - 2 0 0 9 ) virus was purified by 
sucrose gradient, concentrated and inactivated with [5-
propiolactone, to create an influenza zonal pool prepara-
tion (a gift from CSL, Australia). 25 |iL of Influenza Zonal 
Pool-A/California/7/2009 virus was incubated with an 
equal volume of RDE-treated serum, titrated in two-fold 
dilutions in phosphate buffer solution from 1:10 to 
1:1280, and incubated for 1 hour. 25 |il 1% (v/v) turkey red 
blood cells was added to each well and read after 30 min-
utes. Controls for the HI assay were performed with posi-
tive ferret sera (sera collected from naive ferrets infected 
with A/California/7/2009 H l N l pandemic virus and bled 
14 days later), positive human sera from RT-PCR positive 
individuals collected in the convalescent phase, and nega-
tive human sera collected from non-infected individuals. 
Positive sera had high titres by both HI and MN assays 
against pandemic H l N l viruses. Titres were expressed as 
the reciprocal of the highest dilution of serum where hae-
magglutination was prevented. Individual seroconversion 
was indicated by a four-fold or greater rise in titres 
between successive samples. 
Statistical Analysis 
The data was analyzed using the Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS, version 16.0, Chicago, IL) with 
the level of significance set at 0.05. Categorical variables 
were summarized as percentages and continuous vari-
ables as means with standard error (SE); the Student's T-
test was used to investigate the relationship between con-
tinuous variables. 
Results 
Outbreaks A, B and C occurred in 3 separate units on 22 
Jun 09, 9 Jul 09 and 16 Jul 09 respectively. Prior to these 
outbreaks, there were no increases of influenza-like ill-
ness or respiratory illness cases in these units, nor were 
there any confirmed cases of 2009 Influenza A ( H l N l ) . 
Of the 252 personnel initially identified and sampled; 15 
personnel were subsequently excluded as they had com-
pleted their conscript service and left the military before 
completion of the study (Figure 1). The final study popu-
lation consisted of 237 personnel of which 11 personnel 
were index cases of the outbreaks. These index cases were 
started on treatment dose of oseltamivir (75 mg twice 
daily for 5 days) and given medical leave at the onset of 
the outbreak and thus did not have any baseline serology 
taken. 
2 5 2 initially included in study 
2 3 7 finally included in study | 
2 2 6 had paired serological 
blood samples 
15 exc luded {completed 
national service and left 
the S ingapore military) 
11 index cases (no 
basel ine bloods taken as 
on medical leave) 
190 had all 3 blood samples 3 6 had 1" 2 blood samples only 
Figure 1 Enrollment and Follow-up of Study Population 
The mean age of the study population was 21.2 years 
old (range 18.7-30.8) (Table 1) and all were male, reflect-
ing the composition of the military. The ethnic make-up 
was similar to the general Singapore population. Twenty-
three personnel (9.7%) had a history of asthma and 1 
(0.4%) each had hypertension and IgA nephropathy; no 
other relevant medical conditions were present. 
Seroconversion During Prophylaxis (Table 2) 
The overall infection rate of 2009 Influenza A ( H l N l ) 
during the three outbreaks was 11.4% (27 personnel, 
including 11 index cases). A total of 16 personnel (exclud-
ing index cases) developed a four-fold or higher rise in 
antibody titres between the first and second blood sam-
ple, indicating infection whilst on oseltamivir prophy-
laxis. Of these, 8 (3.5% of the population) were 
symptomatic - 6 had fever together with respiratory 
symptoms while 2 had only respiratory symptoms. The 
remaining 8 personnel (3.5%) were asymptomatic and 
tested negative on PCR from consecutive nasopharyngeal 
swabs. 
Seroconversion Post-Prophyalxis 
An additional 23 (12.1%) patients developed 4-fold rise in 
antibody titres between the second and third blood sam-
ple, indicating infection after the cessation of prophylaxis 
and up to the peak of the epidemic wave. Four (2.1%) 
were symptomatic. 
Antibody Titres 
The baseline and post-seroconversion geometric mean 
titres (GMT) of those who seroconverted during prophy-
laxis was 7.4 and 59.1 respectively (Table 3). The baseline 
and post-seroconversion G M T of those who serocon-
verted post-prophylaxis was 6.6 and 62.9 respectively. 
There was no significant difference in mean fold-rise in 
G M T between the two groups (11.3 vs 11.7, p = 0.8 
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Table 1: Demographics of study population 
Overall (n= 237) Outbreak A (n= 149) Outbreak B (n = 42) Outbreak C(n = 46) 
Mean age (SE) (range) 21.2(1.7) 
(18.7-30.8) 
21.1 (2.1) (18.7-30.8) 21.2 (0.8) (20.2-23.8) 21.2 (0.5) (20.1-22.4) 
Median age (yr) 
Male 237(100%) 149(100%) 42(100%) 46(100%) 
Ethnicity 
Chinese 175 (73.8%) 100 (67.1%) 36 (85.7%) 39 (84.8%) 
Malay 41 (17.3%) 34 (22.8%) 4 (9.5%) 3 (6.5%) 
Indian 12(5.1%) 8 (5.4%) 1 (2.4%) 3 (6.5%) 
Others 9 (3.8%) 7 (4.7%) 1 (2.4%) 1 (2.2%) 
Significant medical history 25(10.5%)» 21 (14.1%) 4 (9.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
•All cases of significant medical history were asthma except 1 case of hypertension and 1 case of IgA nephropathy 
Ten index cases (ie given treatment dose of oseltamivir) 
had a single post-seroconversion blood sample taken. 
T h e post-seroconversion G M T for these index cases was 
65 .0 (SE 6.8) compared to 59.1 (SE 6.1) in those who sero-
converted during prophylaxis (p = 0 .590) . 
Compliance and Side Effects 
O f the 237 who started prophylaxis, 2 2 8 personnel 
(96.2%) completed the full course of oseltamivir. Nine 
personnel (3.8%) did not complete the full course due to 
non-compl iance and side effects; 5 (2.1%) complained of 
nausea/vomiting. O f these 9 personnel, one was among 
the symptomatic individuals who seroconverted, while 
the other 8 did not have any symptoms and did not sero-
convert . No allergic, neuropsychiatr ic or other severe 
side-effects were noted. 
Discuss ion 
Prophylaxis with oseltamivir has been shown to be effec-
tive in reducing the immediate spread o f influenza in 
communi ty and household settings during the period of 
administration [3,4]. However, the effectiveness of oselta-
mivir in reducing subsequent infection rates has not been 
widely studied. O u r study showed that prophylaxis may 
be effective not only in reducing the spread o f influenza 
during a localized outbreak, but also after cessat ion of 
prophylaxis during the overall epidemic . In our study, the 
Table 2: Seroconversion during and post-prophylaxis in the study population 
Overall 




(n = 42) 
Outbreak C 
(n = 46) 
Date of 1 blood sample 23Jun-16Jul 10 23Jun 10 9Ju l 10 16Jul 10 
Date of 2"'' blood sample 13Jul-6 Aug 10 13Jul 10 30 Jul 10 6 Aug 10 
Date of 3"' blood sample 21-25 Aug 10 21 Aug 10 25 Aug 10 25 Aug 10 
Seroconversion during prophylaxis (second vs first 
samples)* 
Total 16/226 (7.1%) 10/141 (7.1%) 4/40(10%) 2/45 (4.4%) 
Symptomatic 8/226 (3.5%) 3/141 (2.1%) 3/40 (7.5%) 2/45 (4.4%) 
Asymptomatic (and RT-PCR negative) 8/226 (3.5%) 7/141 (5.0%) 1/40 (2.5%) 0/45 (0.0%) 
Overall infection rate during outbreak (serological and 
index cases) 
27/237(11.4%) 18/149(12.1%) 6/42(14.3%) 3/46 (6.5%) 
Seroconversion post-prophylaxis (third vs second samples) 
Total 23/190(12.1%) 16/115(13.9%) 1/34 (2.9%) 6/41 (14.6%) 
Symptomatic 4/190 (2.1%) 2/115(1.7%) 1/34 (2.9%) 1/41 (2.4%) 
Asymptomatic 19/190(10.0%) 14/115(12.2%) 0/34 (0.0%) 5/41 (12.2%) 
•Excluding index cases 
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Table 3: Compar ison of change in ant ibody litres dur ing and post-prophylaxis 
•Comparing mean fold-rise in litres 
Baseline GMT(SE) Post-seroconversion GMT (SE) Mean fold-rise in titres (SE) p- value* 
Seroconversion during prophylaxis 7.4 (5.8) 59.1 (6.1) 11.3(2.7) 0.888 
Seroconversion post-prophylaxis 6.6 (5.7) 62.9 (5.7) 11.7(1.5) 
overall in fec t ion rate du r ing the ou tb reak was 11.4%. This 
was lower t han clinical a t tack ra tes in o the r seasonal 
inf luenza o u t b r e a k s d o c u m e n t e d in the mil i tary- 57.7% 
a m o n g Ta iwanese mil i tary r ec ru i t s [15] and 42% o n a 
navy ship [16], O u r in fec t ion rates were also lower w h e n 
c o m p a r e d to similar 2009 In f luenza A ( H l N l ) ou tb reaks 
in o the r closed c o m m u n i t i e s - >30% at tack rate in a 
school ou tb reak [17] and 13-17% a m o n g househo ld con-
tacts (which cons i s ted of o lder age groups) [18], 
T h e se roconvers ion rate a f te r the cessat ion of p rophy-
laxis unti l a f te r the c o m m u n i t y epidemic ' s peak was 
12.1%, which was similar to tha t of the initial ou tb reak 
(11.4%). In addi t ion , t he overall c o m b i n e d infect ion rate 
t h r o u g h o u t t he en t i re ep idemic of 21.1% (50/237) was 
lower t h a n tha t of o the r similar mi l i tary coho r t s surveyed 
in t he S ingapore mil i tary du r ing the same per iod wi th a 
se roconvers ion rate of 28% [19]. T h e latter coho r t s did 
no t receive early osel tamivir prophylaxis . This shows that 
anti-viral prophylaxis did no t r ende r t he popula t ion m o r e 
suscept ib le to f u r t h e r ou tb reaks even t h o u g h prophylaxis 
was s t o p p e d 1 -4 weeks be fo re the peak of the epidemic . 
O n the cont rary , anti-viral prophylaxis al lowed cases to 
be sp read ou t across t ime, r educ ing peak absen tee i sm 
and d i s rup t ions to t he mil i tary or bus iness continuity. A 
previous s tudy in a n o t h e r closed e n v i r o n m e n t , a boa rd ing 
school , us ing a m a n t a d i n e pos t - exposure prophylaxis for 
seasonal in f luenza A / H 3 N 2 m o d e l e d tha t prophylaxis 
r educed the n u m b e r of clinical inf luenza- l ike illness cases 
du r ing its use by approx imate ly 83.7%, and a l though the 
n u m b e r of cases increased u p o n cessat ion of prophylaxis , 
the overall clinical a t tack rates were 21.7%, which was 
lower t h a n p red ic ted us ing previous ou tb reaks for c o m -
par i son [20]. 
A s y m p t o m a t i c , RT-PCR negat ive se roconvers ion 
occu r r ed in 3.5% of the pa r t i c ipan t s du r ing osel tamivir 
prophylaxis . Th i s shows likely exposure to and infect ion 
with 2009 In f luenza A ( H l N l ) , and the s u b s e q u e n t devel-
o p m e n t of an t ibod ies wh ich may be protect ive, w i thou t 
increas ing t ransmiss ion . F u r t h e r m o r e , we f o u n d tha t the 
an t ibody t i t res in those w h o se roconver t ed dur ing pro-
phylaxis were no t s ignif icantly d i f fe ren t f r o m those w h o 
se roconve r t ed a f te r cessa t ion of prophylaxis . As such, in 
add i t ion to p r even t ing clinical infect ion, prophylaxis may 
also resul t in a s y m p t o m a t i c infec t ion and s u b s e q u e n t 
i m m u n i t y wh ich provides individual p ro tec t ion against 
f u r the r infect ion af ter cessat ion of prophylaxis , as well as 
increas ing herd immuni ty . T h e identical rates of symp-
tomat ic and a symptoma t i c se roconvers ions du r ing p ro-
phylaxis show tha t the p r o p o r t i o n of a symptoma t i c 
infect ion is substant ia l and mus t be cons idered du r ing 
any inf luenza ou tbreak [21]. O u r f indings are similar to 
the ano the r s tudy by Hayden and colleagues, which 
showed that in the general c o m m u n i t y du r ing seasonal 
ep idemic inf luenza, 2.3% to 2.5% of those w h o received 
osel tamivir prophylaxis had a s y m p t o m a t i c infect ion, 
a l though this was no t s ignif icant c o m p a r e d to those o n 
placebo [3], 
O u r s tudy provides evidence on serological infec t ions 
and a symptoma t i c seroconvers ion while on osel tamivir 
prophylaxis, i ncorpora t ing serological, PCR and clinical 
data . However, there are s o m e l imita t ions of this study. 
T h e lack of p lanned control g roups which makes it diffi-
cult to assess the likely exposures and infect ion rates 
wi th in similar sett ings, bu t previous exper iences have 
suggested that exposures and infect ion rates du r ing the 
initial ou tb reak phase are high in closed e n v i r o n m e n t s 
[15-17]. In addi t ion, the age g r o u p in these ou tb reaks is 
l imited to young adults . Addi t ional s tudies should be per-
f o r m e d in di f ferent popula t ions and age groups , wi th 
compar i son g roups to d e t e r m i n e the overall effect iveness 
of prophylaxis in reduc ing clinical infect ions and p r o m o t -
ing immuni ty . 
Conclusion 
O u r s tudy showed that pos t -exposure osel tmaivir pro-
phylaxis r educed the rate of infect ion in a vulnerable pop-
ulat ion and did no t adversely increase subsequen t 
infect ion rates u p o n cessat ion of prophylaxis before the 
epidemic 's peak. In addi t ion, we have shown tha t asymp-
tomat ic se roconvers ions occur du r ing prophylaxis , which 
may confer p ro tec t ion against f u tu re infect ion. Post-
exposure prophylaxis r emains a s trategy to cons ider in 
prevent ing the spread of inf luenza in closed envi ron-
m e n t s and essential pe rsonne l popula t ions . 
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Chapter Eleven 
Oseltamivir Prophylaxis Failures 
While the previous chapters show the effectiveness of oseltamivir ring prophylaxis 
during influenza outbreaks, there is concern that prophylaxis failures may be due to 
resistance and these strains will be evolutionarily selected for replication and 
transmission. There are few documented reports of prophylaxis failures during the 
2009 pandemic that explores the possible reasons behind these failures. 
The following manuscript presents the laboratory confirmed prophylaxis failures that 
were identified from groups of military servicemen where ring prophylaxis had been 
used. Although there were only 10 cases available, these provided sufficient viral 
material for testing for mutations that confer oseltamivir resistance. As the H274Y 
mutation was involved in most of the resistant viruses, this was one of the main 
focuses of the testing. In addition, the whole-of-genome sequencing allowed for the 
identification of other possible mutations and the effect these may have had on 
resistance to anti-viral drugs. 
The study showed that these failures were primary failures and were unlikely to have 
originated from viral genetic mutations. Although the sample size is small, it provides 
some evidence that not all prophylaxis failures are due to mutations, and that primary 
prophylaxis failures remain the most likely cause for the majority of cases. At the 
same time, it does not mean that anti-viral prophylaxis should be used 
indiscriminately due to the still existing possibility of promoting resistance by natural 
selection, and other side effects. Prophylaxis should instead be considered in 
situations where the benefits outweigh potential costs, such as to maintain essential 
services or reduce complications in vulnerable populations. The rational use of anti-
viral medications will ensure that they will continue to be viable as a strategy in the 
future. 
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A B S T R A C T 
Background: Antiviral post-exposure prophylaxis with oseltamivir has been used as a strategy in mitigat-
ing the Influenza A (H1N1 -2009) pandemic. There have been few reports of well-documented prophylaxis 
failures and the reasons for failure. 
Objectives: We report herein a series of 10 cases of prophylaxis failures and explore the reasons behind 
their prophylaxis failure. 
Study design: In the early pandemic phase, the military employed oseltamivir post-exposure ring-
prophylaxis of affected units. From June 22 to July 30, 2009. cases of laboratory-confirmed prophylaxis 
failures were identified. Nasopharyngeal swabs were collected and tested by PGR. Samples with suffi-
cient RNA material were sent for whole genome sequencing, and screened for mutations that confer 
oseltamivir resistance, especially the H275Y mutation. 
Results: Ten cases of laboratory-confirmed prophylaxis failure were identified, with a mean age of 22.3 
years. One case was asymptomatic; the remaining 9 had fever or cough but without severe complications. 
The mean duration of exposure before starting oseltamivir was 1.9 days (SD 0.9), while the mean duration 
of oseltamivir consumption before symptom onset was 1.9 days (SD 1.4). None of the samples had the 
H275Y mutation or other known mutations that confer resistance. From the whole genome sequencing, 
several mutations at the HA (T220S, E275V, T333A. D239G); PB2 (K660R, L607V. V292I); NSl (F103S), and 
NP(W104G)gene segments were detected, but none of them were likely to result in anti-viral resistance. 
Conclusions: Primary prophylaxis failures exhibited mild symptoms without complications; all did not 
have the H275Y mutation and were unlikely to result from other mutations. 
® 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
Abbreviations: PGR, polymerase chain reaction: DNA, deoxyribonucleic acid; 
RNA, ribonucleic acid: PDB, Protein Data Bank: BMl, body mass index: SD, standard 
deviation: NP. nucleoprotein; NS l , non-structural protein 1: WT, wild-type: M l . 
mutant-type: AA, amino acids. 
• Corresponding author at: 701 Transit Road #04-01, Singapore 778910. 
Singapore. Tel.: +65 97928896: fax: +65 64531015. 
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1. Background 
The Influenza A (H1N1-2009 ) pandemic resulted in the activa-
tion of response measures worldwide, ' '^ wi th oseltamivir antiviral 
prophylaxis used frequently. Oseltamivir protects against sea-
sonal influenza when used as post-exposure prophylaxis^' ' ' or 
pre-exposure prophylaxis.^-® However, resistance to oseltamivir 
has been developing, especially in seasonal H l N l viruses, largely 
due to the H275Y mutation.'-® 
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Influenza A (H I N1-2009) is resistant to adamantanes but 
remains largely susceptible to neuraminidase inhibitors®; 
with only sporadic cases of oseltamivir resistance reported 
w o r l d w i d e . ' " " The Singapore military utilized post-exposure 
oseltamivir prophylaxis as part of its pandemic response plan 
to prevent the uncontrolled spread of influenza among essential 
personnel, and some prophylaxis failures occurred. Apart from 
antiviral resistance,' ' prophylaxis failures may also occur without 
resistance.^''' However, there have been few well-documented 
reports of prophylaxis failures during the 2009 pandemic. 
2. Objectives 
W e aim to explore possible reasons behind a series of 
oseltamivir prophylaxis failures among military personnel. 
3. Study design 
The Singapore military is a conscript service for males after high 
school. During the pandemic, a confirmed influenza A (H I N1 -2009) 
case was defined as laboratory-confirmed infection by reverse 
transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (PCR) or viral culture.'^ 
In the early pandemic containment phase the military employed 
the strategy of post-exposure oseltamivir chemoprophylaxis for 
close contacts of cases, with 10 days of oseltamivir (75 mg daily).'^ 
Any servicemen on prophylaxis with febrile respiratory illness 
(reported fever with cough or sore throat) underwent PCR testing. 
A case of prophylaxis failure was defined as confirmed influenza A 
( H l N l - 2 0 0 9 ) with onset of symptoms >24 h after commencement 
of oseltamivir. Prophylaxis failures were converted to treatment 
doses of oseltamivir (75 mg twice a day for 5 days) upon diagnosis. 
From June 22 to July 30, 2009, laboratory-confirmed prophy-
laxis failure cases were identified and information collected via 
questionnaire, telephone interview and medical records review; 
including time from exposure (first contact with the case), risk fac-
tors, clinical symptoms, medication compliance, and side-effects. 
This study was approved by the military's Joint Medical Committee, 
and the National University of Singapore and Australian National 
University's ethics board. 
Table 1 
Demographics , clinical cha icteristics and compl icat ions of cases (n = 10). 
= 10 
Demographics 
Age in years: mean (range) ( SD ) 22.3 (19.6 -30.0 ) (3 .1 ) 
Ma le 1 0 ( 1 0 0 % ) 
BM l : mean (range) ( SD ) 24.3 (15.6-34.3) (6.0) 
Smoke r 5 ( 5 0 % ) 
Comorbidities- ' 1 ( 10% ) 
Clinical characteristics 
Fever (>37.5 C) 8 ( 8 0 % ) 
- M a x i m u m temperature: meai n (range) ( SD ) 38.0 C (37.6-38.4) (0.2) 
- Overall duration: mean (rangi e ) ( S D ) 2.6 d a y s ( l -- 4 ) (0.9) 
Cough 
- Productive 7 ( 7 0 % ) 
- Dry 2 ( 2 0 % ) 
Sore throat 6 ( 6 0 % ) 
Runn ing nose 6 ( 6 0 % ) 
Blocked nose 4 (40%) 
Mya lg ia 4 (40%) 
Arthralgia 0 ( 0 % ) 
Shortness of breath 0 ( 0 % ) 
A symptomat i c 1 ( 1 0 % ) ' 
Total durat ion of illness: m e a n ( r ange) ( SD ) 7.4 days (3-- 14 ) (3 .2 ) 
Complications 
Pneumonia 0 ( 0 % ) 
Hospital ization 1 ( 1 0 % ) 
" Includes asthma, ischaemic heart disease, diabetes mellitus, hyperlipidemia. 
malignancy, immuno supp re s s ed state, any other chronic cardiac, pu lmonary, renal 
or liver condition. 
procedure,'® and where possible, additional 3D structural models 
were generated to strengthen data interpretation of the molecular 
effect of the mutations identified. W e used B L A S T P " against the 
Protein Data Bank (PDB)'® to identify the most closely related tem-
plate of known structure and then aligned and modelled the query 
sequence using MODELLER.'® Complexes with ligands or host pro-
teins were additionally minimized with short simulated annealing 
molecular dynamics simulations with the AMBER03 force field as 
implemented in YASARA^" that was also used for visualization of 
structures and mutations. 
4. Results 
3.1. Laboratory analysis and sequencing 
Nasopharyngeal swabs, collected from all febrile respiratory 
illness cases, were tested by real time PCR, using the S W H l For-
ward/Reverse primer set and probe, as previously described by the 
Wor ld Health Organization.' ' ' 
Positive samples with sufficient RNA material were subjected 
to whole genome sequencing to determine the molecular basis 
for failed prophylaxis, as the causative mutation may be beyond 
the neuraminidase protein. Viral RNA from diagnostic swabs 
or RNA extracted from Madin-Darby canine kidney cell cul-
tures was reverse-transcribed to cDNA and then amplified by 
PCR using influenza A (H INT-2009) specific primers. The PCR 
products were sequenced using Genome Institute of Singapore 
influenza-resequencing microarrays manufactured by Roche Nim-
blegen, as described previously." This was utilized to screen the 
positive samples for mutations that conferred oseltamivir resis-
tance, including the H275Y mutation detected in sporadic cases 
w o r l d w i d e . ' " " The possible molecular effect of each identified 
mutations was then interpreted in the prophylaxis failure context. 
3.2. Bioinformatics methods 
Structural models were created for the reference strain 
A/New York/20/2009(H1N1} following a previously described 
From June 22 to July 30, 2009, 1032 personnel received 
oseltamivir prophylaxis, and 10 cases (1 %) of laboratory-confirmed 
prophylaxis failures were detected. The entire cohort comprised of 
males with a mean age of 22.3 years and mean BM l of 21.8 kg/m^. 
The mean age of the cases was 22.3 years. The average BMl of the 
cases was 24.3 kg/m^ - 2 were obese (BMl > 27.5), 3 were over-
weight (BMl 23.5-27.4) and 1 was underweight (BMl <18.5). One 
patient with hyperlipidemia was on dietary control (Table 1). 
4.1. Clinical characteristics and complications 
Of the 10 cases, 1 case was asymptomatic throughout and was 
identified through our active surveillance initiative (in the first 
three outbreaks, thrice weekly surveillance nasopharyngeal swabs 
of the affected cohorts were carried out until no further cases were 
detected). Eight cases had fever with a mean temperature of38.0°C, 
and 9 cases had cough of which 7 (70%) cases were productive. 
There were no severe complications - 1 individual had mild illness 
but chose hospitalization to isolate himself from his family. 
The mean duration of exposure before starting oseltamivir was 
1.9 days (SO 0.9), while the mean duration of oseltamivir consump-
tion before symptom onset was 1.9 days (SD 1.4) (Table 2). All cases 
were compliant to prophylaxis. Post-initiation of prophylaxis, two 
cases had nausea and vomiting, and 1 each had headache, dizziness, 
diarrhea, and rash respectively; these manifestations could either 
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Table 2 
Time course of oseltamivir commencement and symptom onset in the 10 cases of 
prophylaxis failure. 
D239G 
Days of exposure before Days of oseltamivir 
starting oseltamivir prophylaxis completed 
before symptom onset 
Serviceman 1 3 5 
Serviceman 2 3 4 ' 
Serviceman 3 1 2 
Serviceman 4 2 1 
Serviceman 5 2 1 
Serviceman 6 1 3 
Serviceman 7 1 1 
Serviceman 8 1 2 
Serviceman 9 3 I 
Serviceman 10 2 1 
^ Serviceman was asymptomatic. Date of diagnosis was tal<en to be date of s ymp-
tom onset as nasopharyngeal swab 2 days prior was negative. 
be due to the innuenza infection or oseltamivir side effects. There 
were no severe adverse or neuropsychiatric side effects. 
4.2. Resistance testing and molecular sequencing 
Nine cases had sufficient RNA material for v^^hole genome 
sequencing. As oseltamivir directly targets the sialic acid bind-
ing pocket in the neuraminidase protein (NA), we investigated 
possible mutations in this region. The well-studied mutations in 
position 275 are k n o w n to convey resistance. In the 9 samples 
tested, none had the mutated form encoding tyrosine, wh ich wou ld 
cause resistance, whi le 7 gave clear evidence of the drug-sensitive 
wildtype histidine (H275 ) (sequences from the other two sam-
ples were suboptimal at the specific region). All 9 samples did not 
reveal mutations in another previously k n o w n position affecting 
oseltamivir resistance in N2 neuraminidases, position 119, with the 
encoded protein s howed drug-sensit ive glutamate. 
To systematically address if new resistance mutations could 
have occurred, 35 positions near the drug-b ind ing pocket were 
screened (supplementary Table 1). W e obtained reliable amino acid 
sequences wi th >90% coverage over all samples, and showed that 
drug-sensitive wi ldtype residues could be confirmed with no muta-
tions found except in one case. The only identified mutation was 
E47G, found in the neuraminidase protein. A l though this muta-
tion wou ld have changed the local electrostatic environment by 
removing a negative charge, its position in the non-globular stalk 
is far from the drug-b ind ing pocket and thus unlikely to affect drug 
binding significantly. 
Fig. 1. Identified mutations (red balls) mapped to 3D structural model of viral 
hemagglutinin (grey ribbons) in complex with the host cell receptor (blue balls), 
based on PDB template IRVT. (For interpretation of the references to color in this 
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of the article.) 
Table 3 shows the identified mutations. The most frequently 
identified mutation, HA T220S, is located at the HA head domain 
(Fig. 1), wh ich has the important function of host cell recognition. 
However, the mutation 's orientation facing away from the bind-
ing site wou ld minimize potential effects on viral biology. Serine at 
position 220 is c ommon among seasonal H I N1 strains and no clini-
cal abnormalities for either serine or threonine at position 220 have 
been found. HA E275V and HA T333A appear at neutral positions 
and also globally without clinical abnormalities. W e also report a 
HA D239G mutation. Position 239 on top of the receptor at the sugar 
binding pocket (Fig. 1) likely influences host cell sialic acid binding. 
Mutat ions 1<660R and L607V in the viral polymerase protein 
PB2 occur in its C-terminal domain wh ich is implicated in bind-
ing the human host protein importin alpha wh ich plays a role in 
nuclear import. Neither appears close enough to affect the respec-
tive interaction (Fig. 2). Another mutation, PB2 V2921, is located 
just before the CAP-binding domain in a region without known 
structure. V2921 and 1<660R had been previously found in several 
patients without reported anomalies.^' 
Mutat ion F103S in the viral non-structural protein 1 ( N S l ) 
appears in a position critical for interaction with the F2F3 frag-
ment of human cellular factor CPSF30 (Fig. 3), wh ich is implicated 
in suppress ing host antiviral response.^^ As the wildtype aromatic 
phenylalanine fits into a hydrophobic pocket of the human protein, 
mutation to the small and polar serine wou ld definitely weaken 
this interaction, possibly suggesting a reduction in virulence. Mos t 
occurrences of this mutation globally were reported from Singa-
porean samples,^' suggesting local transmiss ion chains. 
Mutat ion W 1 0 4 G in the viral nucleoprotein (NP) replaces 
a buried hydrophobic residue with a flexible non-hydrophobic 
Table 3 
Summary of identified mutations, their expected molecular effects and global occurrences. 
Protein Mutation*^ {aitemative numbering) Number of Expected molecular Global wild type Global mutant type Global other amino 
occurrences effect occurrences occurrences acid occurrences 
HA T220S (H3:206. HI: 203) 6 Neutral, common 
variation 
1013(56.62%) 774(43.26%) 2(0.11%) 
PB2 K660R 4 Neutral 1024(94.90%) 55(5.10%) 0(0.00%) 
NS l F103S 3 Altered host protein 
interaction 
1092(97.59%) 25(2.23%) 2(0.18%) 
PB2 L607I 2 Neutral 1086(100.00%) 0(0.00%) 0(0.00%) 
PB2 V292 I 1 Neutral 1041(97.93%) 22(2.07%) 0(0.00%) 
HA D239G (H3:225, HI: 222) 1 Altered host cell 
receptor interaction 
1650(92.80%) 24(1.35%) 104(5.85%) 
HA E275V(H3:261.HI:258) 1 Neutral 1757(99.55%) 6(0.34%) 2(0.11%) 
HA T333A (H3:318.H1:316) 1 Neutral 1738(99.89%) 1 (0.06%) 1 (0.06%) 
NP W 1 0 4 C 1 Affect viral protein 
stability 
1147(100.00%) 0(0.00%) 0(0.00%) 
NA E47G (N2: 51. Nl: 47) 1 Neutral, in stalk far 1416(99.86%) 2(0.14%) 0(0.00%) 
from drug binding site 
^ The number ing and amino acid changes are relative to early representative strain A/New York/20/2009(H1N1) to which most samples of this study were most 
closely related (m in imum number of mutations). Alternative HA and NA numbering are in relation to seasonal H3N2 (A/Brisbane/10/2007(H3N2)) or H l N l (A/Puerto 
Rico/8/1934(Hl N1)) residue positions. 
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L607V 
K660R 
Fig. 2. Identified mutations (red balls) mapped to 3D structural model of viral PB2 
(grey ribbons) in complex with the host protein importin alpha (blue ribbons), based 
on PDB templates 3 C W 4 and 2JDQ. (For interpretation of the references to color in 
this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of the article.) 
Fig. 3. Identified mutation (red balls) mapped to 3D structural model of viral NS l 
(dimer: both units as grey ribbons) in complex with the host protein human cellular 
factor CPSF30 (dimer: 1 unit as blue ribbons and 1 unit in blue surface representa-
tion), based on PDB templates 3EU6 and 2RHK. (For interpretation of the references 
to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of the article.) 
glycine (Fig. 4) wl i ich may destabilize the surrounding structural 
scaffold. As structural integrity of NP is required for viral RNA 
genome binding and organization, the W 1 0 4 G mutation could 
attenuate viral replication efficiency. 
Fig. 4. Identified mutation (red balls) mapped to 3D structural model of viral nucle-
oprotein (grey ribbons), based on PDB template 2Q06. (For interpretation of the 
references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of 
the article.) 
5. Discuss ion 
Oseltamivir has been used for prophylaxis against influenza, and 
cases of prophylaxis failures have been documented. ' "® Confirmed 
prophylaxis failures accounted for about 1 % (10/1032) of our cohort, 
comparable to previous studies of 1.2%5 and 1.4%.3 A l though sub-
clinical cases could have been missed, this is lower than the 44% 
infection rate determined through serological testing in a similar 
g roup of servicemen not g iven oseltamivir prophylaxis in a separate 
study.^'.s" 
Prophylaxis failures can occur secondary to antiviral 
resistance.''® " However, to date, the pandemic influenza A 
( H I N1 -2009 ) virus remains largely sensitive to oseltamivir with 
about 200 reported cases of oseltamivir resistance - all showing 
H275Y mutation and thus remaining sensitive to zanamivir. ' " 
None of the prophylaxis failure cases in our study had this H275Y 
mutation. There have also been no wide commun i t y circulation of 
oseltamivir resistant viruses except for the transmiss ion of resis-
tant viruses in a few local sett ings. ' " - " Pr imary prophylaxis failures 
not due to mutations that confer resistance are also a common 
occurrence.^'"' In our study, none of the prophylaxis failures had 
the H275Y or other mutations that may have produced antiviral 
resistance. 
Primary prophylaxis failures may be due to longer exposure 
durations before prophylaxis commencement, insufficient time for 
prophylaxis effect, or insufficient dosing. The mean duration of 
exposure before starting oseltamivir was 1.9 days ( SD 0.9) with 
more than half having been exposed for 2 days or longer. This expo-
sure duration may have al lowed substantial viral replication before 
prophylaxis, thereby reducing its efficacy. The mean duration of 
oseltamivir consumpt ion before s ymptom onset wa s 1.9 days (SD 
1.4), wi th about half having taken only 1 dose of oseltamivir - pos-
sibly resulting in insufficient time for therapeutic dosing. Half of 
our prophylaxis failure cases were overweight/obese, compared 
with <10% for the general military population, raising the pos-
sibility of inadequate dos ing since the effective dose per body 
weight wou ld be reduced. A l though a previous study showed 
no significant difference between once compared to twice daily 
dos ing of oseltamivir prophylaxis,^ this requires further investiga-
tion. 
From the genome sequencing and 3D simulations, none of the 
highlighted mutations were expected to interfere w i th prophylaxis 
through direct effects on oseltamivir binding. Only mutation D239G 
in HA has the potential to increase virulence as a hypothetical 
mechan i sm in developing s ymptoms despite antiviral prophylaxis. 
The HA D 2 3 9 G mutation has been identified in fatal or severe 
ca ses ' " in additional to mild cases; we report herein the first 
case wi th this mutation in Singapore, wh ich wa s a mild case. The 
importance of position 239 for host cell recognition and host speci-
ficity was highlighted previously as part of a double mutation 
(E204D, G239D ) that turned the viral hemagglut in in from avian 
to human specificity, a lthough posit ion 204 appeared to be the 
stronger determinant.^^ G at position 239 should, therefore, favor 
the avian a-2,3 receptor type wh i ch is also found on specialized 
human cells. It cannot be excluded that early prophylaxis could 
have eventually weakened the effects of the potentially danger-
ous D 2 3 9 G mutation since our case did not display any severe 
complications. 
A l though these 10 individuals failed prophylaxis, the prophy-
laxis regime may have conferred some protection against severe 
illness as they had mild illness, similar to influenza cases with 
early treatment w i th oseltamivir.26.27 p ^ g ji^g ^ ^ g n sample 
size, further cohort studies w i th compar i son g roups are needed to 
determine if pr imary prophylaxis failures are less symptomatic and 
have less complications compared to cases not on prophylaxis, as 
well as further delineate the reasons for prophylax is failures. Addi-
108 Vj. Lee et al. / Journal of Clinical Virology 50 (2011) 104-108 
tional experimental phenotypic testing should also be considered 
in future studies to understand the link between genetic sequences 
and resistance. 
We have shown that primary prophylaxis failures for pandemic 
influenza A (H lN l -2009) occur. None of these were due to the 
H275Y mutation and were unlikely to be caused by other viral 
mutations based on genetic sequences. 
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Supplementary Table 1. Detailed sequencing of positions close to drug-binding pocket 
Neuraminidase ref 
Distance to N2 N1 (NY Service- Service- Service- Service- Service- Service- Service- Service- Service- %AA 
drug pos pos 20) man 1 man 2 man 3 man 4 man 5 man 6 man 7 man 8 man 9 coverage 
<5 A 118 118 R R R R R R R R R R 100.0% 
<5 A 119 119 E E E E E E E E E E 100.0% 
<5 A 134 134 L L L L L L L - L L 88.8% 
<5 A 151 151 D D D D D D D D D D 100.0% 
<5 A 152 152 R R R R R R R R R R 100.0% 
<5 A 156 156 R R R R R R R R R R 100.0% 
<5 A 178 179 W W W W W W W W W W 100.0% 
<5 A 179 180 s s s s s s s S S S 100.0% 
<5 A 221 222 N N N N N N N N N N 100.0% 
<5 A 222 223 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100.0% 
<5 A 223 224 L L L L L L L L L L 100.0% 
<5 A 224 225 R R R R R R R R R R 100.0% 
<5 A 225 226 T T T T T T T T T T 100.0% 
<5 A 227 228 E E E E E E E E E E 100.0% 
<5 A 246 247 S - - S S S S S S - 66.7% 
<5 A 274 275 H H - H H H H H - H 77.8% 
<5 A 276 277 E E E E E E E E - E 88.9% 
<5 A 277 278 E E E E E E E E E - 88.9% 
<5 A 292 293 R R - R R R R R R - 77.8% 
<5 A 294 295 N N N N N N N N N N 100.0% 
<5 A 348 345 G G G G G G G G G G 100.0% 
<5 A 349 346 V V V V V V V V V V 100.0% 
<5 A 371 368 R R - R R R R R R R 88.9% 
<5 A 406 402 Y 
%AA 
cover-
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
' 
66.7% 
age 95.80% 79.20% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 91.70% 91.70% 83.30% 
>5 A <7 A but 
highly conserved 136 136 Q Q Q Q Q Q Q - Q Q 88.9% 
>5 A <7 A but 
highly conserved 201 202 A A - A A A A - A A 77.8% 
>5 A <7 A but 242 243 T T - T T T T T T - 77.8% 
highly conserved 
>5 A <7 A but 
highly conserved 243 244 D - - D D D D D D D 77.8% 
>5 A <7 A but 
highly conserved 244 245 G G - G G G G G - - 66.7% 
>5 A <7 A but 
highly conserved 250 251 A A A A A A A A A - 88.9% 
>5 A <7 A but 
highly conserved 293 294 D D - D D D D D D D 88.9% 
>5 A <7 A but 
highly conserved 295 296 W W W W W W W W W W 100.0% 
>5 A <7 A but 
highly conserved 350 347 K - - K K K K K K K 77.8% 
>5 A <7 A but 
highly conserved 405 401 G G G G G G G G G G 100.0% 
>5 A <7 A but 
highly conserved 425 425 E E - E E E E E E E 88.9% 
%AA 
cover-
age 81.8% 36.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 81.8% 90.9% 72.7% 
total % 
AA 91.4% 65.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 88.6% 91.4% 80.0% 
Average overall coverage: 90.8% 
Chapter Twelve 
Effectiveness of Combinations of Public 
Health Measures in Reducing the Spread 
of Influenza 
The previous chapters have described the possible cross-reactivity of seasonal 
vaccination against the 2009 pandemic influenza strain, and the effectiveness of anti-
viral drugs as prophylaxis. However, the uptake of seasonal influenza vaccine alone is 
unlikely to be sufficient to avert the pandemic's spread, and pandemic vaccines, 
whilst likely to be effective, are also unlikely to be available ahead of the first 
pandemic wave in any sufficient numbers. Anti-viral drugs, while useful in specific 
settings, are not a feasible solution to prevent the spread of influenza across the world. 
Public health measures may therefore be the only set of strategies that are available to 
reduce the spread of influenza in most populations. As discussed in Chapter Seven, 
most of the available suggestions for the effectiveness of public health measures to 
reduce the spread of influenza are from mathematical modeling studies. There have 
been few opportunities to study the effect of public health measures in sizeable 
populations due to the difficulty in collecting sufficient data on infection rates in 
separate groups where different interventions have been used. 
The next and final manuscript in this thesis provides much awaited evidence on the 
effectiveness of public health measures in reducing the spread of influenza. This is a 
detailed analysis of the military cohort which was part of the study described in 
Chapter Five. The Singapore military provided the ideal opportunity to study these 
measures due to the well-circumscribed groups with different sets of measures 
implemented, as well as the seroepidemiological study design which allows all 
probable cases to be identified in addition to clinical cases. One of the cohorts 
selected for this study was healthcare workers, which may be affected by the contact 
with infected patients, and the use of infection control measures together with health 
education. It will therefore be important to determine if measures used for healthcare 
workers are effective in reducing their risk of infection. 
The results provide conclusive evidence on the effectiveness of combinations of 
public health measures in reducing the spread of influenza. In the healthcare worker 
cohort, these measures are likely to have reduced the workplace exposure, but the 
overall training in infection control and hygiene procedures may have also influenced 
their behavior outside of the workplace to result in an additional overall reduction in 
transmission. 
Study 10 
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M A J O R A R T I C L E 
Effectiveness of PubKc Health Measures 
in Mitigating Pandemic Influenza Spread: 
A Prospective Sero-Epidemiological Cohort Study 
Vernon J. Lee, '^" ' Jonathan Yap,' Alex R. Cook," Mark I Chen,'® Joshua K Tay,' Ian Barr," Anne Kelso," 
Boon Huan Tan,' Jin Phang Loh,» Raymond Lin,' Lin Cui,' Paul M Kelly," Yee Sin Leo,' Kee Seng Chia,' 
Wee Lee Kang,'° Paul A Tambyah,' and Benjamin Seet'° 
'B iodefence Centre, Min is t ry of D e f e n c e , ' Centre for Health Services Research, 'Depar tment of Epidemiology and Public Health, "Department 
of Stat ist ics and Appl ied Probabil ity, and 'Div is ion of Infect ious Diseases, Nat ional University of Singapore, ^Department of Clinical Epidemiology 
and 'Depar tment of Infect ious Diseases, Tan Tock Seng Hospital. "Defence Medica l and Environmental Research Insti tute, DSO Nat ional 
Laboratories, 'Na t iona l Public Health Laboratory, Min is t ry of Health, and '"Headquarters Med ica l Corps, Singapore Armed Forces, Singapore: 
"Na t i ona l Centre for Epidemiology and Populat ion Health, Austra l ian Nat ional University and ' W o r l d Health Organization Collaborating Center 
for Reference and Research for Influenza, Melbourne, Austra l ia 
Background. Few studies have validated the effectiveness of pubhc health interventions in reducing influenza 
spread in real-life settings. We aim to validate these measures used during the 2009 pandemic. 
Methods. From 22 June to 9 October 2009, we performed a prospective observational cohort study using 
paired serum samples and symptom review among 3 groups of Singapore military personnel. "Normal" units were 
subjected to prevailing pandemic response policies. "Essential" units and health care workers had additional public 
health interventions (eg, enhanced surveillance with isolation, segregation, personal protective equipment). Samples 
were tested by hemagglutination inhibition; the principal outcome was seroconversion to 2009 influenza A(HINI ) . 
Results. In total, 1015 individuals in 14 units completed the study, with 29% overall seroconversion. Sero-
conversion among essential units (17%) and health care workers (11%) was significantly lower than that in normal 
units (44%) (P<.001) . Symptomatic illness attributable to influenza was also lower in essential units (5%) and 
health care workers (2%) than in normal units (12%) (P = .06). Adjusted for confounders, unit type was the 
only significant variable influencing overall seroconversion (P< .05). From multivariate analysis within each unit, 
age ( P < . 0 0 I ) and baseline antibody titer (P = .012) were inversely related to seroconversion risk. 
Conclusions. Public health measures are effective in limiting influenza transmission in closed environments. 
The 2009 influenza A(HINI ) pandemic affected most 
countries within months of its emergence. Despite early 
identification of the virus and massive scale-up ofvaccine 
production, initial responses were largely based on pre-
existing pandemic plans due to the pandemic's rapid 
spread before the vaccine's availability months later. The 
use of combination strategies, including anti-viral treat-
ment of cases, prophylaxis and quarantine of close con-
tacts, and community social distancing have been shown 
in computational mathematical models to reduce influ-
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enza attack rates [1-3]. Although policy makers world-
wide have adopted these interventions, there are few 
studies that have clearly validated these models' findings 
for pandemic influenza control in real-life settings, which 
is critical to assess their actual effectiveness [4]. 
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Influenza pandemic attack rates have been higher than those 
of n o n p a n d e m i c influenza [5], whereas attack rates have also 
been high in env i ronments such as mili tary facilities ( 4 2 % -
58%) [6, 7] and board ing schools (71%) [8], even in n o n p a n -
demic years. There is indirect evidence that schools are potential 
amplifying arenas for influenza t ransmission [9, 10], and the 
same may also be t rue for other closed and semiclosed envi-
ronments . Notably, the first outbreaks of 2009 influenza 
A ( H I N I ) in Singapore, a tropical city-state in Southeast Asia, 
occurred in such settings: a tertiary educat ion institute, a rmy 
camps, and church camps [11]. Therefore, measures that can 
control outbreaks early in closed or semiclosed env i ronments 
may be an impor tan t pandemic mitigation strategy. 
Most popula t ion-based studies of nonpharmacological in-
tervent ions have been based on influenza-like illness (ILI) or 
labora tory-conf i rmed influenza [12, 13], but there are diffi-
culties arising f rom lack of specificity of clinical defini t ions and 
documen ta t ion of labora tory-conf i rmed influenza. Sero-epi-
demiological studies are m o r e definitive in de termining pop-
ulation infection rates and effectiveness of intervent ions [14, 
15], yielding critical in format ion on preventive measures that 
cannot be obtained f rom observational studies alone. Previous 
pandemic studies have either relied on observational data [16, 
17], single pos t -pandemic blood specimens [18], or cross-sec-
tional serological samples [19]. However, the presence of cross-
reactive antibodies to 2009 influenza A ( H I N I ) [19, 20] un-
derscores the impor tance of using paired samples for precise 
measurement of seroconversion rates. 
We therefore under took a prospective observational study 
using paired serum samples a m o n g 3 distinct groups of military 
soldiers in Singapore to evaluate the impact of public health 
measures for the control of pandemic influenza before the pan-
demic vaccine was made available. 
METHODS 
This s tudy was pe r fo rmed on the Singapore military f rom 22 
June to 9 October 2009 and was part of a larger seroepide-
miological investigation involving other c o h o r t s — c o m m u n i t y 
adults, health care workers f rom 1 hospital , and long- term care 
facility residents [21]. Singapore is a globally connected tropical 
city-state, and the Singapore military is composed of both con-
script personnel , where all men enlist after high school, and 
regular employees. These personnel work and reside in military 
camps dur ing weekdays and re turn to the c o m m u n i t y on week-
ends, resulting in a mostly closed-living env i ronment but with 
regular exposure to the general communi ty . 
The military's pandemic response plan was developed pr ior 
to the pandemic and involved a stratified and targeted response 
to ensure operat ional readiness. " N o r m a l " units followed the 
prevailing national pandemic response policies, in which in-
dividuals were provided general health educat ion on respiratory 
and hand hygiene and were advised to seek medical care if ill. 
"Essential" units, def ined as those uni ts critical to the mil-
itary's func t ion ing where absenteeism at any t ime point must 
be minimized, received an addit ional set of public health mea-
sures dur ing the epidemic 's dura t ion . This included enhanced 
surveillance (daily recorded t empera tu re and symptom mon-
itoring with p r o m p t identif ication and repor t ing of acute res-
pira tory illnesses [ARIs]) with medical referral and provision 
of h o m e medical leave for these cases, as well as segregation of 
uni ts into smaller work ing subgroups . Segregation as a form 
of social dis tancing entailed noncon tac t when possible between 
subgroups of as small as 20 individuals, including having dif 
ferent activity and meal t imes, and t imes of en t ry and exit from 
camp. Health care workers in mili tary medical centers were 
subjected to similar enhanced surveillance measures as essential 
uni ts and in addi t ion wore N95 masks, gloves, and gowns con-
t inuously du r ing their work ing hours ; compl iance was ensured 
th rough regular inspections. Both these groups also received 
rout ine annual seasonal influenza vaccination, which was not 
routinely offered to normal units, w h o were, however, free to 
obtain this on their own. 
These 3 main groups were selected a priori to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the different levels of intervent ions summarized 
in Table 1. Multiple uni ts representative of each main group 
were chosen, and par t ic ipants were recrui ted f rom within these 
units. The working and living facilities, and intraunit interac-
tions, were generally similar across the units. 
Three b lood samples were collected f rom each participant. 
The first sample (sample A) was taken f rom 22 June to 1 July 
2009, immediate ly following the appearance of local commu-
nity t ransmission in Singapore in the second half of June 2009 
[ 22], before the widespread epidemic. N o n e of the units selected 
had any recorded increase in respiratory illness or had any 
conf i rmed 2009 influenza A( H1N1) cases before sampling. The 
second sample (sample B) was mostly taken f rom 20 August 
to 3 September 2009, 3 - 4 weeks after the epidemic's peak in 
Singapore, which occurred dur ing the first week of August 2009 
[23, 24]. The final pos tepidemic sample (sample C) was taken 
f rom 29 September to 9 October 2 0 0 9 , 4 - 5 weeks after epidemk 
activity had subsided and nat ional ARI and ILI rates had re-
tu rned to baseline levels [23, 24]. 
Standardized quest ionnaires were given to participants dur-
ing the 3 b lood samplings, and at 3-week intervals in between. 
The quest ionnaires collected data o n demographics, medical 
history, any previous vaccinat ion history, a n d new onset symp-
toms related to influenza. ARI was def ined as onset of rhinor-
rhea, nasal congestion, sore throat or cough; febrile respiratory 
illness (FRI) was defined as ARI with concur ren t self-reported 
fever or t empera tu re of &37.5°C [25]. Wri t ten informed con-
sent was obta ined, and s tudy approval was granted by the mil-
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Table 1. Characteristics of Study Population 
Characterist ic Overal l Normal personnel Essential personnel Health care worke rs 
No. of units in each cohor t 14 5 5 4 
Total no. of individuals in the units 1515 594 757 164 
No. of individuals w h o part ic ipated 1166 (77) 472 (79) 567 (75) 127 (77) 
Mean sample size w h o part ic ipated per unit (SE) 73 (11) 87 (4) 94 (21) 27 (7) 
Samples 
At least 2 samples provided 1015/1166 (87) 437/472 (93) 470/567 (83) 108/127 (85) 
In tervent ions Standard pandemic Standard pandemic plan plus Standard pandemic plan plus 
plan 
• Segregat ion among work ing subgroups • PPE, including N-95 dur ing wo rk i ng hours 
• Enhanced survei l lance and isolation^ • Enhanced survei l lance and isolat ion ® 
• Seasonal influenza vaccinat ion • Seasonal inf luenza vaccinat ion 
Demograph ics 
Med ian age' ' 20 19 22 21 
IQR 19-22 18 -20 2 0 - 2 6 2 0 - 2 2 
Range 17-61 17-51 18-61 1 8 - 5 4 
NOTE. Data are no. (%) of participants, unless otherwise indicated. IQR, interquartile range; PPE, personal protective equipment; SE, standard error. 
° Included daily temperature monitoring and prompt reporting of cases of acute respiratory illness, with provision of home medical leave. 
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Figure 1. Proportion of participants w i th the respective baseline and fo l low-up antibody t i ters among the 3 groups. For the fo l low-up graphs, the 
black bars are the fo l low-up antibody titers, whereas the wh i te bars are the baseline t i ters superimposed for comparison. Geometric mean titers are 
shown in the row below the bars, w i th the mean value indicated by the vertical line and 95% confidence interval indicated by the horizontal line. 
itary's Joint Medical Committee for Research and the Australian 
National University's ethics review board. 
Laboratory methods. For each sampling, 5 - 1 0 mL of ve-
nous blood was taken. The hemagglutination inhibition assay 
was performed for all samples in parallel, according to standard 
protocols [26] at the World Health Organization (WHO) Col-
laborating Centre for Reference and Research for Influenza in 
Melbourne, Australia. 
The serum was pretreated with receptor destroying enzyme 
(RDE [II]; Deka Seiken Co Ltd), 1:4 (vol/vol), at 37°C for 16 
h; then the enzyme was inactivated by addition of an equal 
volume of 1.5% tri-sodium citrate (Ajax Chemicals) and in-
cubation at 56°C for 30 min. Egg-grown A/California/7/2009 
A ( H l N l - 2 0 0 9 ) virus was purified by sucrose gradient, con-
centrated, and inactivated with /3-propiolactone, to create an 
influenza zonal pool (IZP) preparation. In total, 25 fiL of 
(4HAU) IZP-A/California/7/2009 virus was incubated at room 
temperature with an equal volume of RDE-treated serum. Se-
rum samples were titrated in 2-fold dilutions in phosphate-
buffered saline from 1:10 to 1:1280. Following 1 h incubation, 
25 fiL of 1% (vol/vol) turkey red blood cells was added to each 
well. Hemagglutination inhibition was read after 30 minutes. 
Titers were expressed as the reciprocal of the highest dilution 
of serum where hemagglutination was prevented. 
To determine seroconversion to 2009 influenza A(HINI) in 
individual participants, we compared antibody titers between 
successive pairs of blood specimens. Seroconversion was defi-
ned as a &4-fold rise in antibody titers [27[. 
Statistical analysis. The principal outcome measure was 
seroconversion to 2009 influenza A ( H I N I ) . The secondary out-
come measure was the presence of ARI and/or FRI likely due 
to influenza (ie, symptomatic seroconversions). To determine 
the sample size, we assumed 25% seroconversion in normal 
units on the basis of previous studies and a difference with the 
intervention groups of at least 10%. To achieve 80% statistical 
power at the 5 % significance level for pairwise comparisons 




mean proportion (SE)'' Mean proportion (SE) Relative risk (95% CI)" P value" 
Normal 44 (3) 1 N/A 12 (3) 
Essential 17 (3) 0.39 (0.26-0.54) <.001 5 (3) 
Health care worker 11 (3) 0.26 (0.07-0.46) <.001 2 (3) 
NOTE. CI, confidence interval; N/A, not applicable; PPE, personal protective equipment; SE, standard error. 
' Comparing the intervention cohorts (essential cohort or health care cohort) to the nonintervention normal cohort. 
P = .061, comparing all 3 groups using the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
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Figure 2. Rates of seroconversion (/I) and symptomatic seroconversion 
[B] w i th in individual units among the 3 groups. 
would requi re 250 i n d e p e n d e n t par t ic ipants per g roup . At the 
uni t level, a pos tu la ted m e a n d i f ference of 10% a n d 5 % stan-
dard devia t ion requi re 5 un i t s to at tain the same power a n d 
significance level. We there fore a imed for 250 individuals in 
each c o m p a r i s o n g roup , spread a m o n g 5 uni ts per g roup . Wi th 
d e p e n d e n c e of final o u t c o m e s , sample sizes wou ld have to in-
crease; however , logistical cons t ra in t s resulted in rec ru i tment 
of m o r e n o r m a l a n d essential soldiers bu t fewer health care 
workers . 
D e m o g r a p h i c s were c o m p a r e d using the Kruskal-Wallis test 
for age a n d Pearson x ' test for sex, us ing the H o p e M o n t e 
Carlo version for small sample sizes with 1 mil l ion i terat ions 
[28]. T h e Pearson x ' test was also used to assess whe ther base-
line t i ters varied by seasonal vaccinat ion status. We also c o m -
puted the geomet r i c m e a n titers (GMTs) for the 3 groups , where 
titers <10 were assigned a value of 5. 
O t h e r statistical analyses were based on the d e p e n d e n t na tu re 
of disease s tatus wi th in un i t s d u e to the con tag ious na tu re of 
inf luenza. For the m a i n analysis, we therefore t reated the mil-
i tary uni t as the basic statistical uni t of interest , implicitly as-
s u m i n g that indiv idual mil i tary uni ts are effectively indepen-
d e n t — t h e i r m e m b e r s w o r k i n g a n d living separately f r o m o ther 
mil i tary units . Overall unit- level seroconvers ion rates in the 3 
g roups were c o m p a r e d us ing a Fisher analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) test wi th Gauss ianness tested by the Shapiro-Wilk 
test [29] a n d homoskedas t i c i ty by the Bartlett test [30]. C o n -
fidence intervals (CIs) for relative risks (RRs) were calculated 
using the Fieller m e t h o d [31]. 
Finally, we p e r f o r m e d 2 mul t ivar ia te analyses. The first was 
an ecological s tudy on uni t seroconvers ion us ing proper t ies of 
the un i t as predic tors , namely, m e a n age, p r o p o r t i o n of m e n , 
and an t ibody titer at baseline, wi th in a l inear mode l f r amework 
to assess whe the r these c o n f o u n d e d uni t type. In addi t ion , an 
individual-level mul t ip le logistic regression was p e r f o r m e d us-
ing age, sex, t i ter at baseline, a n d vaccine s tatus ( the only in-
te rvent ion c o m p o n e n t tha t cou ld be separately quant i f ied) as 
pred ic tors a long with a uni t -specif ic d u m m y variable, al lowing 
the possible effect of these covariates to be assessed, cond i t ioned 
on at tack rates wi th in each uni t . All analyses were p e r f o r m e d 
with R sofhvare p r o g r a m m i n g language [32]. 
RESULTS 
Study population. A total of 1515 individuals f r o m 14 dif-
ferent mil i tary uni ts were initially selected. Of these, 1166 (77%) 
agreed to part icipate in the study, and 87% (1015/1166) of par-
ticipants completed the s tudy by providing a baseline and at least 
1 o the r sample for paired sample serological analysis. The m a -
jori ty w h o did not comple te the s tudy were soldiers w h o had 
left the mil i tary du r ing the study. The fo l low-up rates for the 
no rma l , essential, and health care worker cohor t s were 93% 
(437/472), 83% (470/567), and 85% (108/127), respectively. 
Table 1 shows the general characterist ics of the cohor t . The 
major i ty of the par t ic ipants were young m e n , reflecting the 
general mil i tary popu la t ion . Essential uni ts had a significantly 
higher p r o p o r t i o n of personnel of older ages c o m p a r e d with 
the o ther g roups ( P < . 0 0 1 ) . Heal th care worker uni ts were 
smaller than the o ther uni ts because these were teams work ing 
in p r ima ry health care facilities that had fewer personnel than 
o ther t ra ining or work ing units. 
Primary and secondary outcomes. The baseline and fol-
low-up an t ibody titers a m o n g the 3 g roups are shown in Figure 
1. There was no significant dif ference in the baseline titers 
a m o n g the 3 groups , whereas the G M T on fo l low-up were 
significantly higher in n o r m a l personnel than in the o ther co-
hor t s ( P < . 0 0 1 ) . The mean fold increase in titers c o m p a r i n g 
baseline to fo l low-up titers for each individual was 1.65 (95% 
CI, 1.53-1.77) for essential personnel , 1.52 (95% CI, 1.30-1.73) 
for health care workers , and 2.72 (95% CI, 2 .52-2.91) for nor -
mal personnel ( P < . 0 0 1 ) . 
Overall, the p r ima ry o u t c o m e of serologically c on f i rme d 
2009 inf luenza A ( H I N I ) infect ion was 29% (295/1015). Mean 
serologically c on f i rme d infect ions were significantly lower in 
bo th essential worker uni ts (17%; P < . 0 0 1 ) and health care 
worker uni ts (11%, P<.OOI) than in the n o r m a l uni ts (44%) 
(Table 2). However, no significant dif ference was f o u n d between 
essential uni ts and health care worker uni ts (RR, 0.66; 95% CI, 
0 .14-1.54; P = .22). The secondary end poin t of symptomat i c 
illness a t t r ibutable to inf luenza infect ion was lower a m o n g es-
sential uni ts (4.8%) and health care workers (2.2%) than in 
n o r m a l uni ts (12%) and of border l ine statistical significance 
( P = .061). Figure 2 shows the rates of seroconvers ion and 
symptomat i c seroconvers ion within individual uni ts a m o n g the 
3 cohor ts , whereas the exact b reakdown by individual uni ts can 
be f o u n d in Table 3. 
Pe r fo rming a mult ivariate , ecological, unit-level analysis with 
uni t type, p ropo r t i on of m e n , mean age, and baseline an t ibody 
Table 3. Rates of Seroconversion and Symp-
tomat ic Seroconversion in Each Individual Unit 
Th is tab le is ava i lab le in i ts en t i r e t y in t h e 
on l i ne v e r s i o n o f Journal of Infectious Diseases. 
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Table 4. Mult ivariate Logistic Regression of Factors Af-
fecting Seroconversion wi th in Each Individual Unit 
Predictor OR 95% CI P value 
Age, years 0.86 (0.80-0.94) < 0 0 1 
Sex, men relative to women 2.73 (0.56-13.23) 0.21 
Seasonal influenza vaccine 1.03 (0.63-1.68) 0.89 
Baseline titer 0.80 (0.68-0.95) .012 
NOTE. CI, conf idence interval; OR. odds ratio. 
titers against 2009 influenza A ( H I N I ) as predictors of pro-
port ion who seroconverted, we found that only unit type was 
a significant predictor, with both essential units and health care 
units having lower proport ions infected than did normal units 
(essential vs normal, P = .007; health care vs normal, P = 
.001). Age (P = .59), sex (P = .89), and baseline titer (P = 
.74) had no effect at this scale. This suggests that although age 
and sex patterns in the units differ, these differences did not 
result in different seroconversion rates other than those attrib-
utable to the associated interventions themselves. 
To assess whether age, sex, or baseline antibody titers had 
any protective effect at the individual level, we performed a 
multiple logistic regression with a separate intercept parameter 
per unit. Seasonal vaccine status, the only intervention we could 
separately quantify, was also included as a parameter. Table 4 
summarizes this multivariate analysis and the corresponding 
odds ratios. Age (P< .001) and initial titer (P = .012) were 
significantly inversely related to the risk of seroconversion after 
accounting for different exposures in the different units, al-
though there was no evidence of effect on the basis of sex 
(P = .21). Seasonal vaccine at the individual level was also not 
a significant predictor of individual seroconversion (P = .89). 
In addition, there was no significant difference in baseline geo-
metric mean antibody titers (GMTs) between those who re-
ceived previous seasonal vaccine and those without (11.2 vs 
15.1; P = .15). 
Epidemic curves. Figure 3 shows the cumulative clinical 
epidemic curves based on reported symptom onset of ARI and/ 
or FRI among those who seroconverted, stratified by unit type 
and compared to the estimated communi ty cumulative epi-
demic curve [24]. The peak of the epidemic for normal units 
occurred earlier than in the essential units, health care worker 
units, and the general community. 
C O N C L U S I O N S 
This is one of the first large serological cohort studies to doc-
ument the effectiveness of combined public health interven-
tions against pandemic influenza. These interventions can be 
performed with minimal disruption of essential services and 
potentially reduce the impact of influenza illness and trans-
mission, leading to lower peak infection rates and point ab-
senteeism. Delaying disease spread may allow other interven-
tions to be instituted, such as vaccination that was only avail-
able later. Our normal units had earlier epidemic peak than did 
the general communi ty and high overall seroconversion rates 
(44%), which are likely due to the younger adult ages and closed 
settings. A similar observation was made in seasonal influenza 
outbreaks in schools (21%-71%) [8, 33] and military camps 
(42%-58%) [6, 7], and dur ing the 2009 pandemic with >30% 
attack rate dur ing a school outbreak [34]. It is therefore im-
portant to reduce influenza transmission in similar closed set-
tings where high attack rates dur ing a short t ime period and 
high absenteeism are undesirable, including schools, boarding 
facilities, long-term elderly care facilities, and essenfial services 
such as health care workers. This may also reduce the chance 
of such settings acting as amplifiers for a novel virus [9, 10, 
35]. 
Our study showed the likely effectiveness of public health 
measures, in particular, enhanced surveillance (daily temper-
ature taking and p rompt ARI reporting) with isolation through 
home medical leave, and segregation of smaller subgroups, on 
the spread of influenza. These measures were effective, easy to 
administer, and sustainable during the entire 2-month epidemic. 
Symptomatic seroconversion was also reduced in the interven-
tion cohorts with marginal significance, suggesting that the in-
terventions proportionally reduced symptomatic cases (a proxy 
for absenteeism). Although seasonal influenza vaccination may 
elicit cross-reactive antibodies against the pandemic strain [20], 
there was no evidence in our study that individuals vaccinated 
against seasonal influenza had lower risk of infection above the 
other interventions. Essential units had delayed onset compared 
o 1.0 -
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Figure 3. Cumulative clinical epidemic curves among those who se-
roconverted for each group, compared wi th estimated community cu-
mulative epidemic curve from GP sentinels. Colored bands indicate sam-
pling times, w i th dark bands representing interquartile range (IQR) a"'' 
light bands representing range (excluding 11 samples taken from 9 to 10 
September 2009). Mult iple acute respiratory illness and/or febnie res-
piratory illness episodes per individual were proportioned equally anti 
attributed to that individual. 
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with normal units but similar to that of the community (Figure 
3), possibly due to community exposures and the effectiveness 
of the public health measures in delaying spread in the military 
setting. 
Our results provide serological evidence to support previous 
observational studies during pandemics where public health mea-
sures designed to reduce transmission such as social distancing 
and restrictions on public gatherings, and isolation and quar-
antine significantly reduced overall mortality in the absence of 
an efficacious vaccine [16, 17, 36], The measures used in our 
study were minimally disruptive and ensured business conti-
nuity by minimizing peak infection rates and point absenteeism 
and can be similarly applied to other closed settings over long 
durations with prior planning. For example, in schools, daily 
temperature taking and symptom monitoring can be imple-
mented on entry, and anyone with respiratory illnesses can be 
referred for medical consult. In addition, social distancing can 
be achieved through students being segregated by classrooms 
or educational levels with staggered entry and exit, breaks and 
meal times, and deferment of school-wide mass gatherings. 
These measures can potentially reduce simultaneous spread 
across classes, without the need for disruptive school closures. 
Health care workers had reduced attack rates compared with 
normal units possibly due to the use of personal protective 
equipment, including wearing of N-95 masks during working 
hours, on top of the enhanced surveillance. Health care workers 
also had lower seroconversion rates compared with essential 
units, although this was not statistically significant (RR, 0.66; 
P = .22). At the same time, 11% of health care workers showed 
serological evidence of infection, highlighting the possible role 
played by nonoccupational acquisition of influenza. Although 
health care staff would have similar infection risks from settings 
outside their work environment, they might reasonably be ex-
pected to have higher occupational exposure to pandemic in-
fluenza cases and thus would have been expected to have had 
higher infection risks. The combination of personal protective 
equipment, together with enhanced surveillance, may have re-
duced seroconversion rates among health care workers despite 
their higher risk exposure. These strategies may be similarly 
applied to health care workers in other settings, reducing their 
risk of infection and minimizing disruption to the critical pro-
vision of health care. 
We have also found that age and baseline antibody titers 
were independently inversely correlated with seroconversion. 
This is consistent with other observations that the pandemic 
affects young adults with relative sparing of older age groups 
[19, 35]. A recent study found that preexisting antibodies may 
protect against pandemic influenza infection [19], whereas 
higher baseline titers may also independently reduce the like-
lihood of infection and consequently seroconversion [20, 37, 
38]. Additional studies are needed to determine the effective-
ness of baseline antibodies in reducing influenza infection. 
Limitations of this study include the relatively few groups for 
comparison and the study's inability to separate the incremental 
impact of each individual intervention. These are intrinsic issues 
with observational cohort studies, even preplanned ones like 
ours, and additional studies should aim to look at other inter-
ventions, whether in combination or individually, where oppor-
tunities exist. We did not monitor participants after the epidemic 
to determine if cumulative case numbers trended toward parity 
over time for the different groups. However, national and military 
surveillance data showed that postepidemic ILI rates and per-
centage of ILI positivity for 2009 influenza A(HINI ) were low, 
and no major pandemic influenza outbreaks were detected in 
the military. 
The measures adopted by the Singapore military were simple 
to implement rapidly, and the data reported here suggest that 
these public health measures—in particular, enhanced surveil-
lance with isolation and social segregation—are likely to be 
effective in limiting influenza transmission and reducing the 
high attack rates during an epidemic in closed environments. 
These should be considered in preparation for future epidem-
ics and pandemics, as well as in developing countries where 
pandemic vaccine coverage has not reached sufficient levels 
to prevent future outbreaks. 
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Chapter Thirteen 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Although there have been many studies on different aspects of influenza over the 
years, there are still many areas that we do not understand about this important global 
threat. The 10 publications described in this thesis help to address some of these gaps 
and provide a substantial contribution to the existing scientific knowledge on 
influenza and its prevention. The findings from these studies are important for public 
health decision makers in this post-pandemic period during the revision of pandemic 
preparedness and response plans, and also to reduce the spread and impact of future 
seasonal influenza epidemics and outbreaks. This final chapter revisits the different 
concepts discussed in the previous chapters to identify lessons learned and their 
importance to policy making, suggest possible strategies for future implementation, 
and raises outstanding questions that need to be addressed in future studies. It also 
presents in the relevant context the limitations of these studies and the need for further 
studies to address some of these issues. This will enable researchers and policy 
makers to use the evidence base created by this thesis for planning in their local 
context. 
Influenza in the Tropics 
It is well known that influenza spreads globally with substantial morbidity and 
mortality. However, the spread and impact of influenza in the tropics has not been 
extensively studied. As shown in the third chapter and previous studies that I have 
published, tropical regions such as Singapore are not spared from the impact of 
influenza. In addifion, many of the seasonal epidemics and pandemics that circulate 
globally also affect Singapore with regularity. However, the reasons for the unique 
timing of spread in terms of the main epidemic months remain unknown and are 
important to understand the spread of influenza in the tropics. One hypothesis for the 
different patterns in the tropics relate to the timing of the global circulation of 
inf luenza viruses. Influenza viruses continually circulate in the tropics, especially in 
East and South-East Asia, resulting in overlapping epidemics which may seed the 
epidemics in temperate regions in both the northern and southern hemispheres (1). 
Other studies have shown that influenza viruses transmit better in animal models in 
condit ions of lower temperature and lower humidity, while high humidity reduces 
viral survival (2,3). This may explain the high transmission during winter seasons in 
temperate countries, but does not fully explain the year round transmission with 
similar overall impact in the tropics without seasons and where high humidity 
abounds. Another hypothesis is that the transmission of influenza in temperate regions 
may be mostly by aerosol spread, while transmission in the tropics may be mostly by 
contact spread (4). As the evidence for influenza transmission in the tropics is lacking, 
more studies in this region on the circulation of influenza viruses is important. This 
may unlock the secrets to the global circulation of influenza viruses, and allow for 
international measures to be developed to reduce spread, especially during pandemics. 
These epidemiological studies should not only be focused on a few large developed 
cities in the tropical and sub-tropical regions where good data is available across time, 
but should also look collect data f rom less developed cities and rural areas to paint a 
more complete picture. Where data is unavailable, new surveillance studies should be 
set up to start data collection and lay the foundation for future studies. 
The high baseline circulation of influenza throughout the year in the tropics with 
irregular t iming of epidemic waves may also reduce the awareness of the population 
to the threat of influenza. This is unlike in temperate countries where influenza results 
in a reasonably consistent large epidemic wave during the winter months, prompting 
measures such as vaccination to be taken by the local population. At this moment, 
there are few studies exploring the link between the patterns of influenza spread to the 
knowledge, attitudes and practices of the local populations. This will influence health 
education programs, public awareness and actions such as seasonal vaccination, and 
this should also be an area of future study. These studies will be crucial for those 
making policies to raise awareness of, and to advocate for, the use of preventive 
measures such as vaccination and other non-pharmaceutical measures. 
Importance of Surveillance 
Good surveillance systems, including laboratory capacity, are needed to answer the 
key questions on the spread and impact of influenza in the tropics and other regions, 
to examine the constant transmission of influenza in the tropics, and to determine the 
impact on the local population. Surveillance systems have to be customized for the 
local population, and be used on a routine basis to ensure that they are well managed 
and fully operational during epidemics and pandemics when they are most urgently 
required. 
Surveillance is also key to the successful response to any epidemic or pandemic. As 
many of the studies in this thesis have shown, good preparedness and response 
planning is important to reduce the overall impact of influenza epidemics. The overall 
impact, which is influenced by the rate and extent of spread (including sub-
populations at higher risk of infection), and the clinical severity of the disease, will 
determine the scope of the response. This is important as the response to any public 
health event must be proportional to the impact of the event. A disproportionate 
response is undesirable - for example, an over-zealous response compared to the 
impact will result in resource wastage and indirect losses due to the response 
measures which may be more severe than the event itself. Examples of the latter 
include closure of borders which can affect travel and trade and negatively impact on 
the economy; while closure of schools for prolonged periods will result in economic 
costs and social issues. Conversely, an inadequate response will result in ineffective 
measures which will waste precious resources while not adequately reducing the 
impact of the event. As historical epidemics and pandemics (and previous trends) do 
not fully predict the outcome of future events (5), good surveillance systems are 
therefore needed to enable early epidemic detection for prompt measures to be taken, 
and also to determine key parameters such as the rate and extent of spread and the 
disease severity so that the response can be proportional to the impact. 
Surveillance, especially laboratory-based surveillance of seasonal influenza, is also 
important to allow for a better understanding of the seasonal burden of disease and 
patterns of transmission, such that comparisons of impact can be made during 
epidemics and pandemics for proportional responses to be instituted (6). Surveillance 
must therefore be part of a routine system to ensure that capacities and capabilities are 
present to answer these critical questions. As local settings are unique, it is essential 
that surveillance strategies are tailored to the local situation, and this requires more 
local research to be performed. 
However, influenza poses substantial and unique challenges for surveillance. As 
shown in Chapter Six, while it is possible to use various clinical symptom complexes 
to better identify influenza cases from non-influenza cases, it is inherently difficult to 
completely differentiate between them using clinical presentation alone. Where 
possible, the use of clinical syndromes or symptom complexes should be 
supplemented by laboratory testing. The results from Chapter Four are similarly 
important for policy and decision makers, as they show that the estimation of 
infection rates using relatively simple ILI surveillance in primary healthcare settings, 
together with laboratory testing, can yield estimates that are comparable to more 
complex serological tests. The estimated numbers of laboratory tests that are needed 
during an epidemic to determine the epidemic curve and infection rates are also 
relatively small compared to the population at risk. This suggests that lower resourced 
countries and local areas can obtain samples from sentinel sites and send these 
samples to regional reference laboratories for testing, or to develop their own 
laboratory capacity as part of the national core capacity building to meet the 
requirements of the WHO ' s International Health Regulations. As the surveillance 
system that is most appropriate for each setting will vary according to the population 
distribution and interactions, additional feasibility studies should be performed in the 
local setting to determine the optimal surveillance system. This will need to take into 
account the healthcare system and available resources, and be tested and improved 
upon during local epidemics. 
Throughout the 2009 pandemic, simple ILI and laboratory based surveillance systems 
were able to provide data on the development of epidemics early enough so that 
measures could be taken to reduce their spread, and to monitor the general shape of 
the epidemic curve. However, as the study in Chapter Four has shown, more data is 
required to accurately determine the overall infection rates. Using only unadjusted ILI 
numbers or laboratory-confirmed cases alone will result in gross underestimates in the 
infection rates, and may consequently result in overestimation of severity estimates 
such as hospitalization and mortality rates. This occurred in the early data from 
Mexico during the 2009 pandemic which suggested high severity estimates, and 
prompted global fear that the pandemic would be much more severe than it actually 
was (7). In this context, it is necessary to have good data on the proportion of milder 
influenza cases and the health seeking behavior of clinical influenza cases among 
other variables, and this may be difficult to come by during the early phases of a 
pandemic. Additional studies will therefore have to be promptly performed during a 
pandemic to provide these data, and since it is often difficult to design and execute a 
study after the pandemic's onset, these study designs and resources have to be in place 
before the next pandemic. 
Serological studies are a useful tool to provide good estimates of infection rates, to 
provide estimates of parameters such as the proportion of clinical to subclinical cases, 
and together with surveys to determine health seeking behavior of these cases. As 
shown in Chapter Five, the serological studies in different cohorts in Singapore 
allowed us to determine the extent of possible infection in the general community 
which showed that the majority of the population remained susceptible to infection, 
prompting pandemic influenza vaccination programs thereafter. It also showed the 
relative extent of possible infection in different sub-populations, and the predictors of 
infection in these populations. Where resources allow, serological studies should be 
considered as part of the surveillance system and study designs put in place a priori to 
enable prompt activation of data collection during the emergence of a novel influenza 
virus. These studies should also be done during seasonal epidemics to increase the 
understanding of infection rates and influenza transmission, and to show the 
effectiveness of interventions. However, serological studies have their limitations 
which include the time lag to detection with current laboratory technology, the 
resource intensive nature from the laboratory testing, and with cohort studies where 
unique blood collections have to be performed. 
For public health planners, it is therefore important to consider all possible 
surveillance solutions and adopt the best mix given the available local resources. 
Countries with sufficient resources should consider having different surveillance 
systems for cross referencing, and to maximize the advantages of each method while 
covering for their individual deficiencies. 
Selection of Sentinel Sites 
Sampling from sentinel sites is important for any surveillance system because it is not 
always possible to perform a comprehensive survey in the community or to sample 
from all possible sites due to the large sample sizes required. Sentinel sites therefore 
provide a reflection of the population being studied. In the selection of sentinel sites, 
it is important that these are chosen to enable early detection of epidemics, 
representativeness, and ease of data collection. In this aspect, as shown by the studies 
in this thesis, semi-closed communities that are closely linked with the general 
community and are at high risk for transmission are possible sentinel sites. This is 
because they often amplify any disease that is circulating in the community, and are 
more easily detected because of the intrinsic monitoring systems in place. For 
example, the military in the Singapore setting is similar to a boarding school where 
young adults gather during the week and return to the community during the 
weekends, often visiting community locations which provide a good conduit for 
disease transmission. These include malls, cinemas, nightclubs, religious and social 
events, and other similar mass gatherings. It is not surprising that some of the first 
2009 H l N l outbreaks in Singapore occurred in the military setting, and some of these 
were linked to an outbreak in a popular nightclub. 
Other early outbreaks in Singapore occurred in a church camp and school - similar 
semi-closed settings. In addition, the military provides free healthcare to the camp 
population (although individuals can also visit external healthcare facilities when they 
are outside the camp), and this ensures a relatively captive population where the 
majority of cases in an outbreak will visit the same facility and be easily noticed by 
the healthcare workers. This is in contrast to other mass gathering settings where 
individuals at the gathering disperse soon after and visit separate healthcare facilities 
when ill. Although it is certainly possible to piece together the epidemiologic puzzle 
to determine the presence and source of the outbreak, it may require more time and 
may only identify larger outbreaks. 
However, in other countries, militaries may or may not be equally good sentinel 
surveillance sites as their structure and interactions with the general populations 
differ. This is especially true in larger countries where military camps may be located 
far from major population and travel centers. Schools, on the other hand, are quite 
similar in structure across countries - being located near population centers and 
having a population made up of children, youths, and young adults who frequently 
participate in mass gatherings. Schools are therefore a good setting for the 
surveillance of influenza and other diseases and sentinel surveillance sites can be set 
up in schools, and even within classes in each school. Monitoring of school students 
can be easily done by teachers, and in some schools onsite healthcare staff, as they 
have a close and consistent relationship with the students. Such surveillance systems 
will have to be routine so they are functioning well ahead of any epidemic. Setting up 
surveillance systems in these settings during an epidemic itself is inherently difficult 
due to the approval processes, logistics, and training needed. I was part of a school 
surveillance study during the 2009 H l N l epidemic in Singapore which was started at 
the onset of the epidemic itself, and can attest to the difficulties in setting up and 
obtaining good data from such a project. In comparison, the military surveillance 
studies shown in this thesis were much easier to execute due to the existing 
surveillance programs in the military which familiarizes staff to the different 
components and issues in performing surveillance. This ensures that even new 
systems such as collection of samples for serological testing, which is not routine, is 
easily performed because the surveillance principles are similar. 
Measures for Preparedness and Response 
While surveillance is necessary to detect the impending epidemic and determine the 
likely impact, it is important that measures are taken in response to the available 
information to reduce the impact - either on the spread of the virus, or the clinical 
severity of the infections. 
Vaccines are one of the most effective measures to reduce both the spread and 
severity of infection. Seasonal vaccination has been shown to be effective in reducing 
infection rates, and have been encouragcd for use in the general population (8) and 
with special emphasis in high-risk populations. However, as mentioned above, 
vaccination uptake rates in the tropics have been low, and this may be due to a lack of 
awareness and the behaviors of the local populations although there is a lack of 
evidence in this area. Additional studies will therefore have to be done to understand 
the reasons behind the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of local populations to 
enable measures to be taken to increase the vaccination uptake rates. 
Chapter Eight suggests that some cross protection exists between different influenza 
strains, and previous studies have suggested that the elderly may be less affected by 
the 2009 H l N l pandemic strain due to pre-existing antibodies possibly obtained from 
pre-1957 H l N l infections. However, the serological studies in this thesis in Chapters 
Five and Twelve found no significant protective relationship between previous 
seasonal influenza vaccination and serological conversion to the 2009 H l N l 
pandemic strain. This is similar to a recent case-control study in Australia which 
showed no reduction in pandemic infection rates among those who had received the 
seasonal influenza vaccine (9). This Australian study also found no harm from 
seasonal influenza vaccine in increasing pandemic infection, which had been 
previously suggested as a possibility by a Canadian study (10). The latter may be due 
to the seasonal vaccine preventing natural seasonal influenza infection which provides 
non-specific temporal immunity, therefore leading to a higher infection rate among 
those immunized against previously circulating seasonal strains (11). There is 
currently a lack of studies showing how serological cross protection from infection or 
vaccination actually translates into protection against clinical infection, and a possible 
reduction in clinical severity even if full protection from infection is not achieved. 
More research is clearly needed in this area as this will influence policies on seasonal 
influenza vaccination for the general population, especially if vaccination reduces 
natural infection and immunity against different influenza strains. 
Another research area that is promising is the development of universal influenza 
vaccines which are effective against a range of influenza subtypes and strains (12,13). 
This will address the major issues surrounding existing vaccines which are difficult to 
deploy during a pandemic - current stockpiling strategies involving candidate pre-
pandemic vaccines for early deployment is a gamble on an unknown future pandemic 
subtype and strain, while the development of well-matched pandemic vaccines during 
the pandemic itself takes a long time (up to four to six months, excluding production 
of sufficient quantities to meet global demand). The availability of a universal vaccine 
would make the stockpiling of pre-pandemic vaccines more compelling and perhaps 
even cost effective for a wide range of countries. 
In the absence of vaccines during a pandemic, anti-viral drugs and other non-
pharmaceutical interventions are appropriate supplements that can be synergistic 
when used in combination. Many countries have been stockpiling anti-virals for 
treatment of influenza cases, pre-exposure prophylaxis of groups at high-risk of 
infection, and post-exposure prophylaxis of close contacts. However, there are few 
studies showing their effectiveness during epidemics or pandemics. 
In Chapters Nine to Eleven, we have explored a novel use of these anti-virals and 
have shown conclusively that oseltamivir can be used for the protection of unique 
groups through ring prophylaxis to prevent the spread of influenza while maintaining 
their work funcfions. With this evidence, it is now possible to consider close 
monitoring of these essential personnel or populations at high-risk of infection, and to 
initiate ring prophylaxis only when initial outbreaks are detected. This is a shift from 
previous preparedness plans and should be considered in the future as a possible 
effective and efficient use of national stockpiles to protect essential personnel without 
the need for prolonged pre-exposure prophylaxis, which expends large quantities of 
antivirals and are difficult to time well to coincide with the local epidemic (14). Such 
a strategy will be applicable to groups where it is necessary to maintain their work 
functions, where there are high-levels of group interaction, and where it is possible to 
monitor for initial outbreaks - examples of such settings would include hospitals, 
militaries and civil defense, and essential public services. Stockpiling of anti-viral 
drugs is costly even for well-resourced countries and are not likely to be cost-effective 
in the longer term for lower-resourced countries where two-thirds of the world's 
population reside (15). It is therefore important to consider different ways of 
maximizing the use of these drugs. Additional health economic studies are needed to 
determine the cost effectiveness of ring prophylaxis as a strategy to reduce the overall 
impact of the disease and reducing the need for treatment doses of the anti-viral drugs 
since less people are infected, against the quantities of the drug needed for the 
intervention. 
For these pharmaceutical and other non-pharmaceutical interventions, one of the 
biggest challenges is in selecting the most appropriate set of measures at the global 
level that are proportional to the impact of the pandemic, and at the local level for the 
respective epidemics. This not only involves determining the impact, which poses its 
own challenges as mentioned previously, but also in the effectiveness and timing of 
the public health measures. There is a lack of field studies to show the effectiveness of 
individual or combinations of public health measures in real life. Such research is 
difficult because it is often not possible to perform randomized trials during an 
epidemic, and observational studies have to be done to determine the effectiveness of 
prevailing measures in whatever setting is available. This necessitates the setting up of 
large scale research studies in different settings during various epidemics and 
pandemics to explore the large range of possible combinations of measures in 
different unique settings. 
Given the demographic, economic, socio-cultural, political, and many other 
differences between settings, measures that are effective and feasible in one setting 
may not accrue the same level of effectiveness or feasibility in another setting. For 
example, the acceptance of (and compliance to) the measures by the local population 
is equally as important as there are many social, cultural, and economic reasons why 
different measures may be more or less acceptable in the local setting. These also 
have to be determined through behavioral research. In addition, access to health 
education, risk communication, and access to health care is important. Surge 
capacities may have to be considered in implementing many of these strategies. Given 
limited resources, it is also essential that the set of public health measures maximizes 
the use of available resources to ensure the best possible outcome. Health services 
research such as cost-effectiveness studies and resource optimization studies need to 
be performed in the local setting. 
As there is a current lack of epidemiological and field data, it is also important to 
consider mathematical modeling studies to provide some evidence on the 
effectiveness of various strategies for policy making in the absence of definite studies. 
As mentioned in Chapter Seven, mathematical models can provide suggestions for 
decision makers to consider, while field studies such as those shown in Chapters Eight 
to Twelve are essential both to prove the effectiveness of the measures suggested by 
the models, and also to provide additional data for future models. While there are 
many proponents and opponents of mathematical modeling, similar to many other 
situations, there is always potential merit in any activity but they must be used in 
moderation and in the correct context. Decision making using only mathematical 
models may be dangerous, especially if the models use assumptions obtained from 
other settings and when policy makers attempt to use these models to predict the 
future. Similarly, using only the limited epidemiological field studies available may 
result in similar problems if policy makers attempt to extrapolate these findings out of 
context. It is therefore essential to base critical decisions on all available information 
and tools, which often include both mathematical models and epidemiological field 
studies, and to analyze the context and assumptions under which they were 
performed. It is also essential to encourage additional research to validate these 
decisions where the opportunity arises, and this requires pre-planning and long term 
commitment. The later chapters of this thesis provide some epidemiological evidence 
to back up the findings of these models, as well as generating a new hypothesis for 
future studies. 
Study Limitations 
There are two key limitations for the overall thesis in addition to the limitations 
mentioned in the individual studies. One important limitations is the fact that many of 
the studies were performed in the military setting which is made up of young adults, 
mostly male, and mostly fit individuals (although conscription includes almost all 
fitness and medical conditions and provides appropriate job scopes to match the 
individual). In addition, the military is a semi-closed environment which has its own 
unique social mixing characteristics which will affect the spread of disease. While the 
results of this study are relevant to similar groups, including other semi-closed 
environments, further studies are needed in the general population and specific sub-
populations of interest such as schools, healthcare facilities, and among high-risk 
individuals to ensure that these findings are also applicable in those settings. The 
collection of studies in this thesis provides a good basis for hypothesis generation. 
Another limitation to consider is the use of Singapore as the focus of the studies. 
Singapore is a unique city-state at the confluence of global travel, and a melting pot of 
different cultures and populations. As such, Singapore is able to provide an overall 
representation of the diversity of the tropics in a relatively small environment which is 
easy to study. At the same time, it is important to note that Singapore is an urban and 
well-resourced country and while it lends itself well to the availability of data for 
these studies, the same may not be available in other countries in the region or 
globally. In addition, social and behavioral differences will exist between countries, 
and socio-economic groups. It is therefore important to consider the findings of these 
studies as evidence on the importance of research on influenza and other diseases in 
the tropics, and to place additional emphasis on performing addifional studies in the 
tropical regions for local relevance. 
Conclusions 
This thesis has contributed additional evidence on the spread of influenza in the 
tropics and the management of influenza outbreaks. It has answered some critical 
questions on the impact of influenza in the tropics, and proven the hypotheses on the 
effectiveness of various interventions such as anti-viral prophylaxis, and public health 
measures during influenza outbreaks. It has also generated additional questions and 
hypotheses for future studies such as the possible cross protection of influenza 
vaccines, and the need for better clinical and laboratory diagnosis for clinical 
management and surveillance of influenza. The results of these studies should, in the 
near future, be validated in other sub-populations and in other settings to show their 
accuracy over a wider range of scenarios. 
In addition, there are many similarities between influenza and other respiratory 
viruses, and influenza can be used as a good model for the management of outbreaks 
in the event of the emergence of yet unknown respiratory viruses. The SARS outbreak 
showed that these events can occur without warning, and there is the likelihood of 
another occurring in the future. Good preparedness and planning is therefore essential 
if we are to withstand the impact of future outbreaks and pandemics. Policy makers 
must therefore rely on the best available evidence and work together with researchers 
to ensure that evidence-based policies are made for the benefit of society. 
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